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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
We are four students from three different universities with a common interest in the recent 
political and social changes in the Middle East and North Africa, especially in Egypt. Thanks to 
the extensive use of social media, we have been able to follow the developments closely from 
Denmark, and this gave us an inclination to travel to Egypt and experience the dynamics on the 
ground. 
We have all followed the uprisings in Egypt during 2011, how the people claimed their freedom 
and took the streets by the dozens in January 2011, the uprisings which led to the ousting of 
President Mubarak, and how the military council has been the highest authority since. It has been 
a period of disappointment and many young people have lost their lives in the struggle for 
freedom, but many keep fighting.  
Horrendous pictures and videos documenting a violent treatment of protesters have flourished on 
the Internet, while the official accounts from the same episodes have been different. The 
protesters have accused the military of violence, while the military and the state owned media 
have claimed that the military have only been acting in self defense. These completely different 
portrayals of reality arouse our curiosity about the effect of social media in this regard. During 
one year and a half the access to citizen produced documentation from protests and events in 
Egypt have been increasingly accessible online, but what about the part of the Egyptian 
population with no access to social media? Are they exposed to these documentations and aware 
of the state media telling only one side of the story? With these questions in mind we traveled to 
Egypt to do research for two months in April and May of 2012, and the present project is the 
result of this stay. 
1.2 Problem area and problem statement 
During the last year international media has focused on social media as an important factor in the 
Egyptian revolution. Social media has allowed traditional news consumers to become active 
participants in all stages of the production, dissemination, and consumption of news, giving a 
voice to people, who were previously limited to more passive forms of news consumption. 
Citizen journalism has emerged to be an important news source, and citizen produced 
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documentation of what is going on at demonstrations, clashes or elections is increasingly 
representing an alternative to the perception of reality portrayed in state media. However, a 
relatively low number of Egyptians have access to the Internet and this is raising the question 
whether these documentations are reaching out to the Egyptians or only circulate among those 
having access to the Internet mainly in Egypt’s bigger cities? Since the revolution there has been 
an increased focus on making the video material accessible for as many as possible, and this has 
led to an emergence of different initiatives with this purpose. One of them is the Kazeboon 
campaign, which we have chosen as a point of departure for our project. Kazeboon, meaning 
‘Military Liars’ in Arabic, is sharing documentation of military violations by screening citizen-
produced videos uploaded on YouTube in streets and public places in Egypt. The campaign has 
no leaders and it is based online with a Facebook page, a Twitter account and a YouTube 
channel where people can upload videos, communicate and announce screenings. Anybody 
interested can organize a screening in the name of Kazeboon by putting up a screen and show a 
Kazeboon video in a public place. 
International media like Al Jazeera and BBC News have described Kazeboon as very successful, 
and as having a strong momentum due to the context from which it emerged: “Its success 
reflects widespread and growing discontent with the ruling military council in Egypt (...)“ 
(Edwin Lane 2012). The campaign caught our intention because of its autonomous methods, 
non-hierarchical structure and the way the campaign seeks to take social media to the streets. We 
are curious to know how it concretizes the bridging between social media and the streets, what 
elements have contributed to its success and how it is perceived among its receivers. 
Our target group is young Egyptians who have been both senders and receivers of the Kazeboon 
campaign, because they have attended screenings and also participated actively in the campaign 
by arranging screenings or contributing with material to the campaign (see chapter 1.3 
Delimitation of target group). We are furthermore interested in how the online media affects the 
credibility of information and finally the question of outreach. To what extent can the Kazeboon 
be considered to move within a circle of people agreeing that the military are liars?  
All these considerations lead to our problem definition: 
 
How do the structure and implementation of the Kazeboon campaign affect its diffusion among 
its receivers in an Egyptian context, and how is it perceived among our informants?     
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1.3 Delimitation of target group 
Our project takes its point of departure in the information-sharing campaign Kazeboon. One of 
the campaign's main concepts is a flat governance structure where everybody can join and share 
their own videos and information. The receivers of Kazeboon get videos and information about 
the campaign, forward them to others and participate actively by organizing screenings. This 
creates an interactive community, where the receivers play the role as both senders and receivers 
in the information-sharing process:  
 
A central consequence of social media is that the distinction between the three outlined 
categories, social media activists, conventional journalists, and news consumers become blurred 
and therefore the same person might easily fit into all three categories (Mollerup 2011: 4). 
 
We base our delimitation of target group on this notion of a blurred distinction between activists 
and news consumers without looking at ‘conventional journalists’. Our target group is young 
Egyptians in the age of 20-30 years who are taking part in the Kazeboon campaign by both being 
activists and news consumers. Our selection of informants is gender balanced and we have 
endeavored to get informants from different social backgrounds (see chapter 4.3 Informants). 
In the beginning of the project our intention was to focus on young Egyptians that are both 
receivers and senders and active on social media platforms. However, we found it of big interest 
and importance to talk to people without Internet access as it could give us a more representative 
view on how the Kazeboon campaign is received, since the majority of the Egyptian population 
does not have access to the Internet. Because of our limited time in the field we were not able to 
reach receivers of Kazeboon without Internet access, since we did not have enough contacts and 
there was no Kazeboon screenings in Cairo in our period of fieldwork (see chapter 4.3 
Informants). 
Of course it can be argued that this is a weakness of our project, since it excludes the possibility 
to get first hand experiences that explain how Kazeboon is perceived when only experienced 
through the screenings in the streets. Furthermore it is one of the main features of the campaign 
that it tries to reach the public through other means than the Internet, and we are missing out on 
an important source of information to elaborate on this. But this does not mean that we do not 
include the aspect of the screenings in public places, since our informants have all attended at 
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least one screening. The fact that they have experienced both the online and offline approach of 
the campaign makes them able to reflect on the two different aspects of the information outreach 
of Kazeboon. Our informants also explain how people at the screenings react to the videos. 
Although this can only be characterized as our informants' own personal observations and 
perceptions of the receivers without Internet, it gives us an idea of the reactions to the Kazeboon 
screenings.  
 
1.4 Concept clarification 
 
We will now define the concepts of social media, revolution in Egypt, and online/offline, that we 
will use in the chapter about the Egyptian context and throughout the project, as we define and 
use the concepts in a certain way.  
1.4.1 Social media 
When we use the term social media, we refer to the definition of social media as mainly 
comprised of user-generated content, which allows many-to-many interaction (Mollerup 2011: 
5). In this project we will focus mainly on YouTube, Facebook and Twitter. YouTube because 
this is where the videos used in Kazeboon are uploaded to, and Facebook and Twitter because 
they are the main channels for distributing news, videos and information about Kazeboon 
screenings and events. 
1.4.2 Revolution in Egypt 
Some scholars and experts, international and Egyptian, abstain from calling the uprisings in 
Egypt a revolution. This is based on the argument that nothing has actually changed since 
Mubarak was forced to step down in February 2011. The military is at power now, just as it has 
been the case during the last 60 years. Therefore it is argued that there has not been a system 
change and it cannot be named a revolution. 
However, after a parliamentary election in the fall of 2011 and the first election of a President 
taking place at this writing (May 2012), we see social change happening. Furthermore according 
to the young Egyptians with whom we have conducted our interviews, there is no doubt that 
what happened in January 2011 was a revolution, we have also chosen to call it such. 
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1.4.3 Online/offline 
We use the definition online to describe activities that happen on the Internet, while we use the 
definition offline to describe the screenings of Kazeboon. The screenings happen in public spaces in 
Egypt and we consider them offline, since they do not require Internet access. 
We are aware that this distinction can be questioned, since while using the Internet, for instance by 
interacting on social media, you are always present in the offline and it is a part of your physical 
presence. We have though found it necessary to use the definitions online and offline when 
distinguishing between activities on the Internet and in the streets. 
 
2. Theory of science 
 
In this chapter we will introduce the theory of science that we have chosen as the overall 
theoretical framework for this project. 
The scope of this project is to shed light on how the Kazeboon campaign is understood by our 
informants, who are involved in the campaign as both senders and receivers. This understanding 
is shaped by their Egyptian culture, history and the society. Likewise our interpretations as 
researchers are affected by our own pre-understandings. It is important to take these factors into 
account when we examine our field of research. Knowledge is a product of the meeting between 
both pre-understandings and in our role as researchers we will bring our own pre-understandings 
into play. With this ontological approach to the field of research, the project enrolls in a 
philosophical hermeneutic line of thought. To elaborate on our theory of science we need to 
consider our analytical approach, which is influenced by our different academic backgrounds, 
and our analytical approach creates a framework for our project. 
2.1 Analytical approach to the field 
Our analytical approach is interdisciplinary in the sense that we are four students from three 
different universities and different academic fields: Communication, Anthropology, and Middle 
Eastern Studies. In writing this project together we will combine and make use of our different 
approaches and knowledge. 
To understand the context we are working in we will make use of the in depth knowledge about 
the social, political and economic conditions in Egypt from Middle Eastern Studies. In our target 
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group analysis we will combine methods from Communication and Anthropology by conducting 
semi-structured interviews in combination with observations and informal interviews. In our 
analysis we will combine communication theory and our knowledge from all three disciplines in 
order to get a more in depth understanding of our target group as we analyze our field from three 
different perspectives. 
During the process we have discussed the strengths and weaknesses of our different approaches 
in relation to our specific field in Egypt and have chosen the different analytical and 
methodological approaches according to our objectives. In our theory of science we have chosen 
to approach our field of research inspired by the way the hermeneutic circle is conceptualized in 
philosophical hermeneutics, which we will elaborate on in the following. 
2.2 Philosophical Hermeneutics 
Our approach to our field of research is inspired by the concept of philosophical hermeneutics 
explained by the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer. He argues that the pre-condition to 
any understanding is a pre-understanding of the case or relation one wishes to understand 
(Højberg 2009: 309). According to Gadamer the human understanding is closely related to the 
everyday life of the individual and its life world, and every individual has its own horizon which 
is both determined and limited by the pre-understandings shaped by culture, history and society 
(Ibid.: 322). The horizon can be broadened and changed through language dialogue, which can 
lead to a fusion of horizons, that can cause new understandings (Ibid.: 323). Gadamer re-
conceptualizes the hermeneutic circle first introduced by the German philosopher Martin 
Heidegger. In Gadamer's optics the circle illustrates the relation between the interpreter and the 
object, and these two are in a constant movement in both directions with no beginning and no 
end, creating a continuous circulation (Ibid.: 320). 
2.3 Hermeneutics in the project 
In our project we are inspired by the philosophical hermeneutic approach, as our understanding 
of the field is shaped by culture, history and society, which shape our pre-understandings. 
In the hermeneutic circle the interpreter as well as the object is part of the circle influencing the 
understanding simultaneously. This means that we as interpreters are brought into play with the 
aim to clarify our pre-understandings of and prejudices towards the object in focus, which is our 
informants and the Kazeboon campaign. 
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The hermeneutic approach supports our wish to examine the informants' own understanding of 
and reflections on the campaign having in mind, that we influence our informants' statements in 
our interviews. Both our informants and us bring our own pre-understandings to the conversation 
as an inevitable element, and thus the creation of new understanding emerges in the meeting 
between our informants and us. The fusion of our different horizons thus leads to new 
understandings of our field. An example of a fusion of horizons is how our informants have 
affected our understanding of the military, as our perception of the military has become more 
negative. 
We perceive our informants' statements with a theoretical perspective developed in another 
context than the Egyptian, and we analyze the elements in Kazeboon that we find important by 
reading it in our optics, thus we influence our analytical results. 
Our pre-understandings are shaped by our educational background, which includes our academic 
schooling in theories and analytical approaches. We keep in mind that we cannot avoid bringing 
our own pre-understandings into our project, which we draw on both consciously and 
unconsciously. It is therefore important to reflect on the fact that the Kazeboon campaign has 
been developed in a different social and political context than our own. Our informant's pre-
understandings are shaped by their culture, history and society, and it is therefore important that 
we understand the context we are working in. We will therefore describe the Egyptian context in 
the following chapter in order to set the frame for our analysis of the Kazeboon campaign. 
 
3. The Egyptian context 
 
In this chapter we will introduce the context in which we are carrying out our analysis. We will 
describe the Egyptian media landscape and how it has changed with the emergence of the 
Internet and social media, next how these tools have had an impact on the revolution and on our 
target field. Finally we will explain the context from which the Kazeboon campaign has emerged 
and how it operates. 
As part of the recent uprisings in the Arab World, millions of Egyptians from a variety of socio-
economic and religious backgrounds went to the streets on the 25th of January 2011 and 
protested against the increasing poverty, unemployment, police brutality and the government 
 9 
corruption of Hosni Mubarak and his government, who had ruled the country for 30 years 
(Canalley 2012). After 18 days of massive protest and pressure, the people succeeded in toppling 
Mubarak as president on the 11th of February 2011 (Ibid.). After this, the supreme council of 
armed forces (SCAF) took responsibility of the transition period and promised to transfer the 
power to a democratically elected government within six months. However, this did not happen 
and they have been ruling the country since (May 2012). During the revolution the military 
council was claiming to support the people’s movement, but after continuous postponements of 
handing over the power and clampdowns on protests, there has been an increasing opposition 
against them. People are divided in their relation to SCAF; some perceive them as a stabilizing 
necessity for the country, others as a mere continuation of the regime of Mubarak. 
3.1 Media in Egypt 
The level of freedom of the press in Egypt declined in 2011 as a result of a crackdown prior to 
and during the November 2010 parliamentary elections. This included legal harassment, spurious 
arrests, and violations of due process against journalists and bloggers (Freedom House 2011). 
Mubarak had an ambivalent attitude toward the press, which was evident in that, although he 
allowed opposition parties and their publications to exist, there were continuous cases of arrests 
and abuse of journalists. Furthermore, the absence of true democratic practice and real political 
participation left the emerging oppositional parties and their papers without a real base of 
popular support. This caused a lack of trust that limited their credibility in the eyes of the 
Egyptian people (Khamis 2011: 2). A number of privately owned newspapers have emerged 
during the era of Mubarak and they are referred to as independent media. But the fact that these 
media are privately owned does not necessarily make them independent. There are several cases 
where reporters from these independent media have lost their jobs as a consequence of 
expressions against the regime (Hamamou 2011).  Despite this, some of the independent media 
have not kept away from criticizing President Mubarak on its pages, and has thus upheld a 
considerable margin of press freedom (Abdulla 2006: 2).  
 
However, the era of President Mubarak also witnessed significant developments that affected the 
Egyptian media landscape. This includes the introduction of private satellite television channels 
and growing Internet accessibility. The launch of satellite television in 1985 opened up for a high 
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number of national, regional, international and private satellite channels and a new space for 
political communication, breaking the ability of state control of the flow of information. The use 
of Internet as a public network started to gain momentum in the early 1990s and since then, the 
number of people using the Internet has been on a continuous steep rise (Lynch 2011: 2). 
3.2 Internet in Egypt 
In 2003 Egypt had three million Internet users, five million by 2005 and by the end of 2011 the 
number had raised to more than 21 million constituting 26,4 percent of the total population 
(Internet World Stats 2012). Open Net Initiative estimated in 2009, that 75 percent of the Internet 
users were connected from private computers, whereas one fourth of Egyptian Internet users 
were visiting Internet cafés to get online (OpenNet Initiative 2009: 2). Though the government of 
Mubarak built ambitious programs to expand the access to Internet as an engine of economic 
growth, its security forces increasingly attempted to curtail the use of new technologies for 
disseminating and receiving sensitive political information. There has been a growing crackdown 
on Internet-based activism among Egyptians during the last years (Freedom House 2011). 
 
There have been several cases of Internet activists being exposed to intimidation, legal 
harassment, detentions and surveillance. One of these is the blogger Kareem Amer who in 
February 2007 was sentenced to four years in prison for “incitement to hatred of Islam” on his 
blog and for insulting the president. He has since become the symbol of online repression for the 
country's bloggers (Lynch 2007: 9). 
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which have been ruling Egypt since 
Mubarak stepped down, have actively clamped down on press freedom since taking charge of the 
country. Recently the Egyptian blogger Maikel Nabil Sanad was sentenced to three years in 
prison because of his criticism of the Egyptian military’s use of force against protesters in Tahrir 
Square and his objection to military service (Ghannam 2012: 15). Human Rights Watch is 
describing how Egypt throughout 2011: “(...) has seen a disturbing assault on free expression. 
Not only are direct critics of the military under physical and legal threat, but so are those who 
deliver these critical voices to the public.” (Ibid.). 
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But this fact does not mean that people refrain from using the Internet as a platform for 
communication, activism and mobilization. Not now, and neither when Mubarak was at the 
helm. Internet activism began to play a role especially with the emergence of the Kifaya 
movement in December 2004. Kifaya is the Arabic word for enough, and the movement 
appeared in 2004 calling for political reforms. The movement made street protests and eventually 
blogging became part of its repertoire of contention. Over the following two years Kifaya 
inspired people to demand change (Radsch 2008: 2). A natural symbiosis between Egypt’s early 
core bloggers and the emerging protest movement helped popularize the Egyptian blogosphere as 
Kifaya grew in popularity during 2005. Before 2005 there were about 40 bloggers in Egypt, but 
as technological development made Arabic script available and more people got access to the 
Internet, the network of bloggers were rapidly expanding (Ibid.: 3). According to Professor Marc 
Lynch, expert in Middle Eastern Media, Egypt has some of the most active political bloggers in 
the Arab public sphere, meaning, bloggers who are connected to political movements and are 
actively engaged in politics instead of merely discussing politics (Lynch 2007: 12). 
3.3 Social media and the Egyptian Revolution 
This link between online activism and active engagement on the streets became evermore 
obvious during the Egyptian revolution in early 2011, reflected by the number of social media 
users which has accelerated with more than four million new Facebook users in Egypt between 
January and October 2011 (Ghannam 2012: 12). 
Social media platforms and mobile technologies helped mobilize mass protests and gave voice to 
popular demands and were enabling a vanguard of citizens, activists and media outlets pushing 
the boundaries of free expression. As Professor Sahar Khamis puts it, there existed a need to 
connect between the massive prevalence of public anger and resentment of the ruling regime in 
Egypt and actual public mobilization to bring about real change: “Political activism in the real 
world combined with cyberactivism in the virtual world found this link.” (Khamis 2011: 6). 
Furthermore, citizen journalism increasingly became an established and accepted part of news 
making as mainstream media increasingly began to make use of citizen media as a valid source. 
This happened in step with a decline in the public’s perception of credibility in the state-
controlled media, as they were playing down protests and did not reflect an accurate image of 
what was going on in the streets. This credibility crisis was deteriorated by the coverage from 
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transnational satellite channels such as Al Jazeera, as well as to the reporting of citizen 
journalists who provided minute-by-minute unedited accounts of actions on the ground (Ibid.: 7) 
Location, time and documentation from the demonstrations were announced and shared on 
Facebook and Twitter. The number of demonstrators was steadily increasing, and on January 
25th hundreds of thousands of protesters were on the streets all over Egypt representing a major 
increase over the paltry numbers in previous demonstrations (Eaton 2012: 7). The activists thus 
succeeded in transforming the online movement beyond the somewhat elitist circle of Facebook 
and Twitter users to the mainstream. The demonstration on January 25th was first announced as 
an event on Facebook, but the message was spread by other means and reached enough to fill the 
streets around Egypt. 
 
Among others the campaign Kazeboon is one of the initiatives, which has emerged after the 
revolution working to continuously transform the online movement by bringing online content, 
in this case YouTube videos, to the streets and to people without Internet access. Now we will 
look at how and on what basis Kazeboon is working. 
3.4 Kazeboon 
As earlier explained our field of research is the Kazeboon campaign and its receivers. Kazeboon 
was established in the aftermath of several bloody episodes conducted by the Egyptian military 
towards activists, followed by the army denying any use of violence (Sabh 2012). 
Mainly two incidents have captured a lot of attention and caused anger in the Egyptian 
population. One of them was the incident in front of the TV/Radio Building in Cairo called 
Maspero the 9th of October 2011. The second is referred to as “the girl with the blue bra” that 
took place on the 17th of December 2011 in Tahrir Square (Taha 2012). Our informants have 
repeatedly referred to these two incidents when describing military violence. The incident at the 
Maspero TV/Radio building was a result of a gathering of Coptic Christians to protest over the 
destruction and burning of a church near Aswan in the South of Egypt, declared to have been 
constructed without permission. The protesters were attacked by the military and 28 people were 
killed, and this incident contributed to an increased opposition against SCAF (Ibid.). One of our 
informants describes why his friend changed from supporting SCAF to join the protesters:  
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I think it was Maspero, especially for Christians Maspero was the moment. With Maspero 
they realized, okay, we are facing not only military dictatorship but a racist regime as well. 
(Annex 1, Mohammed: 20) 
 
The second incident, “the girl with the blue bra”, has become a symbol for civil Egyptian 
protesters violated by the military. This incident was filmed and flourished on the Internet. The 
video portraits a woman getting dragged, beaten, stamped on and having her clothes ripped off 
by soldiers showing her blue bra (Higgins 201). One of our informants describes how this 
incident has influenced the Egyptian people:  
 
(...) people were really affected by the incident with the girl with the blue bra, people had 
enough and this incident was really the last thing they could take. People were thinking, how 
could the army of our country, every small boys dream, do this to our people, to our girls. 
(Annex 1, Wael: 36). 
 
Based on these two incidents, Kazeboon emerged with the aim of exposing the violence of the 
military through social media platforms. Kazeboon wants to reach people from all layers of 
society and without Internet access, by screening videos that document violence by the military 
in public areas all over Egypt (Sabh 2012). Many of the videos used by Kazeboon come from the 
collective Mosireen. Mosireen is a new (2011) citizen journalists' media collective that collects 
videos documenting different perspectives of the Egyptian revolution (Trew 2012). Mosireen is, 
among other things, an ‘archive’ providing access to the videos, both online and in physical form 
(Ibid.). As one of our informants describes them:  
 
Mosireen (…) is a source of media information, and they have so much material (…) and it's 
a library. You can easily go there and ask them for files and material if you need. (Annex 1, 
Sara: 10) 
 
Kazeboon developed out of a Mosireen initiative called Cinema Tahrir. This emerged after the 
revolution to document the events through citizen-produced videos, which they showed at Tahrir 
square (Trew 2012). 
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With this introduction to the context in which we are working, we have now set the frame for 
carrying out our analysis. In the next chapter we will introduce our methodological approach 
before we move on to analyzing the structure and work of Kazeboon in depth. 
 
4. Methodology 
 
In the following chapter we will explicate the methodological considerations of our project and 
present the methods used in our data production. We are inspired by qualitative anthropological 
methods in our project with our use of semi-structured interviews, informal interviews, and 
observation. However we do not use anthropology as an overall analytical approach in our 
project. In this chapter we will describe the methods used and how they have affected our data 
production. Furthermore we will reflect on our access to the field and how factors like ethnicity, 
language, and positioning have had an impact of the production of our data. In addition we will 
reflect upon the validity of our data and how our chosen methods like observation, semi-
structured interviews, and informal interviews have played a role. We will start by taking a look 
at how we gained access to our field. 
4.1 Access to the field 
We recruited our informants in different ways: through our network in Egypt and by using 
snowballing, where one recruited informant would introduce us to another. Some of the group 
members have a prior knowledge about the field from former stays in Egypt, and three of the 
group members speak Arabic. This helped us getting easier access to the field and to possible 
informants, and it allowed us to recruit informants from a different social class than our other 
informants. This was done by contacting possible informants in Arabic, but also by asking our 
contacts if they could recommend possible informants that were not necessarily highly educated 
and English speaking, since we wanted a diverse group of informants. We thus conducted two 
interviews in Arabic, one in both English and Arabic, and seven in English. 
We have also used Facebook to contact informants online, which has helped us in getting access 
to our informants. We have followed our informants on Twitter and added them as friends on 
Facebook, this has given us access to follow their activities and posts related to Kazeboon on 
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these platforms. Furthermore our knowledge to the Arabic language has played a very important 
role when following informants on Twitter and Facebook and when reading what is written on 
the Kazeboon Facebook page, since a lot of it is in Arabic. 
With the prior knowledge about the field and the use of our network of young Egyptians, we had 
the opportunity of easier finding informants early in the process of fieldwork. This easier access 
meant that we conducted all our interviews in the month of April and had more time to observe, 
transcribe and analyze our data.  
4.2 Multi-sited field 
Now we will elaborate on our field, which we define as multi-sited.  
Traditional ethnography has been based on the ideas of locality. But with the rise of globalization 
processes this concept has been increasingly questioned on a theoretical level. We are inspired 
by the American anthropologist George Marcus’ concept of multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 
1995, 1998). Marcus focuses on the interrelations between different sites and questions the idea 
of locality:  
 
Media studies have been one important arena in which multi-sited ethnographic research has 
emerged. Distinct genres of research have appeared on production on the one hand, and on 
the reception of such productions, on the other. (Marcus 1998: 87) 
 
We are using multi-sited ethnography as the methodological frame for our fieldwork, because it 
has been a suitable methodological strategy, since it allows a movement from a conventional 
single-sited ethnography. This approach is relevant if not necessary in our field, while operating 
with social media platforms where we did not have one specific site, but rather our site was 
where our informant were placed. Therefore our field was not linked to a certain place, since we 
also conducted some of our data on social media platforms. 
In our two months of fieldwork and project writing in Egypt, we produced1 data from observing 
social media sites as Facebook and Twitter, where we ‘followed’ the Kazeboon campaign and 
our informants and their activities online. Furthermore our main data was produced in our 
                                                
1 We operate with the term produce, when we refer to our data, because we understand that our knowledge is 
produced in the interaction between our informants and us. Thus we do not collect data, we produce it in the fusion 
of our horizons of understandings (see chapter 2. Theory of scientific methods). 
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interviews with receivers of the campaign through interviews. We therefore did not operate with 
one specific site thus a physical site were not central to our fieldwork, rather it was where the 
informants were located and social media platforms. Therefore our fieldwork was carried out in 
different sites. 
4.3 Informants 
Our empirical data consist of two months in the field where the first month was primarily used to 
execute qualitative interviews with ten informants, five young women and five young men. 
Furthermore we observed some of our informants on social media and in their social context 
with their friends. The second month was used to analyze our data and write our project. 
We are using five of our informants as key informants, as they are the informants primarily 
quoted in the project and play a central role in our analysis. Our interviews with them were the 
most detailed and structured ones, and we have spent more time with them and observed them on 
social media platforms. 
We use the five other informants as secondary informants, as they have mostly provided us with 
supplementary knowledge about the Kazeboon campaign and have therefore only been quoted in 
few parts of our project. 
Due to the unstable political situation in Egypt, political activists perceived as opponents to the 
current military rule can be in security risk. To ensure our informants' security, we have therefore 
chosen to make them anonymous by changing their names in our project. 
In the following we will make a short presentation of our informants in order to provide an 
understanding of their different backgrounds, which can also affect their perception of Kazeboon 
and thus their answers to our interview questions. 
4.3.1 Key informants 
 
Radwa is 25 years old. She works as a project manager in an Egyptian NGO, works in a political 
movement and is a volunteer in a NGO. She is a master student in International Relations at the 
American University of Cairo and has a bachelor in Political Science from Cairo University. She 
has attended one of the first Kazeboon events and is active on Facebook and Twitter, where she 
has 191 followers. 
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Sara is 26 years old. She works with women’s right and studies political science at Cairo 
University. She is active in many initiatives that work on women’s rights, which is her main area 
of interest. She has been involved in Kazeboon by attending screenings and spreading knowledge 
about the campaign, both on social media and by the word of mouth. She is active on both 
Facebook and Twitter, where she has 4.459 followers. 
 
Mohammed is 23 years old. He works as an IT engineer and has studied engineering. He 
considers himself as an activist and is part of the activist community, with things like Kazeboon 
he is often a part of the initial discussion and planning. He has organized one Kazeboon event 
and has attended a couple of screenings. Mohammed is active on Facebook and Twitter, where 
he has 16.336 followers. 
 
Amjad is 26 years old. He works as a Human Relation consultant and as a radio host, he has his 
own radio show. He follows Kazeboon on a daily basis on social media and has attended few of 
their screenings. Amjad is active on Facebook and Twitter, where he has 736 followers. 
 
Yusef is 27 years old. He works at the American University in Cairo teaching Egyptian dialect to 
foreigners. He studied Spanish at the university. He does not consider himself as an activist, but 
he has been active in the Kazeboon campaign, where his role was to work on the planning and 
securing of the Kazeboon screenings. Yusef is active on Facebook. 
 
4.3.2 Secondary informants 
 
Ahmad is 25 years old. He works as a director and does not have a higher education. He is 
politically active and very active in the Kazeboon campaign, where he puts the videos together 
before the big screenings. He has a Twitter account, but is not on Facebook. 
 
Wael is 20 years old. He studies at the Faculty of Business at Azhar University. He describes 
himself as one of the initiators of the Kazeboon campaign and has come up with the idea of the 
military cap in their logo. He does not have access to the Internet at home and is not very active 
on social media. 
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Mariam is 25 years old. She lives in Alexandria and has graduated from the School of Law. She 
was active in the Kazeboon campaign when screenings began in Alexandria. She has arranged 
and attended some screenings and is active in several revolutionary initiatives in Alexandria. 
Mariam is an active user of both Facebook and Twitter. 
 
Kamilah is 25 years old. She studies Political Psychology. She has been active in the Kazeboon 
campaign for six months where she has been contacting her friends and people interested in news 
about Kazeboon by phone informing them about Kazeboon screenings. Kamilah uses Facebook 
as her main social media platform. 
 
Marwa is 23 years old. She works as a software engineer and is a photographer. During the 
Egyptian revolution she was actively documenting the protests through her pictures. She has 
watched Kazeboon videos online and attended one of the screenings, but does not consider 
herself as active in the campaign. Marwa mainly uses Facebook and Flickr and has her own blog 
where she posts her pictures. As for Twitter she used it a lot before and during the revolution and 
has 19.632 followers. 
 
In addition to our interviews we have followed Kazeboon’s Facebook and Twitter pages and 
some of our informant’s activities on these social media platforms. Furthermore we have tried to 
attend one Kazeboon screening at Cairo University, but the security personnel did not led us into 
the university campus, because they claimed that there was no Kazeboon screening happening. 
This is an example on Kazeboon’s methods, as the screening was organized with very short 
notice and no authorities were informed about it. We will elaborate on Kazeboon’s methods in 
our analysis (see chapter 6.1 Kazeboon as a campaign). 
We planned to attend other events arranged by Kazeboon, but there has not been any other 
screenings in Cairo in our period of fieldwork (April and May 2012), as the focus has been more 
on the presidential elections in May 2012. At least there has not been any screenings we have 
know of, which can also be due the decentralized structure, where people can arrange their own 
screenings, and screenings might therefore not always be centrally announced. 
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Furthermore we requested editors of the Kazeboon Facebook page to let us know when they had 
an event and they promised to get back to us if anything happened. We did not hear from them, 
but we kept on following what they wrote on the page to be updated. We have though attended 
an event arranged by Cinema Tahrir on May 1st, which was focusing on worker’s rights in 
Egypt. The event was not directly linked to Kazeboon, but as earlier explained in the chapter 
about context Kazeboon works with some of the same methods as Cinema Tahrir and Kazeboon 
is developed from Cinema Tahrir (see chapter 3.4 Kazeboon). 
4.4 Methods used 
 
In the next section we will elaborate on the methods used in our project. The main methods that 
we used were observations of our informants and their activity on social media, semi-structured 
interviews, and informal interviews. In addition we have been talking to people we have met 
during our stay in Egypt about the Kazeboon campaign. We perceive this as additional data that 
has influenced our knowledge about different perceptions about the campaign. 
4.4.1 Observation 
We used observation as a method to explore our newly acquired knowledge and to be better 
prepared in our interviews with our informants. According to Kirsten Hastrup we must enter the 
world that we study by taking place in it (Hastrup 2003: 10). We therefore understand 
observation as a method that aims to provide close insight and understanding of our context, how 
our informants use social media and how Kazeboon is perceived through it. Therefore we see it 
as a strength that we are situated in the context that we study, by constantly being in the field, 
following the political context, and having the possibility of meeting our informants if needed. 
By observing our informants on social media and in their social context with their friends, we 
take place in the field we study. We are thus able to compare our informants' statements in our 
interviews with the knowledge gained in our observations. 
Because of our positioning in our field and the lack of time it was not always possible to observe 
our informants in their daily life, but we observed our key informants' use of social media via 
social media, which was our main observing tool and also in fact a part of their daily life. 
Furthermore the way we observed our key informants was by adding them as friends on 
Facebook and following them on Twitter. Furthermore we have used participant observation 
 20 
when, 'liking' their posts on Facebook, 'retweeting' their tweets on Twitter, and sometimes we 
participated in their discussions online. 
We thus complemented our interviews with our observations to get a better understanding of the 
field, and to know which questions to ask in our interviews. At the same time we complemented 
our observations with both informal and semi-structured interviews, as we will elaborate on in 
the following. 
4.4.2 Semi-structured interviews 
In our fieldwork we have decided to use a combination of informal and semi-structured 
interviews. We have conducted ten interviews, eight semi-structured and two informal 
interviews. 
According to Kvale the qualitative research interview attempts to understand the world from the 
subjects’ point of view, to unfold the meaning of our informants' ”(...) experiences, to uncover 
their lived world prior to scientific explanations” (Kvale 1996: 1). Because there were some 
specific subjects that needed elaboration in relation to the purpose of our project, we had 
prepared an interview guide. We used it as a checklist in order to make sure that all subjects were 
covered, which is something that characterizes a semi-structured interview (see annex 2. 
Interview guide). 
Our interview guide focused on how our informants are engaged in the Kazeboon campaign, 
how they perceive it and their use of social media. The themes of the interviews thus allowed the 
informants to further describe their understanding of and engagement in the Kazeboon campaign. 
Our questions in the interview guide were not meant to be followed chronologically, as it 
depended on the individual informant's response, but we managed a certain continuity in order to 
have comparable data. We therefore used the same interview guide as the fundamental basis for 
all our interviews. We though rearranged our interview questions after the first couple of 
interviews, where we had gained more knowledge about the campaign, the political context and 
the informants' perception of Kazeboon. Most of our interviews lasted about one hour and we 
were mostly two group members to execute the interviews, one writing notes and the other 
interviewing. 
 
Furthermore we recorded our interviews on a dictaphone, except from three interviews. Two of 
them were informal interviews with secondary informants, where we took notes. This was to 
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maintain the informal atmosphere that was set beforehand since the aim of the interview was to 
get supplementary knowledge about Kazeboon. In addition to the two informal interviews, one 
semi-structured interview was not recorded. That was not a conscious choice, since the informant 
showed up unexpected. While interviewing one of our informants, Yusef, his friend Ahmad was 
sitting in the same café. He told us that Ahmad was very engaged in Kazeboon, and therefore he 
joined the interview. We were two group members conducting the interviews, and since Ahmad 
only speaks Arabic, the Arabic speaking group member conducted this interview. We therefore 
had to split up and we only had one dictaphone, so we chose to take notes at the interview with 
Ahmad and record the interview with Yusef that was initially planned. 
Furthermore we have been writing field notes in the beginning of our fieldwork, and we have 
transcribed all our recorded interviews in order to code and analyze our data in a more structured 
way. All the transcriptions are enclosed (see annex 1. Transcriptions of interviews). 
In the following we will reflect on how our open and informal approach in our interviews can 
have played a role in the data produced as a result of our interviews. 
4.4.3 Openness in our interviews 
According to Kvale the semi-structured interview is “(...) a uniquely sensitive and powerful 
method for capturing the experiences and lived meanings of the subjects’ everyday world.” 
(Kvale 1996: 70). In relation to our focus this means that interviews enable us to obtain an in-
depth understanding of our informants’ experiences with Kazeboon and their engagement in the 
campaign. One of the great benefits of using interviews as a research tool is that they are open, 
meaning that the interviewer can ask follow-up questions to interesting answers (Kvale 2009: 
41). 
In our interviews we were leading the informants to discover and elaborate on their answers, 
which means that we created a space for their personal stories and experiences. This method 
resulted in different outcomes than expected, as many of our informants came up with very 
personal stories about their activism during the revolution, one example is their families 
reactions towards them. Some of these personal stories will be described in our analysis (see 
chapter 6.2.4 Communication channels). 
 
Kvale describes the importance of establishing a good relationship and an open atmosphere 
between the researcher and the informant (Kvale 1996:125). Most of our interviews took place in 
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cafés and contributed to a more open atmosphere, which helped the informants to ‘lighten up’ 
and feel comfortable in the interview situation. This might have influenced them to open up and 
tell more than they perhaps would have done, if the interview had been more structured or had 
taken place in a different surrounding. But there can also be disadvantages of having an informal 
setting, because it is a public place where other people can follow the conversation. This can 
make the informant reconsider his or her words and even constrain him- or herself. Another 
disadvantage of having an informal setting, is that it can lead to a lack of seriousness in the 
interview situation and insecurity about whether it is a friendly conversation or an interview. For 
example this was the case in two of our interviews, where one of the group members knew the 
informant beforehand, and the two interviews therefore developed into informal interviews. 
Nevertheless we intended to establish rapport with our informants by spending time with some of 
them outside a formal context. We often ended up having a lot of data from such situations, 
which served as informal conversations and observations when ‘hanging’ out with them after 
interviews, demonstrations or social activities. We though found it of ethical importance to 
always have in mind and letting our informants know, that we are researchers. Because of 
limited time in the field we did not have the possibility to spend time with all of our key 
informants, even though it could have been useful data. 
4.5 Reflections on the collected data 
Throughout our process we talked a lot about our experiences in and understanding of the field. 
Thereby, we reflected upon our interviews and observations, and could therefore through the 
process detect our analysis patterns in the data. By having to verbalize our data, we produce what 
the anthropologist Inger Sjørslev calls a meaning that corresponds back and contributes to the 
further recognition process (Sjørslev 1995: 181). This contributed to our ongoing constructive 
discussions about our focus and our wonder and helped us rearrange the focus when necessary. 
The combination of methods permitted us to validate, compare, and challenge the informants’ 
different responses, instead of only using semi-structured interviews as our methodological 
approach where questions often become one-sided. 
There can be some drawbacks to the used methods. According to Kvale one drawback is that the 
method can lack objectivity, which in particular can be due to the personal contact inherent in the 
interview situation (Kvale 1996: 64). With our hermeneutic approach in mind we are aware that 
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we cannot be objective in our interviews, but it is not necessarily a drawback that we bring our 
pre-understandings into the interview situation, according to our hermeneutic approach we 
cannot avoid it (Højberg 2009: 322). 
In addition to this we perceive the subjectivity in our way of asking questions as something 
positive, as it allowed us to adjust our way of asking questions to the interview situation. We are 
though aware that we bring our pre-understandings into the interview situation when asking 
questions, which affects our informants, and our informants' pre-understanding affects us, this is 
due to the constant circulation between us and the informants described in the hermeneutic circle 
(Højberg 2009: 320). The role and position of the interviewer is thus of importance determining 
the meaning in an interview, where data is being produced in interaction in the specific context 
between the interviewer and the informant (Kvale 2009:102). With this in mind we will in the 
following describe the meaning of our positioning in the field. 
4.6 Positioning 
Fieldwork is affected by the researcher’s own personality and identity, which the field context 
consequently reacts to (Langness and Frank 1985: 31). In other words, the mere presence of the 
researcher affects the field. 
With the intention to use our informants’ statement in our further research, our position as 
researchers might have had an impact on what our informants chose to tell us. In addition to this, 
our Danish backgrounds could also have an affect, which we became aware of in our interviews: 
“We made the revolution possible, not the west… Please write it down, this is important.” 
(Amjad). 
This is an example of how our Danish background positions us as 'outsiders' and has an impact 
on the interview situation and our produced data. Furthermore it exemplifies how Amjad's pre-
understanding of our intention with the interview is different than our own pre-understanding, 
which is important to be aware of in our hermeneutic approach. In addition it also indicates that 
he found it important to tell us this because of his understanding of what is relevant knowledge 
to our project. 
Another important factor in the positioning was the fact that one of the group members, Khadije, 
is from Lebanese and Palestinian descendance and was often perceived as an Egyptian. 
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Therefore she was often categorized as an insider by the informants being an Arab, although she 
was also an outsider being a Dane and a Lebanese/Palestinian. 
The Egyptian-American anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod describes how sharing the same 
background as your informants may put you in a position where you cannot claim ignorance to 
cultural taboos (Abu-Lughod 1988). This issue is described by Khadije in her field notes after 
carrying out an interview with Ahmad in Arabic:  
 
The notable in this interview, was that my positioning played a significant role, where the 
informant often did not tell the whole stories he referred to and instead said “Yeah you know” 
or, “We Arabs” and referred to Arabic quotes by a famous Marxist, and a great Arabic poet 
that I “of course” should know, since I was an Arab. (Khadije, Field notes April 17, 2012) 
 
Another positioning that might have had an impact on our interviews is our gender, as all the 
group members are women. We experienced this in our interview with Sara, who is a women's 
rights activist. In the interview situation she constantly referred to her work on women's rights 
and after the interview we continued the conversation with her about these topics. We shared the 
same interests and gender, which could have been a factor contributing to a sense of 'sisterhood' 
between us and Sara. It is difficult to know if or how she would have answered differently in an 
interview with a man, but it is a factor that we have considered and that created a comfortable 
atmosphere in the interview situation. Our positioning thus affects the data produced in our 
interviews, which leads to our methodological considerations to the validity of our data. 
4.7 Validity 
In this section we will dwell on our chosen methods and how they affected our data. The most 
important aspect in the analysis of validity is that we must try to account how the context and our 
presences influence the informants’ statements. Therefore we claim that "independent" and 
"clean" data do not exists, as knowledge is always produced in the encounter between the 
researcher and the informant (Sanjek 1990: 394). This is also an important point in our 
hermeneutic approach, as we are aware that we bring our own pre-understandings to the 
conversation as an inevitable element in the creation of new understandings. 
Furthermore the time perspective plays an important role in the validity of our data production.  
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By staying in Egypt the whole period of fieldwork (April and May 2012) we had the ability to 
get an understanding of our informants and the context, for example of the political context that 
our informants refer to in our interviews. With a long-term fieldwork, we could have had more 
time with each informant, which would strengthen the validity of the collected data. 
 
With these methodological considerations in mind, we are now ready to move on to an analysis 
of the data we have collected. Initially we will set a frame for our theoretical basis. We will 
briefly present the main theories and concepts that we make use of in our analysis. 
 
5. Theoretical Frame 
 
We will now present and legitimize our theoretical approach.  
At the start we will use the Danish communication researcher Preben Sepstrup to analyze 
Kazeboon as a campaign. In his book from 2007 he is setting forward a theoretical campaign 
model. He claims that to make an effective campaign, it is necessary that the sender has a 
theoretical point of departure and that certain criteria are met. We apply his theory on Kazeboon 
because we want to specify how the campaign is fitting into the model and to identify not only 
whether Kazeboon is different from a theoretical understanding of an effectual campaign, but 
how it is different. 
 
Sepstrup developed his theory in 2007, and thus before the Internet became accessible to the 
extent that it is today presenting new campaigning tools of Web 2.0 and social media, for 
example the potential of uploading videos on YouTube and creating and maintaining online 
personal relations on Facebook and Twitter (Iversen 2009: 66). However, when considering the 
receivers of the campaign we find Sepstrup’s definition useful because of his focus on directing a 
campaign towards the receiver and considers the situation and context of the receivers (Sepstrup 
2006). Since Kazeboon is aiming to reach further than the 26,4 percent of the Egyptian 
population who have access to the Internet, using social media as a tool for campaigning is not 
effective and therefore Sepstrup’s theory of campaigning is relevant. 
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Sepstrup´s theory is providing tools in regard to organize and define a campaign, having done 
that we will proceed our analysis by examining further how Kazeboon has diffused. For us 
Kazeboon is presenting innovative methods for campaigning and we therefore define the 
campaign as an innovation. Therefore we have found the American sociologist Everett Rogers´ 
theory about “Diffusion of innovations” useful to conceptualize the diffusion process. Rogers 
defines a diffusion as “the process in which an innovation is communicated through certain 
channels over time among the members of a social system” (Rogers 2003: 5). 
He divides different types of adopters of an innovation into five adopter categories: innovators, 
early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards and he further defines innovativeness 
as the degree to which an individual is earlier in adopting new ideas than other individuals 
(Rogers 2003: 22). We will use these categories to characterize our informants’ degree of 
innovativeness. 
Furthermore Rogers defines a category of rejectors as people who refuse to adopt an innovation, 
because it is not compatible with their values, beliefs, and experiences (Rogers 2003: 4). We will 
use this term to define a challenge that Kazeboon faces when reaching out to their receivers. 
Finally, Rogers introduces opinion leaders, who act as informal leaders and can affect the 
diffusion process by serving as a model for other’s behavior. Kazeboon is characterized by the 
absence of leaders, and with Rogers´ notion of opinion leaders, we seek to understand whether 
some figures nevertheless play a role as informal leaders in Kazeboon, in the diffusion process, 
and on social media in general. 
 
By combining the theories of Sepstrup and Rogers we look at the theoretical aspects of a 
campaign and the diffusion process. With this as a basis, we will turn our attention to how the 
campaign is received. Substantiated by a theory about credibility in Digital media set out by the 
two American communication researchers Andrew J. Flanagin and Miriam J. Metzger we will 
examine the dynamics of online communication processes and whether the online media adds to 
or diminishes the credibility of the information shared. Flanagin and Metzger are defining three 
types of credibility explaining how something is typically judged as credible in digital media; 
source credibility, endorsed credibility and emergent credibility. These categories will be 
explained in the section, and will help us to analyze the considerations our informants tell us they 
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have, when they receive and share information about Kazeboon and through online media in 
general. 
 
From having looked at communication tools and processes with the theories of Sepstrup and 
Rogers, and at the dynamics affecting the reception with Flanagin and Metzger, we will end by 
looking at the concepts set out by the Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells. 
Castells describes the change from industrialized society to a network society. In the industrial 
society the communication system was centered around mass media, characterized by one-way 
communication from one to many. Now in the network society the communication foundation is 
the global web of horizontal communication networks including a multimodal exchange of 
interactive messages from many to many (Castells 2007: 246). 
Castells mentions the emergence of a new form of communication related to the culture and 
technology of the network society based on horizontal networks of communication, and Castells 
calls this mass self-communication (Ibid.: 239). The mass self-communication is a new form of 
socialized communication that is self-generated in content, self-directed in emission and self-
selected in reception by many that communicate with many (Ibid.: 248). The Kazeboon 
campaign is a product of the network society and a relevant example of mass self-
communication. Kazeboon contains all the characteristics mentioned above defining this new 
form of socialized communication, and we will therefore use Castell’s notion of the network 
society in the last part of our analysis. 
 
6. Analysis 
 
We will now analyze Kazeboon to understand and discuss the structure, diffusion process, 
perception of credibility, and outreach of the campaign. Based on our interviews we will 
examine the structure and characteristics of Kazeboon. We will look into how our informants 
have gained knowledge and adopted the campaign, how they consider the credibility of the 
campaign and to what extent the campaign is reaching out to people without access to the 
Internet, as is one of its aims. 
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6.1 Kazeboon as a campaign 
After having conducted one month of research about Kazeboon and interviewed ten young 
Egyptians with different relations to the campaign, one of the things we have learned is that 
something about Kazeboon makes it stand out compared to other initiatives. In the following 
analysis we will look into the methods of Kazeboon to understand how this peculiarity is 
manifesting itself. Kazeboon is classified as a campaign by the activists from the Kazeboon (in 
Arabic it is designated ‘hamlit 3askar Kazeboon’ meaning ‘Military Liars Campaign’), and we 
will start by using the campaign model set out by Sepstrup and examine Kazeboon according to 
this. This way we can see on which issues Kazeboon fits a theoretical understanding of 
campaigns and how it deviates, and through this get a deeper understanding of Kazeboon. We 
will then go deeper into the specific characteristics that our informants argue constitute the 
difference of Kazeboon. 
 
According to Sepstrup and his campaign theory there are certain requirements that need to be 
satisfied in order to create an effectual campaign, and this is whether the campaign is politically 
informative or commercial. Making an effective campaign is requiring more than the ability to 
handle a good practice. In Sepstrup’s notion an effective campaign is originating from a 
theoretical point of departure, since implementing a campaign will always depend on the 
communicator’s idea of how to communicate, and also how the person or group receiving the 
information is reacting (Sepstrup 2006: 20).  
Sepstrup is defining the following characteristics of an effectual campaign (Sepstrup 2006: 20): 
- A thoroughly planned communication-strategy 
- A confined target group 
- A limited period of time 
- Involvement of an entirety of communication methods 
- A specific and explicit aim 
 
We will now, based on these characteristics, show how Kazeboon differs from Sepstrup’s notion 
of a successful campaign and argue that these differences are part of what makes it successful. 
His first point is the importance of having a communication-strategy, but in Kazeboon there is no 
central authority, which would typically be the entity expected to formulate such one. There is a 
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philosophy and a clear aim behind the campaign, but since the campaign was launched it has 
developed more or less autonomously depending on where activists have chosen to make a 
screening. According to Sepstrup, a communication strategy requires that the one carrying out 
the campaign considers and comprehends the receivers of the campaign, and this issue is linked 
to the second criteria of the model; a confined target group. 
According to activists of the campaign, they do not have a set target group, but are targeting 
everyone. One of our informants, who is active in the campaign, describes how they are 
constantly trying to find new ways to reach further out in the villages and outskirts of Egypt to 
reach as many people without Internet access as possible (Annex 1, Wael). So this can somehow 
be defined as a target group, though a very loosely structured one. The third criterion of the 
campaign model is that a campaign should be scheduled for a limited period to be effectual. This 
is not the case with Kazeboon. The campaign has been working for almost half a year now, and 
the level of activity depends on the context. There is no set date for when the campaign is over. 
In this period (May 2012) the focus is on the role of the military in the election and among other 
things the corruption, and during the preparations for the elections the level of activity in terms 
of screenings has not been high. But on Facebook and Twitter there have constantly been 
announcements and debates, and though the campaign has been fading some, it is not fading to 
die. As our informant Radwa explains: “The initiative can never die, the reason why any 
initiative exist at the moment is because we are fighting a certain system.” (Annex 1, Radwa: 6). 
Sepstrup’s last two criteria fit Kazeboon. Yes, the campaign has an entirety of communication 
methods, they are communicating through new media among others Twitter and Facebook, 
screenings and through the personal encounter at these occasions. And also the aim is specific 
and explicit; to document that the military are liars, and to show documentations of their 
violations against the people. This shines through both in the name and the logo of the campaign. 
The name meaning Military Liars and the logo consisting of the word Kazeboon with a military 
hat on the first letter ‘Kaf’ (K in English)2. 
 
We use Sepstrup as a frame for understanding the peculiarity of Kazeboon, and we have now 
clarified the points of similarities as well as deviations from a theoretical campaign definition. 
We understand from this analysis, that the points where Kazeboon deviates from Sepstrup’s 
                                                
2 See a picture of a graffiti with the Kazeboon logo on the front page of this project. 
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characterizations of a campaign can be summarized as caused by the absence of a central 
authority and general planning. 
In Sepstrup’s theory discrepancies from the model of an effectual campaign will clearly result in 
a less effective campaign and thus be a negative feature. However, these features are exactly 
what our informants describe as the main strength of Kazeboon - the absence of a central 
authority and general planning and its decentralized structure. So what does this result indicate?  
Although we argued in our theoretical frame, that despite the dating of Sepstrup´s campaign 
theory in 2007, he is relevant for our analysis of Kazeboon, but he is not covering all the aspects 
needed to understand Kazeboon. Therefore we supplement his campaign model with a theory 
considering the technological development. We argued that Sepstrup is relevant because of his 
focus on the receiver of the campaign, but to understand Kazeboon we need to consider the 
sender as well, since this is something special about Kazeboon. There is not one sender 
communicating a message to many, but on the contrary many senders communicating to many. 
This is what Castells calls mass self-communication and defines as horizontal networks (Castells 
2007: 248). We argue that Sepstrup´s campaign model suits a campaign where the 
communication has a vertical top-down structure and thus does not fit the horizontal 
decentralized structure of Kazeboon. To understand Kazeboon requires an expansion of 
traditional campaign theory to include horizontal patterns of communication, which is central in 
Castells’ network society. We furthermore argue, that the horizontal patterns of communication 
make Kazeboon fit into its Egyptian context. We will come back to in the end of this chapter. 
 
We will now take a closer look at how our informants describe the decentralization and lose 
structure of Kazeboon, and how they perceive it as a strength of the campaign. Understanding 
the structure and peculiarity of Kazeboon is essential to later understand how the campaign is 
diffused and received. 
6.1.1 Decentralization 
Our informants are generally focusing on two factors when they evaluate the decentralization of 
Kazeboon. First the outreach, how the absence of central leadership allows the campaign to 
spread quickly since activists anywhere can organize a screening with fairly simple technology. 
Furthermore, there is no need for obtaining any permission to organize a screening or a march. 
This invokes a sense of ownership and independence for the involved. Secondly, our informants 
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emphasize how the decentralization makes the campaign less exposed to persecution and 
enforced censorship by the authorities. Finally we will argue that it reflects the dynamics of the 
Egyptian revolution which is also emphasized as leader-less, and that a skepticism against any 
leader can be considered as part of the reason of the significance of the decentralized structure. 
We will start by a theoretical explanation of the concept of decentralization to clarify what kind 
of decentralization our informants are operating with. 
 
Decentralization is a notion used in organization theory to describe organizations with a wide 
span of control, reducing the number of tiers in the organization and giving the structure a flat 
appearance. This is concretized by policies of delegating authority down to the lower levels in 
the organization, relatively away from a central authority (Chang et.al. 2000:5). However, the 
way our informants describe the decentralized structure of Kazeboon, is not in the sense that 
authorities are delegated, but more so that no hierarchy or leadership exists at all. 
Sara explains the issue of leadership in Kazeboon as follows:  
 
No one can ever say “this group of people have been founded by that organization to do 
that”. There is no one behind it that you know. Even if you know them they are not alone, 
there a millions who give them the material and who give them the photos and... It’s not 
centralized. (Annex 1, Sara: 8) 
 
Our informants have repeatedly stated, that Kazeboon belongs to nobody, and this is what makes 
it a strong campaign. There is no central authority to turn to or to ask for permission, they are all 
owners. We will now look into the two main factors that our informants refer to, when they 
discuss how the decentralized structure is affecting the Kazeboon; outreach and vulnerability. 
6.1.2 Outreach 
First we will look at the issue of outreach. Our informants describe how the documentation in 
Kazeboon is shared through online media, and therefore people in any location can stream videos 
from YouTube and arrange a screening. The decentralized structure gives the campaign mobility, 
which allows it to move out and reach further, than if every activity needed to be centrally 
planned and organized. Sara explains:  
 
 32 
An important factor of Kazeboon is its decentralization across Egypt. Usually the 
revolutionary ideas are centered in Cairo and Alexandria, especially in downtown Cairo. 
(Annex 1, Sara: 8) 
 
We relate to these statements with some skepticism. Arguing that people in any location can 
stream a video from YouTube and make a screening is complicated by the distribution of 
Internet access in Egypt. Numbers from 2009 show that 21,4 percent of households in urban 
areas use the Internet compared to only 10 percent in rural areas (Future of the Internet Economy 
2009: 10). 
Another informant, Wael, explains how they (activists of Kazeboon) have tried to make a week 
of screenings only in villages, but that they did not succeed. It is hard to say to what extent the 
campaign actually reaches out, and we will come back to this discussion after having examined 
the reception of the campaign, since we first need a deeper knowledge about how Kazeboon is 
adopted. 
While carrying out our fieldwork the only event we have known of, taken place outside Cairo 
has been in Tanta, which has around 430.000 inhabitants and is located 100 km. from Cairo. But 
it is essential in this regard to remember that the lack of control and general management is one 
of the points of the campaign. There is a calendar on the Facebook page of the campaign, but as 
we understand from several of our informants, screenings have often taken place without notice 
there, and this is exactly the autonomy that our informants describe as the strength of the 
campaign. But without concrete information this criteria for success is hard to measure. 
According to those of our informants who have actively been involved in the campaign, it is 
largely spread both nationally and internationally as well. Sara explains: 
 
Egyptians all over the world found finally the chance to feel that they are doing something. I 
have friends who live in Europe, Egyptians, who tell me: “how can we help, what can we do? 
(Annex 1, Sara: 8) 
 
According to her, the international outreach has given Egyptians abroad a chance to involve 
themselves in the revolution by following the activities of Kazeboon and participate online by 
commenting, forwarding, and sharing words and pictures. 
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During our two months of research we have been asking different kinds of people we have met 
about their knowledge of Kazeboon. This has typically been among friends, taxi drivers and 
informal chats with shop owners, thus some people outside the circles of the politically active 
youth. Some of them have not had any knowledge about the campaign, while many have 
promptly answered affirmatively. But then after going deeper into a conversation about the 
campaign, it has turned out that they did not know the campaign itself, but agree with the 
message about the military being liars, and have easily identified with the campaign. This makes 
it even more difficult to get an overview of the outreach of the campaign, and might create a 
false impression of a very expanded outreach. This informal and small collection of data is of 
course not representative in any way, or saying anything general about the outreach of the 
campaign, but it does remind us to consider, that when the activists involved in Kazeboon 
describe the campaign as reaching far out in Egypt and internationally, they may see it as bigger 
and more comprehensive than is actually the case. 
6.1.3 No visible leader 
The second point emphasized by our informants as an advantage of not having a central authority 
of the campaign, is the complications it creates for the authorities if they want to suppress the 
campaign, “They did not have a leader that they could break, so therefore they could never break 
the campaign” (Annex 1, Wael: 36). Most of our informants have experienced that people 
supporting the military have tried to prevent screenings from happening by destroying the 
projector or tearing down the screen, and sometimes the people organizing the screenings have 
been chased by the army. 
But they have not managed to kill the campaign and the reason for this, according to 
Mohammed, is that the government and the security have no understanding of how things can be 
decentralized: “They have been used to power structures like pyramid structure and orders” 
(Annex 1, Mohammed: 20). 
Mohammed goes on with a story about a project he was involved in, which shows the 
significance of mobility and flexibility. He was organizing a public political debate about the 
first post-revolution referendum held in March 2012. The debate was to be held in Down Town 
Cairo at the Goethe Institute. But then on the day, the institute received a phone call from the 
authorities saying that they should not host the debate because it had an anti-military character. 
Mohammed explains: 
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So I called up Alaa Abd al Fettah who is also an activist and one of my friends, and I said this 
is the case, this is what happened so the event is off. He said no its not off...we will make it on 
the street. We will find a place to do it, and then we will do a Kazeboon screening as well and 
then also a demonstration. So they had one thing which they did not like, and we gave them 
three that they don't like, and we did it without them on the streets - so let them try and stop us 
(Annex 1, Mohammed: 15) 
 
This story shows how the decentralization of the campaign allows events to arise, develop and 
change in a quick pace leaving the authorities small chances of keeping an eye on the activities. 
Furthermore, the story tells us something about the notion of leadership in the campaign. 
Mohammed called Alaa Abd al Fettah when the event got canceled. Fettah is a blogger and a 
well-known political activist before, during and after the revolution. He is not in any way filling 
out a role as leader in the campaign, but with him we introduce the issue of opinion leaders. This 
is a notion Rogers uses to define different types of adopters of an innovation. We will return to 
this when we examine the role our informants play as adopters of the campaign. We will discuss 
how some of them have a high level of activity on Twitter and Facebook, in terms of sharing 
opinions and ideas, gives them a certain status on social media as opinion leaders (see chapter 
6.2.7 Opinion leaders). 
 
Finally, we will now argue how Kazeboon is a product of the context in which it has developed, 
and how the decentralized structure is reflecting this. A number of academics, commentators and 
activists are emphasizing the strength of decentralization when describing the development of the 
revolutionary movements in Egypt. They are talking about a presence of horizontalism in the 
Egyptian revolutionary process (Chalcraft 2012). John Chalcraft3 describes how horizontal 
structure and coordination is a key-element in the revolution. He specifically describes this 
structure as: 1) the decentralized form of organizing, 2) the leaderless protest movements, 3) the 
eschewal of top-down command (Ibid.). 
                                                
3 Dr. John Chalcraft is Reader in the History and Politics of Empire/ Imperialism at London School of Economics. 
He is specialized in the history and politics of the modern Middle East with special reference to Egypt, Syria and 
Lebanon. 
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Media actors have tried to name different activists as leaders of the revolution; Google-executive 
Wael Ghonim, activist and blogger Sandmonkey (Mahmoud Salem), and other frontline activists, 
but no one agrees to take on this title. Ghonim states: "I am not a leader. The leaders are in 
Tahrir Square." (Interview on CNN 3.9 2011). Neither Sandmonkey is willing to take on that 
title, he stated on his blog during the 18 days between the 25th of January and the ousting of 
Mubarak on February 11: “This is a revolution without leaders” (Sandmonkey February 3, 
2011). 
We argue that the non-hierarchical structure of Kazeboon reflects a general lack of confidence in 
authorities having grown up during the corrupt dictatorial leadership of Mubarak followed by 
military rule. Clashes between the military and the people re-emerged in November 2011, and an 
activist commented on the situation ”Now, the general sentiment is we don’t trust authority” (Al-
Jazeera 2011). The only way to create credibility around a campaign like Kazeboon is thus a 
continuous emphasis on this issue. There are no interests and no leaders. 
6.1.4 Sub-conclusion 
As a conclusion on this chapter, we have found that the elements which make Kazeboon deviate 
from Sepstrup’s campaign model are exactly the same as those described by our informants as 
the attractive and unique of the campaign, namely the decentralized structure. We found it 
necessary to supplement Sepstrup´s campaign model with Castells to describe the many-to-many 
communication of Kazeboon. This is essential because the campaign is based on material from 
various sources uploaded online, and thus Sepstrup´s campaign theory is not sufficient. We argue 
that the horizontal patterns of communication are furthermore reflecting the horizontal 
coordination of the revolution in Egypt and hereby makes the campaign a product of its 
contemporary context.  
This section has given us an understanding of how the differences of Kazeboon are unfolding in 
practice and how they are affecting the life of the campaign. Now we will move on to look at 
how the campaign has reached our informants and how they perceive it. 
 
6.2 Diffusion of Kazeboon 
 We define Kazeboon's methods as innovative, because the campaign operates different from 
traditional campaign theory. We have shown in the former chapter how Kazeboon differs from 
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three of Sepstrup’s characteristics of an effectual campaign (see chapter 6.1 Kazeboon as a 
campaign). Sepstrup’s theory has thus given us tools to examine the characteristics of Kazeboon, 
and now we will move on to look at how the campaign has diffused. Rogers' theory about the 
diffusion of innovations gives us some new perspectives on how Kazeboon has been spread 
among its receivers. 
In the following chapter we will analyze the way Kazeboon has diffused, and how the 
decentralization of the campaign is an important factor in the diffusion of the campaign. Rogers 
defines four main elements in the diffusion that we will look at in our analysis: innovation, 
communication channels, time and social system.  
First we will analyze the innovative aspects in Kazeboon and how some receivers reject the 
message of the campaign. Secondly we will analyze how the interpersonal channels have been 
effective in the outreach of Kazeboon, followed by how our informants have adopted the 
campaign as innovators. Finally we will discuss how our informants are a part of a social system, 
and how they affect and get affected by others in this social system. 
6.2.1 Kazeboon as an innovation 
We define Kazeboon as an innovation, because it differs from other campaigns in its structure 
and methods, which we have described in the former chapter (see chapter 6.1 Kazeboon as a 
campaign). In this chapter we will further examine the structure and methods of Kazeboon, but 
now with Roger’s perspectives in order to discuss the campaign's adoption and diffusion among 
our informants. 
Rogers defines an innovation as an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by the 
individual, and that the perceived “newness” of the innovation determines the reaction to it 
(Rogers 2003: 12). Our informants perceive the campaign as something new, and we will 
therefore now look at their perception of the campaign. 
6.2.2 Decentralization as newness 
As explained in the former chapter, our informants characterize the newness of Kazeboon in 
terms of its decentralization and outreach. The decentralization makes it possible for our 
informants to define and participate actively in Kazeboon, which Rogers emphasizes in the 
diffusion process. He describes that many adopters want to re-invent the innovation in terms of 
customizing it to fit into their unique situation, and they want to participate actively, which 
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makes the adoption more likely to be sustained (Rogers 2003: 17). In the case of Kazeboon the 
possibility for our informants to participate actively makes the adoption sustained, because it 
results in a feeling of ownership of the campaign. Our informants state that they have 
participated actively in the campaign, which Sara describes in the following: “So I wouldn’t 
consider myself technically a receiver, because at some point I was involved in the action itself” 
(Annex 1, Sara: 8). In this way our informants are adopting Kazeboon by participating in the 
campaign themselves, not only by passively receiving information about it. They are re-inventing 
and customizing the innovation by arranging screenings that fit different locations and their own 
situation, as Sara says about Kazeboon: “It's ours, it's everyone's” (Annex 1, Sara: 9). The 
possibility to re-invent the innovation thereby gives our informants ownership and makes 
Kazeboon diffuse more rapidly. According to our informants the decentralization has thus been 
an important factor in diffusing Kazeboon. 
Apart from decentralization our informants describe the outreach to people on the streets without 
Internet access as something central and unique, and this also leads to different reactions to the 
campaign. The next chapter elaborates on one reaction to Kazeboon, that our informants have 
experienced, which is rejection of the campaign's message. We will look at some of the factors 
that can prevent receivers from adopting Kazeboon to illustrate that there has not only been 
positive reactions to the campaign, when the campaign’s message is not compatible with the 
experiences of the receivers. 
6.2.3 Reactions to Kazeboon 
In our conversation with Radwa about the Kazeboon screenings, she told us that the idea behind 
the campaign is to reach out to people on the streets who would not necessarily seek the 
campaign themselves: “(...) turning the blind eye on those violations is not an option anymore 
because we are coming to you.” (Annex 1, Radwa: 1). But when the campaign forces people on 
the streets to see the Kazeboon videos, it will eventually meet different reactions. Radwa has 
experienced that people refuse to believe the message of Kazeboon. She refers to many incidents 
where she tried to convince people that the violations actually happened. She gives an example 
from a demonstration she attended, where a girl got injured. She explains how she discussed with 
people who were pro-SCAF and explains how one of them refused to believe what she had 
witnessed: 
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I was running with a girl that I don't know, who was having a difficulty breathing. So you 
cannot tell me that this didn't happen. He told me 'no this never happened'. So it's like 
refusing to accept the reality (...) (Annex 1, Radwa: 5) 
 
Rogers explains how a campaign can fail, because the receivers refuse adopting an innovation 
that does not correspond to their norms (Rogers 2003: 4). He defines this reaction to the 
campaign by using the term rejectors and describes: “An important factor regarding the 
adoption rate of an innovation is the compatibility with the values, beliefs, and past experiences 
of individuals in the social system” (Ibid.). Here Sara gives an example of how some people 
perceive Kazeboon, when the campaign’s message is not compatible with their values, beliefs 
and experiences:  
 
(...) the first thing that they would do out of denial is tell you “that's not true”, even if they 
never loved the army of believed in the military force. They would deny it because it's easier 
to live with the fact that there's some kind of backbone institution that will protect you. 
(Annex 1, Sara: 11) 
 
This is an example of how the military has been experienced as a protecting institution, and it is 
therefore difficult to adopt the message of Kazeboon, that portraits the military negatively. 
So the problem here is how to convince rejectors to adopt the message of Kazeboon, when it is 
not compatible with their experiences. Rogers points to the importance of communication 
channels in the adoption or rejection of an innovation. He points out that the interpersonal 
networks are one of the most effective communication channels, because the diffusion of an 
innovation is a social process more than a technical matter (Rogers 2003: 4). Thus it is not 
necessarily through media, that innovations are diffused more effectively. We will look at this in 
the following paragraph.  
6.2.4 Communication channels 
Due to a distrust in the Egyptian state media expressed by our informants, this has not been an 
useful communication channel for Kazeboon:  
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The state media is usually using that trade line of 'the army protected the revolution, we 
cannot attack the army. Either by conviction of by obligation, and we have little channels of 
reaching out to people. (Annex 1, Sara: 8) 
 
Our informants describe how they do not trust any state media channels, because they have not 
been telling the truth about the military violations among other things. This can be exemplified 
by the reactions of shock, when people on the streets saw the military violations screened by 
Kazeboon: “That's not what the media is saying, so when they started to think of ‘okay it's real, 
the army is doing that?’ (...)” (Annex 1, Yusef: 30). So the state media is not a useful 
communication channel for the Kazeboon campaign because of the lack of trust. 
Our informants point to the fact that interpersonal channels have been effective in spreading 
knowledge about Kazeboon. This is also emphasized by Rogers, as he defines interpersonal 
channels as the most effective in persuading an individual to adopt an innovation, since most 
people depend mainly upon subjective evaluations of an innovation (Rogers 2003: 18). When we 
asked our informants how they first knew about Kazeboon, some of them got to know it through 
friends, who have already been working on it and thus evaluated it beforehand: 
“So I have known it through friends who have been working on it and I have seen how to enter it. 
So through personal connections.” (Annex 1, Mohammed: 16). 
In this way some of our informants have been persuaded to adopt the campaign through 
interpersonal channels. This means that our informants find the campaign more credible, when it 
is recommended by people they know. 
Rogers adds that interpersonal channels are especially effective when they link individuals who 
are homophilous, defined as “similar in socioeconomic status, education, or other important 
ways” (Rogers 2003: 18), and less effective when the opposite is the case, and the individuals 
involved are heterophilous. According to Rogers the latter can be a problem in the diffusion of 
an innovation (Rogers 2003: 19). 
Our informants have described situations where they met people who had a certain idea of them 
as activists, for example Sara: “(...) they treat you like you're an alien. They look as us like 'why 
are you young people marching, what do you want?'” (Annex 1, Sara: 9). In this case the 
activists and these other people are very heterophilous. Our informants often describe this by 
referring to a difference between young people and their parents' generation, as Yusef says: 
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So for me as I'm in the streets and I am involved in the clashes and I saw it happen, so you 
can imagine... I came from that and I have to face my family's idea of 'you're burning Egypt, 
you're ruining the army and stop that (...) (Annex 1, Yusef: 32) 
 
Hence our informants find difficulty in persuading their families to adopt the message of 
Kazeboon, if they are very heterophilous. One of our informants describe Kazeboon as a way to 
bridge this generation gap: 
 
There is a pertinent idea of the activists being crazy young people not respecting laws and 
just making Egypt suffer, but at the screenings the audience can see that the activists are not 
thugs but ordinary young people and not only 100 percent activists. (Annex 1, Mariam: 37) 
 
Kazeboon screenings put a face on the activists, because they interact with people on the streets. 
Thus people on the streets can witness things by themselves and experience that the activists 
arranging the screenings are ordinary people and more similar to them than expected. This is 
important in the diffusion of the innovation, because they can identify themselves with the 
activists. 
In the next section we will elaborate on another important aspect in the diffusion process; the 
time span between the first encounter with Kazeboon and the adoption of the campaign. We will 
look at this in order to examine which type of adopters our informants are. 
6.2.5 Time 
Rogers designates time as an important factor in the diffusion of an innovation, and he defines 
the innovation-decision process, which an individual passes through from getting knowledge 
about the innovation to the decision to adopt or reject it (Rogers 2003: 20). The innovation-
decision process consists of five elements: knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation and 
confirmation. 
As explained most of our informants have gained knowledge about Kazeboon from friends or 
other personal connections, which have often been a source of persuasion to adopt Kazeboon as 
well. But one of our informants, Sara, got knowledge about the campaign in a different way. She 
saw the Kazeboon logo on a small graffiti in Down Town Cairo: 
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I saw (...) the letter 'Kaf' and the hat on top of it, and I was very curious 'what is that?', and I 
saw it several times, the graffiti and the sticker across Down Town. And then the word itself 
made sense for me. It's simple, it doesn't accuse anyone, it's 'they are liars' and we know 
who's 'they' because of the hat. (Annex 1, Sara: 9) 
 
Sara connects the word Kazeboon, which in Arabic means 'liars' with the military hat on top of 
the first letter. In this case the graffiti’s message of ‘military liars’ made sense for Sara, because 
she agrees with it. In Rogers' notion this would be defined as compatibility, which is “the degree 
to which an innovation is perceived as being consistent with the existing values, past 
experiences, and needs of potential adopters.” (Rogers 2003: 15). The message of Kazeboon 
was compatible with Sara's existing values and experiences with military violations. The 
innovation-decision process therefore went quickly from knowledge and persuasion to decision, 
implementation, and confirmation, because the degree of compatibility was high. The span of 
time from knowledge to confirmation differs according to different types of adopters, and we 
will now look at which types of adopters we have among our informants, in order to discuss if 
they play a role in the diffusion of Kazeboon. 
6.2.6 Adopter categories 
Rogers divides different types of adopters into five adopter categories: innovators, early 
adopters, early majority, late majority and laggards. The first category, innovators, are the first to 
adopt a new idea. They are active information seekers about new ideas and they cannot depend 
on subjective evaluations from others (Rogers 2003: 22). Sara's first encounter with Kazeboon is 
a good example of active information seeking, where she evaluates the new idea independently 
by using her knowledge from past experiences with military violations. 
Another informant, Ahmad, was exposed to Kazeboon while walking on a street where he saw a 
lot of people and a big screen. Then he walked up to some of the people standing next to the 
projector and offered his help with the movies, and this lead to his active participation in the 
campaign. Ahmad told us that he was first criticizing Kazeboon, because they were only showing 
movies in the upper middle class areas, but then the campaign started reaching people without 
access to social media and furthermore reached a lot of villages, which is what he really liked 
about Kazeboon (Annex 1, Ahmad: 33-34). Ahmad’s story is thus another example of active 
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information seeking. Our informants’ active information seeking process can characterize them 
as innovators in relation to Kazeboon. We have mostly looked as this category of adopters, since 
we expect the active information seekers to be the most active in communicating the innovation 
further, and thus the most influential in the diffusion process. Among our informants we also 
have representatives from the second category, the early adopters, who adopt an innovation after 
subjective evaluations from other people, like we saw in the above-mentioned example of 
Mohammed. We will not go further into the remaining three categories, since these are not 
represented among our informants, but now turn to another category that Rogers emphasizes in 
the diffusion process, that of opinions leaders. 
6.2.7 Opinion leaders 
When we asked our informants about their general use of social media, we found out that they do 
not only evaluate new ideas independently. They refer to people they trust on social media, who 
influence the information they get: “(...) you can be on top of one or two persons in each domain 
and they feed you with all the news that you need to know.” (Annex 1, Amjad: 22). 
In Rogers’ theory these persons are characterized as opinion leaders, as they are at the center of 
interpersonal communication networks, more innovative and serve as “a model for the 
innovation behavior of their followers” (Rogers 2003: 27). An example of our informants’ use of 
opinion leaders is the situation we referred to in the former chapter, where Mohammed called his 
friend Alaa Abd al Fettah, who is a well known blogger and political activist, to get advice on the 
authorities’ cancellation of an event (see chapter 6.1.3 No visible leader).  
But our informants do not only use opinion leaders, some of them also influence other people's 
behavior by being opinion leaders themselves. We have observed this for example on Twitter, 
where some of our informants have thousands of followers. By following our informants on 
Twitter and Facebook we have observed how they communicate about for example the military 
violence. They are very actively posting political statements and photos from protests on 
Facebook and raising debates. This enables us to define some of our informants as opinion 
leaders, as they influence others’ on Twitter and Facebook. Thus our informants play a role in a 
social system, which is the space where the diffusion of an innovation occurs. We will elaborate 
on this notion of a social system in the following. 
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6.2.8 A social system 
Rogers defines it as an important factor in the diffusion of an innovation, that it occurs within a 
social system, that Rogers defines as “a set of interrelated units that are engaged in joint 
problem solving to accomplish a common goal” (Rogers 2003: 23). He states that the members 
of the social system cooperate in order to solve a common problem and reach a common goal, 
and that sharing of this common objective binds the system together (Rogers 2003: 24). Our 
informants are all somehow related to Kazeboon and express a common goal of showing that the 
military are liars, and they can therefore be considered as members of a social system. However, 
Mohammed explained how Kazeboon has evolved over time, when we asked him how he first 
got to know Kazeboon: 
 
I organized one event and attended a couple, and when this momentum grew bigger Kazeboon 
has expanded and become more like an umbrella that would have this goal of bringing down 
the military rule and they would work on exposing the military in any way possible. (Annex 1, 
Mohammed: 15) 
 
This momentum was due to the continuous incidents of violations from the military, and our 
informants describe that it got to a point where they had enough. A common objective of 
bringing down the military was binding the community of activists together, but some of our 
informants have also explained how it later on has split into different communities with different 
goals: “Before people were fighting for the same case – putting down the regime – but now they 
are fighting each other because of the coming president election” (Annex 1, Marwa: 43). This 
shows how a social community can change according to its political context and that a social 
system is not a stable entity. 
Interrelated units can quickly split, when the objective changes, and people start fighting each 
other because of different goals instead of cooperating. We thus argue, that the social system is 
not necessarily a set of interrelated units as Rogers claim, when applying it in the Egyptian 
context, where there have been a lot of changes in the political situation during the last year.  
6.2.9 Sub-conclusion 
We have now examined the diffusion of Kazeboon and looked into the four elements that Rogers 
define as central when innovations diffuse; innovation, communication channels, time and social 
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system. We have defined Kazeboon as an innovation because of its innovative methods. Further 
we have defined our informants as innovators due to their high speed of adoption and 
independent evaluation of Kazeboon. 
Our analysis has pointed out a challenge for the diffusion of the Kazeboon campaign. The 
Egyptian society is split on the issue of the military, and therefore the campaign is facing 
situations where rejectors refuse to believe the message of the campaign. According to Rogers an 
innovation exists within a social system consisting of interrelated units, however, we question 
whether this notion is relevant in an Egyptian context. With huge political changes, the 
momentum of Kazeboon has evolved from a general aversion against the military and a common 
goal to include questions about presidential elections and political development and varying 
opinions in these issues.  
We use this analysis to understand how the campaign is spreading, and it gives us a basis to 
further examine the reception of the campaign. In the following chapter we will thus look at how 
our informants perceive the campaign and interact with it. We focus on what our informants 
consider when they evaluate the campaign as credible or not. 
 
6.3 Reception of Kazeboon 
 
In this chapter we will look into the reception of the campaign and how our informants perceive 
it. All of our informants use social media in their search for information. But in this search, how 
do they decide what is credible information and trustworthy sources? The issue of credibility is 
central in Kazeboon, as the aim is to show documentations of military violence, which some 
people perceive as fabricated. In this chapter the focus will be on our informants considerations 
when they evaluate Kazeboon as credible or not. To further understand the reception we will 
examine the way our informants use social media in Kazeboon, and how this creates a blurred 
distinction between the senders and receivers of information. We will look at this sender-receiver 
relation in order to explain the importance of interpersonal connections in the process of sharing 
the information from Kazeboon. Next we will examine the notion of credibility to analyze on 
what grounds our informants build their judgement of information and sources. We will 
elaborate on this through three types of credibility: source credibility, emergent credibility and 
endorsed credibility. 
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6.3.1 Sender and receiver 
In this section we will look at the sender-receiver relation in Kazeboon, since this is important in 
understanding the dynamics of the information sharing process within the campaign. 
In the following quote Flanagin and Metzger define the constant interactivity among users of 
digital media, which we will use as an outset to examine how they play a double role: 
 
The interactivity afforded by digital media has set up an expectation among many young 
people to play roles as both information source and receiver simultaneously as they critique, 
alter, remix, and share content in an almost conversational manner using digital media. 
(Flanagin & Metzger 2008: 6) 
 
A receiver of information or videos from Kazeboon often becomes a sender as well, since one of 
the methods of Kazeboon is to forward the message to someone else. Sara explains how 
information online is diffused in a high pace: “If one idea comes from one person, in one day it's 
circulated” (Annex 1, Sara: 10). Hence the expectation mentioned by Flanagin and Metzger to 
act as both source and receiver is an underlying aspect in Kazeboon as this is one of the tools to 
diffuse the campaign, engaging the receivers in the interactive sharing of videos. 
Kazeboon has created a space where people can share information, which is what Castells 
describes as one of the concepts of mass self-communication. Providing an opportunity to upload 
and share information and videos, Kazeboon creates a network of a variety of senders. As a 
result the campaign has developed into a platform with a variety of senders. But when receivers 
like our informants are subjected to a constant flow of information from various sources, how do 
they choose what to believe in? This leads to the next subject of importance in the analysis of the 
sharing process within the campaign, namely credibility. 
We argue that the speed and range of the circulation process (mentioned by Sara) depend on how 
the credibility of the sender is judged by the receiver. In the process of sharing the content of 
Kazeboon the individual perception of this content becomes important, as each person creates his 
or her own idea of what is true and false. This affects what information is shared and what is not, 
which we will elaborate on this in the next section. 
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6.3.2 Credibility 
An important factor in our informants’ judgement of information is the question of source 
reliability. We wish to show that credibility is not a fixed concept, since it can emerge from and 
change in the process of sharing information. Therefore we find it relevant to use Flanagin and 
Metzger's definition of credibility to elaborate on the basic mechanics behind the exchange of 
information within the campaign. According to them credibility equals the believability of a 
source or message, and they identify two primary dimensions: trustworthiness and expertise 
(Flanagin & Metzger 2008: 8). Trustworthiness relies on the receiver’s judgement based on 
subjective factors and the expertise defines more objective characteristics like professional skills 
or knowledge, but it also includes subjective perceptions.  
In the case of Kazeboon we re-interpret the notion of expertise to be a result of the level of social 
activism instead. We argue that the receivers' perception of the expertise of a source within the 
campaign can be present on two levels: in the campaign itself and among all the individuals 
sharing their videos. Anyone who shares a video documenting his or her presence in a certain 
event can be considered an expert, and information send by them will be considered more 
reliable. The amount of video evidence affects the perception of expertise and Kazeboon 
becomes an expertise community. 
On the other hand trustworthiness of a source is based on personal perception and individual 
judgement. The decision-making process of the receiver is affected by various aspects, such as 
personal relations, background knowledge and social context. An example of how the perception 
of trustworthiness can differ from one person to another is expressed by Marwa. She talks about 
the generation gap and how her mother would not believe that the military is using violence 
against the people and lives in a 'denial state'. 
Radwa describes it as a fear of not knowing what else to believe in, and if the rejectors choose to 
believe the campaign “(…) they won't be standing on solid ground.” (Annex 1, Radwa: 5). 
Kamilah explains how the perception of Kazeboon can also be a matter of loyalty: “(…) they 
don't believe because they think that the military says the truth, because some families work with 
them (the military).” (Annex 1, Kamilah: 42). 
These examples refer to the receivers' social context and understanding of the reality they live in. 
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When we asked Radwa if she ever changed someone’s perception of the military, she answered 
that she was able to convince her parents that the military is lying. Furthermore she confirmed 
that her parents believed her, because of her strong personal relation to them as their daughter. 
We have shown that our informants' judgement of information is a result of their perception of 
the source. Therefore we will use the next section to explain how they, as receivers of Kazeboon, 
choose their sources of information. 
6.3.3 Source credibility 
In this part of the analysis we will examine how our informants choose their sources and look 
into the criteria on which they base their perception of a source. 
According to Flanagin and Metzger the decision to trust something or someone in face-to-face 
interaction is often based on personal relationship and contact. In the case of the Internet and 
social media, this is no longer a prerequisite for credibility, as we receive more and more 
information online, through sources that are primarily known to us in nontraditional ways not 
based on the personal face-to-face meeting (Flanagin & Metzger 2008: 6). 
We agree that the access to sources of online information can be constrained, since source 
information in some cases is unavailable, masked or entirely missing. But the question of source 
credibility is of great importance to our informants, and there is a general tendency among them 
to build their perception of the source on personal relations and experience. This contradicts 
Flanagin and Metzger's argument that personal relations are given less attention online (Ibid.: 
13). We argue that our informants have found ways of overcoming this uncertainty of source 
credibility through their personal networks. Some connections within these networks are based 
on face-to-face interaction, while others are only practiced through the online medium. 
Especially in the case of the latter, the judgement of a source is affected more by experience than 
personal relations. When we asked Amjad how he chooses what he finds credible or not on the 
Internet, he underlines the fact that it depends on the source. In the following quote he elaborates 
on his general choice of sources, noting that his judgment of credibility is not 'one hundred 
percent certain', but it is his own personal perception. 
 
The people I follow on Twitter, the people I check the references of or those posts of on 
Facebook are people that are... again I can not be one hundred percent certain, but they are 
people that are credible whether they are political activists, bloggers, writers, TV presenters, 
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media affiliated people, whatever, they are people that I trust and I have seen consistency in 
their work, I have seen credibility to what they say. I have seen their statements for the last, 
about year and a half now and it is constantly the same so, they are more trustworthy people 
(...) (Annex 1, Amjad: 23) 
 
One thing that is repeatedly mentioned by our informants as an important factor in the judgement 
of a source is consistency, which means that the choice of sources is a process and it takes time 
and personal experience to navigate between false and true. But sometimes it also depends on 
logic and knowledge about their physical surroundings. This is explained by Radwa, when we 
asked her how she verifies what she reads on social media: “(…) I live in it… If people write 
about violence in this street I either call my friend living there or I go check for myself – I just 
go.” (Annex 1, Radwa: 6) 
In this section we argue that although source information is often less accessible online, the 
question of source credibility is still an important factor when our informants gather information. 
In the next section we will look at the kind of credibility that emerges from Kazeboon, where 
multiple sources are centralized in one location and perceived as one source. 
6.3.4 Emergent credibility 
Now we will look at the emergent credibility in Kazeboon, which is a result of the collective 
accumulation of information within the campaign. We wish to show that the credibility of the 
campaign is affected by the number of people engaging in it, by uploading videos. 
In Kazeboon information and videos are accumulated through a wide range of sources and 
channeled out through one location, for example the campaign's YouTube channel. It can create 
a sense of distrust from the receivers, caused by the lack of information about the sources who 
upload the videos. But at the same time it can be a channel for producing credibility, which is 
what Flanagin and Metzger describe as emergent credibility. Emergent credibility arises from 
group and social engagement like wikis, social networking sites, and other applications providing 
information repositories created by largely self-coordinating individuals (Flanagin & Metzger 
2008: 12). In this regard “(…) credibility can sometimes be an emergent phenomenon that arises 
from a pool of resources, archived through a system of open access to all.” (Ibid.). 
Kazeboon is a perfect example of emergent credibility in the sense that it works as a channel for 
various sources, it is leaderless, and does not follow a policy dictated by a certain authority. This 
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is also what Sara describes as one of the beauties of the campaign and what makes it credible: 
“It's credible because it's independent from anyone and anything, there is no motive for a 
specific person or a group behind it” (Annex 1, Sara: 13). 
While source credibility is based on information about the individual source, we argue that 
emergent credibility depends on the collective accumulation of information. It becomes credible 
by virtue of the collective verification of information. Earlier in this chapter we described how 
the mechanics of the information sharing process in the campaign creates a double role, when the 
receiver often becomes the information source as well. In this process the act of forwarding a 
message becomes a verification in itself. In the next paragraph we will look at how this can also 
result in endorsed credibility, where the nature of the source can create a higher level of 
credibility. 
6.3.5 Endorsed credibility 
The notion of endorsed credibility is relevant to discuss in the context of the Kazeboon 
campaign, since all of our informants, when asked about their choice of sources, nominate some 
sources as being more trustworthy than others. Flanagin and Metzger argue that despite the 
physical distance that prevails in an online environment, group and social engagement play a 
crucial role in the construction of credibility. They define endorsed credibility as based on active 
approval of information and sources from other online actors (Flanagin & Metzger 2008: 10). 
When we asked Mohammed how he decides what to believe on Facebook and Twitter, he 
describes how some information is automatically verified when coming from certain sources: 
 
(...) there are certain people throughout the last couple of years that I have began to trust and 
I know that they are credible people, so whatever comes from them I know they have verified 
the sources and I know they are credible sources that I take as a credible source (...) (Annex 
1, Mohammed: 17) 
 
Furthermore he elaborates on the nature of these trustworthy sources and mentions two kinds of 
sources; those he has chosen after a couple of years experience after following their statements 
on Twitter without meeting them in person, and then the 'frontline comrades', as he characterizes 
the people who stood next to him when fighting the police in the streets (Annex 1, Mohammed: 
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18). The former being based on what we earlier described as experience and the latter being a 
result of close personal relations. 
Another important aspect of the endorsed credibility is, according to Flanagin and Metzger, 
reputation, and the approval from a well-regarded actor or organization can have a convincing 
effect (Flanagin & Metzger 2008: 10). In regards to Kazeboon this aspect is very important, as 
the videos shown through the campaign reflect back on Kazeboon and affect the reputation of the 
campaign. That means that for some people a video's validity is confirmed when it is shown in a 
Kazeboon context, meaning that the campaign in itself gives validity for some people and puts a 
credibility stamp on it. The result is that some receivers believe everything that comes out of the 
campaign, for example our informant Marwa, who states that the videos of Kazeboon have been 
shared to the extend that they must be true (Annex 1, Marwa: 43). Here Marwa creates her 
perception of the Kazeboon videos from her own logic; when a lot of people have perceived the 
videos as true, they must be so. In this example the endorsement happens as a result of the 
collective engagement in Kazeboon. 
The validity of the videos shown by Kazeboon is therefore important, and many opponents to 
Kazeboon have tried to change the perception of the campaign by accusing the videos of being 
false and fabricated. Mohammed says the following about the opponents: 
 
Of course the state propaganda has created this idea that with photoshop you can create 
photos and you can manipulate a video to make it show that the military is running people 
over, (...) so some people would still be stuck in denial saying that this is not happening, this 
is fabricated and not true. (Annex 1, Mohammed: 16) 
 
By challenging the reputation of the campaign as being trustworthy, the opponents might reduce 
some receivers' perception of the campaign as credible. 
We conclude that endorsed credibility affects the flow of information and videos by influencing 
the receivers' perceptions and selections of their sources. It becomes a tool of navigation in the 
constant flow of information. 
6.3.6 Sub-conclusion  
In this chapter we have looked at the reception of Kazeboon and which mechanics affect our 
informants' perception of the campaign and furthermore influence the diffusion of information. 
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We argue that the receivers of Kazeboon often play the double role as receivers and information 
sources, as a result of the way Kazeboon engages receivers in interactive sharing of videos. In 
the process of sharing and receiving, credibility becomes one of the main factors leading our 
informants in their search for reliable sources. The nature of the sources and our informants' 
relations to these affect their perceptions, which are often based on personal relations and 
experience. The level of consistency is one of the measures that our informants use, and this is 
directly connected to their own experience in navigating in the stream of information online. To 
examine the effect of a campaign like Kazeboon in regard to credibility, we have introduced 
emergent credibility to explain the kind of credibility emerging from the campaign, as a result of 
its nature of being a channel for many sources at once. Finally, we have analyzed the notion of 
endorsed credibility, as this is an important aspect in our informants' selection of information. 
They nominate certain sources as more credible than others and therefore perceive information 
coming from them as true. Kazeboon in itself is also perceived by some of our informants as an 
actor who can endorse credibility to the videos they send out, but this relies on its reputation and 
the receivers' perception of the campaign in general. 
One of the things that makes Kazeboon unique according to our informants, is its way of 
reaching people without Internet by arranging screenings in public spaces around Egypt. 
However, while those of our informants who are active in the campaign are stating, that the 
campaign is reaching far out and have had screenings in all the cities and capitals of the 
governorates (Annex 1, Wael: 36). Others are more cautious when discussing the potential of 
campaigns based on the Internet, like Kazeboon, of actually reaching out and including people 
who do not have Internet access. This will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
6.4 A bubble of activists? 
 
With an outset in what we have learned about Kazeboon, the context it works in, its ways of 
diffusing and the reception of it, we find it necessary to challenge the aspect of outreach. One of the 
campaign's strong characteristics is its wide outreach and ability to reach the general public in Egypt 
by bringing social media to the streets. But is this just an optimistic way of looking at the effect of 
the campaign, since it uses social media as a tool of diffusion in a country where only 26,4 percent 
have access to the Internet, and is it in fact just a part of a bubble of social media activists? 
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Since Kazeboon uses social media as a tool to diffuse the message of the campaign, we find it 
necessary to discuss how social movements use social media as a channel to communicate their 
message. We will use Castells' concept of network society and mass self-communication to analyze 
whether or not social media in general can work as an effective tool to influence matters in the 
society. Finally, based on statements from our informants about people on social media being inside 
a bubble, we will take a critical approach to the outreach of Kazeboon. Can we talk about a bubble, 
and if so, how are the dynamics of this bubble? 
6.4.1 Social media as a tool 
Castells argues that mass self-communication channels such as social media can work as a medium 
for social movements to build their sovereignty and confront the institutions of society in their own 
way. Not necessarily originated by technology, but by the use of technology (Castells 2007: 11-12). 
Our informants describe social media as a tool to reach other groups in society: “We used social 
media as a tool to reach out to certain people precisely the youth, but we did not only want to reveal 
the lies of SCAF on the Internet, but also on the streets.” (Annex 1, Wael: 35). 
In the Egyptian context mainstream media is a main source of information for the majority of the 
country, and the goal of Kazeboon is to bring the message of military violence to people, since 
mainstream media does not do this sufficiently according to our informants. We argue that 
Kazeboon uses social media as a tool to put military violence on the agenda, since they consider 
social media as a more credible source of information. This corresponds with Castells, when he 
states that “actors striving for social change often use the Internet platform as a way to influence the 
information agenda of mainstream media.” (Castells 2007: 252). 
Many of our informants explain how they get most of their news, if not all of them, from social 
media and how they often find this a more credible source than mainstream media. It can though be 
questioned, if there is a complete distinction between mainstream media and news from social 
media, since a lot of the news that flourish on social media are from mainstream media. Furthermore 
our informants follow mainstream media through their Twitter and Facebook accounts. Amjad 
explains how he trusts news from social media more than mainstream media:  
 
(...) it has become your source of information especially with the fact, bear in mind, that the 
amount of people that actually trust government sources in terms of TV or media, like 
mainstream news is very little (...) (Annex 1, Amjad: 23) 
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During the clashes in Abbasiya in early May 20124 many of our informants became our sources of 
information to how the situation developed. We followed their status updates on Facebook and their 
tweets on Twitter, which included information and pictures from the clashes. One day we discussed 
with one of our Egyptian friends the number of estimated killings in the clashes, since both the 
Egyptian and Danish mainstream media were claiming different numbers. Our friend, who knows 
our informant Mohammed, suggested that we looked at Mohammed’s Twitter account for numbers, 
as he had been active in posting information about the clashes. This specific episode indicates how 
our friend considers Mohammed as a more credible source, since he turns to him for the number of 
estimated killings rather than to the mainstream media. 
6.4.2 Reaching out from social media? 
During our interviews with our informants we have experienced contradictions in their statements 
about the outreach of Kazeboon. Two of them say that the campaign has reached all areas of Egypt 
(Annex 1, Wael, Kamilah), while others are more skeptical towards this and challenge this 
perception. 
In this section we will focus on our informants' perception of the outreach and analyze their 
reflections on this issue, since we find it interesting that some of them are aware that Kazeboon 
might just represent a small community, and some of them even call it a bubble. 
           
When we discussed with our informants about the success of Kazeboon, some of them emphasized 
the feeling of ownership towards the campaign: “(...) it's not a person's idea, it's for everyone, it's 
popular, and it's the people's media, it's not imposed by any interest.” (Annex 1, Sara: 10). In this 
quote Sara states that Kazeboon is the people’s media and for everyone. But when Kazeboon uses 
social media to mobilize people to participate actively in the campaign, it can be questioned if the 
campaign is really the people’s media and for everyone as Sara states. But in the same interview she 
                                                
4 On the 29th of April 2012, Egyptian protesters staged a sit-in at the Ministry of Defence in Abbasiya area in Cairo 
were they were demanding the end of military rule as a comment to the presidential elections running on the 23 and 
24 of may 2012. The following days thousands of Egyptians marched to the defense ministry after protests in 
Abbasiya.  The sit in resulted in clashes between protesters and military forces were an estimated 20 people were 
killed: http://www.citizenside.com/en/photos/politics/2012-04-29/59841/violence-breaks-out-in-the-abbasiya-
district-of-cairo-egypt.html 
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reflects on this issue in particular, when she refers to a so-called bubble: “Gradually I started 
realizing that it's a bubble. People who are on Twitter and Facebook believe that what ever they are 
discussing is what the world is discussing.” (Annex 1, Sara: 11). 
Sara is thus aware of the fact that people in the bubble can be ignorant to some degree, when they 
forget that what they are discussing on social media is not what everybody else is discussing. Most 
of our informants are critical towards to what extent things on social media reach people without 
Internet access, when they refer to social media activists and themselves as a bubble: “(...) and 
somehow it seems like these people in this bubble tend to like forget that they are in this bubble.” 
(Annex 1, Amjad: 25). Our informants are critical towards this bubble, because what exists on social 
media sometimes only exists there, since only a little more than a fourth of the Egyptian population 
have access to the Internet, as one of our informants explains: 
 
You will find that they are within the realm of social media enclosed in their own bubble, and 
they are having their own arguments online but there is a complete world out there that 
constitutes the bigger majority of Egypt, that has no access to these things. (Annex 1, Amjad: 25) 
 
Our informants are thus aware of their own existence in the bubble, as they constantly underline 
their critique of the way social media is enclosed in it. Our informants repeatedly describe how they 
perceive Kazeboon as a tool to reach people outside the bubble (Annex 1, Sara, Wael). They are 
therefore aware of the importance of reaching further than the bubble. 
We recognize that a lot of our informants are a part of this social media bubble, but nevertheless we 
see their engagement in Kazeboon as an expansion of the bubble towards including more people 
without access to the Internet. An example of this is our informant Wael, who has limited access to 
social media, but he is active in Kazeboon and has been it from the beginning of the campaign. 
6.4.3 The dynamics of the bubble 
Our informants’ awareness of the so-called bubble thus creates dynamics and causes that the bubble 
is not a stable entity. We argue that even if the social system of activists operates in a bubble, it is an 
expanding and moving bubble. As described in the context, Kazeboon focuses on reaching out to the 
people who only get their news from mainstream media. We therefore argue that Kazeboon is a 
campaign that tries to expand this bubble and possibly even try to burst it, because they intent to 
bridge a gap between activities on social media and people without access to the Internet. 
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Furthermore we argue that with the expansion of the bubble, it simultaneously increases awareness 
on this gap. 
When the so-called bubble reaches out to more and more people, it expands and creates a bigger 
bubble and even new bubbles. Therefore we argue that this expanding bubble has an affect on how 
far Kazeboon reaches, since the new bubbles create new Kazeboon events and reaches more people, 
either through social media or street events. In addition to this we claim that Kazeboon succeeds in 
reaching out to a bigger audience than on social media, when new bubbles occur as a result of a 
street event. This is explained by some of our informants who knew about Kazeboon through a 
screening on the street and face-to-face interaction, not through the Internet (Annex 1, Ahmad). 
Furthermore, this is corresponding with Rogers when he states that interpersonal channels are the 
most effective communication channel when adopting an innovation. We therefore argue that with 
the expansion of the bubble it is reaching other communities than the ones on social media 
6.4.4 Sub-conclusion 
From this analysis we have found, that the social system of activists engaged in an online campaign 
like Kazeboon is a so-called bubble. But it is important to underline, that our informants are aware 
of that. They reflect on the existence of the bubble and on how important it is to reach out, especially 
to people without Internet access. Our informants are aware of not forgetting their own existence in 
this bubble and initiatives like Kazeboon is created. This leads us to argue, that it has an impact on 
what happens outside the bubble. The bubble has an impact because it expands and creates more 
bubbles, when the activists involved in Kazeboon influence others to engage in the campaign. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
We have carried out fieldwork in Egypt in April and May 2012 among ten young Egyptians engaged 
in the Kazeboon campaign in different ways. Motivated by an urge to understand how Kazeboon is 
achieving their aim of bringing documentation shared on social media to the streets, we have 
examined different aspects of the campaign. We have been looking into Kazeboon’s methods and 
philosophy, its diffusion among our informants, and its credibility. Finally we have discussed the 
outreach of Kazeboon. In the following we will summarize the findings of our research. 
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We conclude that our informants perceive Kazeboon as something outstanding compared to other 
initiatives, because of its methods and decentralized structure. In addition we have found how 
Kazeboon in some ways fits Sepstrup’s theoretical definition of a campaign and how it deviates. We 
can conclude that Kazeboon deviates from Sepstrup’s characterizations of a campaign exactly 
because of its decentralization and absence of leaders. This is due to its horizontal patterns of 
communication. The structure of the campaign is reflecting the Egyptian political context and the 
decentralized organization of the revolution and argue that a skepticism towards formal leaders 
emphasize the importance of the leader-less structure of Kazeboon.  
We perceive Kazeboon as an innovation, based on its innovative methods. We conclude that most of 
our informants can be defined as innovators based on the way they have adopted the campaign. They 
have become acquainted with it and hereafter actively sought more information. We have found that 
a challenge of Kazeboon is that rejectors refuses to adopt the campaign’s message, because it is not 
compatible with their values, beliefs, and experiences. Furthermore, we can conclude that some of 
our informants play a role in the social system as opinion leaders, as they influence others through 
social media. We argue that in the contemporary Egyptian context Kazeboon does not exist in the 
same social system of interrelated units as Rogers describes, as least not to the extent it did when it 
first emerged. This is due to political changes, where a previous opposition against the military is 
now blurred by different meanings about the development of the situation and the president 
elections. 
When examining our informants´ reception of the campaign, we are focusing on credibility and 
argue that this is affected by the role our informants play as both senders and receivers of 
information. Additionally we conclude that credibility and consistency are some of the main factors, 
when our informants choose which sources to believe.  
We state that Kazeboon manages to reach out to people who do not have access to social media, but 
some of the activists engaged in Kazeboon on social media are navigating within what they call a 
bubble. However, the activists are aware of the limits of this bubble and we argue that this 
awareness is a central factor, since it makes them direct their activities outside of the bubble, like 
they do with Kazeboon. We also argue that since the bubble has an impact on what happens outside 
of it, like with Kazeboon through screenings, the bubble is constantly moving and expanding. Due to 
Kazeboon’s decentralized structure, new bubbles are created, when new actors implement the 
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campaign in their context. This is showing us how the Kazeboon campaign is diffused and 
implemented among its receivers. Our informants are both senders and receivers of the campaign, 
and we have identified how they play a central role in the diffusion process, some of them as opinion 
leaders, others by sharing with friends and other relations. They share it because they agree with the 
aim of the campaign, they believe it to be true and they feel ownership towards due to its 
decentralized methods. 
8. Resumé 
 
Dette projekt tager udgangspunkt i to måneders feltarbejde i Egypten i april og maj 2012. Vores 
genstandsfelt er en kampagne ved navn Kazeboon, som er opstået efter en række voldelige 
overgreb fra militæret på civile under demonstrationer i Kairo siden præsident Mubaraks fald i 
februar 2011. Kazeboons mål er at sprede dokumentation af disse overgreb, som er blevet 
dokumenteret af aktivister og andre civile, som har optaget videoer og lagt dem på YouTube. 
Kun 26,4 procent af den egyptiske befolkning har adgang til internettet, og Kazeboon forsøger at 
nå ud til de egyptere, som ikke har adgang til internet ved at afholde filmfremvisninger på 
offentlige steder i forskellige byer i Egypten. 
Vi argumenterer for at Kazeboon adskiller sig fra andre kampagner på grund af dens 
decentraliserede struktur uden en central leder eller afsender. Vores målgruppe er unge egyptere, 
som både har modtaget Kazeboon via filmfremvisninger og via sociale medier. Vi bruger 
kommunikationsteori til at undersøge hvilke processer og redskaber, som gør sig gældende, når 
kampagnen spredes, og hvordan den modtages og vurderes som troværdig eller utroværdig. Efter 
at have interviewet ti unge egyptere om deres forhold til kampagnen vurderer vi, i hvilket 
omfang kampagnen rækker ud over de sociale medier eller om den befinder sig i en ‘bobbel’. 
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Annex 1. Transcriptions of interviews
Interview with Radwa in Cairo, April 16, 2012
 
R = Radwa
I = Interviewer
R: So actually the whole idea happened with voluntarism, so you just volunteer: I want a show right 
now, so how can you help me? people can help, people show up, and sometimes before you actually 
show up you get a phone call from whoever the security or somethings. Then you hear that it's 
better that you don't have the show so when you actually arrive there you either have a lot of people 
that are chanting against you or against...or actually pro the SCAF pro the military council, and then 
at the end of the day you just had to either protect your screening and go on with the show or it will 
end up in like a march around the area with you chanting against them. So it depends, sometimes 
they were able to shot down the screen and shot down everything and the people went on in the 
streets and the show did not succeed however in a lot of areas the show up was really huge. Like in 
Ma'adi for instance it was always the most successful because a lot of people always gathered up. 
They were pro of the whole idea of having a show. And a lot of people would not known that this 
was happening where able to see for real because they were hitting the streets that never witnessed 
like a march and never were able to see or participate in things like that. So it's just going to the 
people. So even if the people were against it at the end of the day you created a fuzz about 
everything, you know?! The worse case scenario when you had a success in actually showing the 
movies is that roaming the streets that never had marches before, demonstrations before with the 
demands so it was clear.
I: The screenings are actually on the streets, it's not related to an organization…?
R: No no no no. It's very decentralized and it just happens: ah we want to do this show in this area, 
any volunteers?! any equipment needed…(?)…it's very decentralized.
I: And the only tool for like spreading information about the campaigns are online or…?
R: Online yes.
I: Have you ever been to an event?
R: Yes. I've been to one of their very first events in Heliopolis and this event was also when we they 
were mobilizing the people and so on for this. When we went there there were people who were pro 
the SCAF so we had chants from this side and then chants from this side and then chants form this 
side and then chants for this side, until we just decided no no this is not going to happen because it's 
not like a football match so everybody was silent and when the show started everybody was silent 
for a while and then when it was the end of the show we just went around in Heliopolis in the 
streets that never witnessed anything and then people were actually looking from their houses to see 
what was happening so it was very interesting.
I: What was the movie about?
R: The violations of the SCAF like the violations…the violence during the events near the prime 
ministers office. A lot of violations were there because those videos were not spreading and in the 
press conference of SCAF themselves they always say that 'Ough this is not happening, this is 
photoshopped this is bla bla bla'. So actually had these videos on the streets and tell me, 'okay this 
happened', so if you are deciding to believe in national TV that does not air those videos these 
videos are coming to you so that's the whole idea. So they have to see them. So just turning the 
blind eye on those videos on those violations is not an option anymore because we are coming to 
you.
I: and who made these videos?
R: those videos were, it's a collection of videos that were recorded by the people in the 
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demonstrations and so on. Either the activists that are in the demonstrations themselves or by 
journalists. You can actually find them online.
I: we saw some actually but it's just good to ask to know like…cause I was curious is it just how, if 
you go and record something is it…or is it just shows as it is or did they change anything? did they 
edit something like, to do like a movie?
R: What I know of is that there were certain movies that they use and then as the show itself 
developed when it reached Ma'ady for instance the third or the fourth show it was a movie that was 
footage from different videos and it was edited and done…so its. That's what I know. It was started 
as a simple thing and it went on.
I: So how does the video get from the person who record and to…?
R: it's available online.
I: do you have to upload to a specific address or..?
R: it's YouTube. YouTube is making everything, and life is much easier…(?). So you actually 
finding yourself having all the videos on Facebook and YouTube. It's really decentralized.
I: We went to YouTube and looked and you see that it was 3skar Kazeboon who put it up, so we 
were wondering if its some people who are connected to Kazeboon who upload the videos.
R: yeah yeah, there are people who work on that, That's why I'm telling you that it developed. It 
started from just normal videos and normal footage that are there and they are not in a certain video 
and then as the campaign went on and on and gained popularity they started to edit a bit in it. When 
it reached Ma'ydy for instance it had hugged number of audience like thousands really thousands, 
and they are just staying, standing, just watching what is there.
I: this is the movie that we maybe saw.
R: Yeah yeah yeah.
I: How often are there screenings?
R: It was very popular like on daily basis cause it's very decentralized during a certain phase but 
then as the…not the violations themselves started but as we went on in the transition phase itself the 
focus was not on that anymore because they were extremely popular and the idea itself was there 
and nobody could say that nooo they are not liars, everybody knew it. And all the stickers were on 
everywhere so when the message was delivered that line happened (?). And then other campaigns 
took up the momentum and started but I'm not sure if they are as famous as this.
I: are there still screenings in these days?
R: no, not that I know of. But we can ask Sara, because I've been traveling for some time but I 
know for sure that there are no events those days with Kazeboon. You can make sure from Sara.
I: Yesterday on there Facebook page and also on Twitter they said that there was an event at two 
o'clock at Cairo University where they are going to show a movie called: munatheeqoon. You heard 
about that?
R: I didn't hear about that movie but…again they are changing the scope itself and there is another 
actually, campaign also that has the same intension which is Haqeemoon, like 'put them to trial'. So 
the idea itself is spreading but the one that gained popularity, and the one that was spread 
everywhere was this.
I: and we went there but the university didn't know anything about it.
R: It didn't happen or they didn't let you in?
I: they didn't let us in.
I: they really didn't let us in because they said that there was nothing and they didn't know about it 
and stuff so…
R: of course. And the whole idea of those kinds of shows is that you don't take permission. Like you 
just go there, show up, put the screen and it's like 'we're doing it'. So it's, you don't take permission 
because at the end of the day those are the systems that you are fighting against. So you don't take 
the permission from them and in most of the cases the permission is not granted so why go through 
this.
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I: so the case yesterday has probably been some university students themselves and then all of the 
sudden they put it on Facebook and they make it.
R: Yeah. And in so many cases some of the universities actually were totally against and took the 
things from the students but at the end of the day a lot of students gathered and they started chanting 
they gave them back and they will get started.
I: and when was the first time you knew about the Kazeboon? I know it's long time ago.
R: It's after the events of the…where the violence that took place around the prime minister's office 
when they broke the sit-inn. Because that's when it got really irritating that whatever you say 
happened and whatever you witnessed people tell you 'la' this didn't happen and actually 'no I saw 
that, I was there, I was running the people' 'no that didn't happen' 'no no, it WAS happening'. So 
there was no other way of telling the people that this was happening but that.
I: but did you know like…do you remember you knew about the campaign, was it just because you 
were talking about it or was it just there or was it on Facebook or Twitter?
R: no because, I'm actually…I'm part of a lot of initiatives and I'm part of a lot of things so before it 
was on Twitter and on Facebook we knew that somethings gonna happen and….called Kazeboon so 
if you are interested just join and so on. But then again I was too engaged in a lot if things so I 
didn't go with the organization.
I: how many are they?
R: I have no idea but it's a lot. I have no idea of the exact number.
I: but it's a lot of people?
R: Yeah a lot of people because it started with a small number but then again it became very 
decentralized and anyone can have a Kazeboon show. And that's one of the basic success factors.
I: yeah, that everybody can make a screening anywhere.
R: yeah
I: that's maybe also the goal of the campaign…
R: yes, and that it reaches all the streets everywhere not just in Cairo it's everywhere so it actually 
reach a lot of governaries. And one of the conferences that I attended actually a German politician 
was citing Kazeboon, I was like 'Yes! finally we made it' it was interesting. And I was tweeting 
them. I was like 'okay guys you succeeded, I'm at an international conference and they are citing 
you'
I: I just signed up for Twitter yesterday. So last year I know.
R: Being in Egypt those days mean that you have to be on Twitter 24/7, that's where you just get a 
sense of all the initiatives and everything.
I: So you are part of a lot of different initiatives?
R: Yes
I: Do you think…is it a lot of the same people like in the Kazeboon in the 'No to Military Trial' and 
all the different like…?
R: no not the same people but the community itself is not that big so you actually get familiar with 
the people. It's not a huge community right now at this moment but it's not the same people.
I: maybe you should tell more about yourself cause I know a lot about you but they don't know 
anything.
R: okay, I work in a NGO for the Egyptian Federation (?) I'm project manager there.
I: and that's the partner organization of ..(?).. Youth?
R: yes in the project ambassador dialogue and we do a lot of other projects as well. I'm doing my 
Master Degree in International Relation. I'm the head of a campaigning …(?) work of a political 
movement called Asahwa, I volunteer in another NGO working in one of the poorest villages like 
the one thousands poorest villages of Egypt, like the one thousands black spots. They are living 
under poverty line. I volunteer in an education team there working on the school there because it's 
really….they have a lot of work to do with the school. The students, the teachers, and everything, 
the facilities and everything, so this is also what I do.
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I: What is it called that organization?
R: it's called 'al-Thouq al-Haya' (?) it's working in a village called Kouffrah Meye (?) which is near 
Giezah so…it's very underdeveloped.
I: how old are you?
R: I'm 25
I: I knew…which university do you…?
R: I'm doing my Master in the American University in Cairo but I had my Bachelor degree from 
Cairo University.
I: was your Bachelor in International Relations?
R: Political Science
I: like Nadia?
R: yes
I: did you study together?
R: no, I'm older than Nadia. Nadia is in her senior year and I graduated from four years.
I: and you are living far away from here?
R: yes, very
I: where do you live?
R: I live in 6th of October, it's near the desert road, in the beginning of the desert road, the high way. 
But not an agricultural road because we have a lot of high ways. So, but you are mainly focused on 
the Kazeboon, as far as I understand?
I: we are interested in how people receive stories and how like where do receive your stories, how 
do you receive it and do you respond on that every time and…
I: and how…and in a campaign like Kazeboon we thought that it's interesting if a campaign like that 
can actually make people think so…so make somebody who thinks that it's not true what the video 
is showing, to make them actually not change their mind but re-consider the like how…re-consider 
the picture of reality because it seems that there are so many picture of realities in this country.
R: but I tell you what, I've been in a lot of discussions about that and ones I was…it was right after 
also the violence near the prime ministers office and I was visiting the sit-inn because a friend 
was….it was a sit-inn that was started by the parliamentarians but I didn't know that they left at 7 
am, and there were just a few parliamentarians they were like 20 only. So I was going there at 9 am 
just to check on my friend, so I went there I didn't find the people who were in the sit-inn. I found 
on the other hand, the people who were against them, people who were pro-SCAF. So we were just 
very few people who were defending the parliamentarians and defending the sit-inn so I'm a bit….I 
can't just shut up. So when I went there I found one of my other friends and he was just sitting there 
and he had the, not the bullet but you know when the bullet i fired the remains? and I was just 
looking at him 'are you okay?!' and he just showed me that like 'okay, shit you were there, and 
during when they started their violence again? he told me yes and so on. So actually when we 
started talking both of us the people who were pro-SCAF themselves started…I was like the only 
girl…so they started talking to me. So the thing is, so you are saying 'how do people perceive the 
stories'. They started telling me that 'why are you against the army? la la la, and I told him 'I'm 
gonna tell you my story and tell me if I should be against the army or not, and this is my friend who 
has been there and they were shooting at him, that's why I'm…' 'No this didn't happen' like 'No but 
this happened, this guy was there and he is telling you this happened to him' 'No this didn't happen'. 
Okay, so another person was just holding the picture of the girl that they, that they…
I: with the blue bra?
R: yeah, he was just holding the picture and then the other guy said: no no no, take this down, this 
can't be in place, this is very disrespectful' like okay I told them 'take it down, take it down please' 
bas why? this happened, 'no it didn't happen' 'no but this happened!' so it's the idea itself that they 
refuse to believe reality. I was telling them that a friend of mine had to go through two surgeries 
because he was beaten up in the fields hospital, in one of the field hospitals and he told me 'no this 
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didn't happen'. But this happened. I was…he told me the military, not the military council, the 
military police I don't know what they are called in English. They were emptying the square, they 
were braking in the square and emptying the square from everybody. He told they never entered the 
square. I was one of the people running from the square because they broke in the square, I was 
running with a girl that I don't know who was having a difficulty breathing so you can not tell me 
that this didn't happen. He told me 'no this never happened'. So it's like refusing to accept the reality, 
this is one the reaction you can…
I: do you really believe in like the SCAF's, their messages or if they really refuse it like, why do you 
think it's…
R: why do I think they refuse it? because they don't want to believe that what they are having is…
they won't be standing on solid ground. They think that this is what's there so I live with it. They 
can't accept the fact that no this is not okay because it's too dangerous for them and then it will have 
to be 'then what?' then if he doesn't have the answer to 'then what?' then he can't, he doesn't want to 
believe it. It's like the fear of believing that 'yes we are in a very bad situation and what we have to 
think is what's next' And in a lot of cases we sense that the people are 'those are just soldiers dressed 
up in civilian clothes just to pick a fight with us' but this time I sensed that the people there were 
normal people. And that what they just don't want to believe that this is really happening.
I: Have you ever experienced to tell a story like that to somebody saying 'ugh it didn't happen' and 
then you tell your story and you feel that he's actually hearing what you are saying or that you know 
that you can…
R: that happened with my family actually because there is a generational gap between our parents 
and us and they can't believe that this is what we witness. So whenever my dad is like he's always 
having it well (?) so he's just always pro anything that's stabile so in terms of the conversations, 
'well this is wrong' 'yeah, but I've been there, and you know what this happened' 'okay, and then 
what', and then this happened, 'okay that's not the picture that we have' so yes now they understand 
cause this happened. 
I: So because he has a relation to you he would believe you?
R: yes. But sometimes its difficult, for instance…Kazeboon changed the minds of many people, the 
mentality of a lot of people because it has to do with you going to a person, so its like a call for 
help. Its you coming to me, so I cant just ignore it. I have to watch it I have to see it.
But in general it is very difficult to change peoples mind, and to understand the reaction. For me 
that day, I almost..I shouted in the end of the day. When I was talking to these people who kept 
saying that this did not happen, It reached a point where I am telling him that the ministry of 
interior lies in that street, and he is telling me no – it is in not in that street, it is in the other street. I 
am telling him, okay you are coming with me we are going there, and I am gonna show everything 
that is going on but he says no no and he doesn’t wanna go. So you sense that he knows that he is 
wrong, and that deep down he knows that I am right.
I: So you do feel that the Kazeboon has changed the mind of some people?
R: Yes, a lot of people. A lot of mothers at least. They see this happening to young people.
I: Are there debates sometimes after the screenings.
R: Usually you standing there to watch the videos showing that you actually have the intention to 
see..and you are just open a bit. You open your eyes and you see it.
I: And the people you talk with any pro-scaf people that watched the videos?
R: No…I am not sure if they did, cause if they did that would not be the case. And most of the time 
actually they wont go to the show and they will tell you not to go. Once I was going to the 
Kazeboon, walking on the street. We were stopped and asked where we were going, and the people 
said “ no no, don’t go, is this the right time to do something like this?” and so on and then you stand 
and talk for a while, why is it not the right time? And they want stability and blab la and they refuse 
to see it because they cannot take reality. But debates happened afterwards.
I: Has there ever been discussions inside Kazeboon about the selection of the videos whether they 
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were true or not true?
R: Definitely. The filtering process of the video because we have a lot of videos! It is not that hard 
to differentiate between what is true and false. The outfit if the military, the death of the Imam 
sheikh Hamid…no that’s him being shot, this is a famous person and the streets are known in the 
area.
I: But do you think its difficult for some people to see the difference?
R: That’s the excuse of a lot people. No those movies are just fabricated, they  are not real.
What role do you think the social media is playing in all of this?
R: Dissemination of everything and mobilization of the people. Mobilization of the people to attend 
and to actually have the show. It is creating this decentralization-thing. If you were just calling the 
people you know, this would not have gone anywhere – please have a show there please have show 
there….its not like that this project. This was more like a snowball effect which happened because 
of the means available.
I: What do you think make people attend the screenings just by seeing it on Facebook?
R: If I don’t know about the campaign at all, and I see people setting up a screen in the streets and a 
projector in front of my house. The old generation don’t have access to Facebook they watch the 
national channels just, and they never see these videos. So to reach these people you have to just go 
out on the streets. And in this sense social media was just a tool for spreading and arranging. Also it 
was very interesting and mentioned on one of the national TV-shows, we had a sit in front of the 
Maspero and because of that they hosted one of the activists and they were talking about change. 
“See we are changing here, actually hosting one of the activists!”. So one of the activists said, so if 
you are talking about change why don’t you put up a screen and show a Kazeboon video? And the 
host freaked out….
I: So you say there is not really any screenings right now, but following Kazeboon there are still 
posts all the time?
R: the initiative itself did not die, it can never die! The reason why we exist, the reason why any 
initiative exist at the moment is because we are fighting a certain system, and we are fighting it with 
every tool available, with all your power. No violence and they don’t say that ah ok, we did not do 
that or something means that we are waiting for something to happen and then we activate 
ourselves. But this does not mean that the cause died. Everybody is just working for the same cause. 
I: they tweet a lot, do you consider them credible?
R: The Egyptian society in general is very critical about what they hear Not everything there is said 
is just believed. Also because Kazeboon f. ex is not the only initiative. There are a lot and you are 
following all of them so you get many different sources.
I: How do you decide what to believe or not?
R: It depends on the source, my knowledge of the person and more about the cause.
I: What do you mean by the person?
R: Somebody credible, somebody who is not lying. Somebody consistent for a couple of years, 
active a lot and credible.
I: How critical do you think people are towards social media?
R: What is very tricky about social media, is that everybody can post. A lot of rumors are spreading 
and people are panicking. We have to understand the probability of this. Not being true is a 50 50 
chance.
I: How do you verify shat you read?
R: Its hard to say step by step. I live in it…if people write about violence in this street..I either  call 
my friend living there or I go check for myself – I just go. Teargas being fires, a hospital is started 
and need this .. i just go.  And sometimes we will be the ones actually saying what is the needs and 
saying shat is happening in the hospital, we were tweeting for the hospital making sure that the 
rumors are killed. If you see something not true, you spread that word.
I: Your own use of social media.
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R: twitter for instance is installed on my phone so its with me all the time. I check it every second. I 
am not one of the persons who are really active on Twitter with a lot of followers, but I check the 
news and verify everything that is happening.
Facebook I am done with the old rumor things, for so long its been one the sources of information 
and dissemination. But the idea that everybody thinks that  if you are fighting a battle on Facebook 
its just a bridge (???) than actually going to the streets for some time now i am jut keeping the 
political aspects as little as possible, but we know about demonstrations and events through 
Facebook and Twitter.
I: And how has your use changed after the revolution?
R: Before the revolution I was not even on Twitter. And during the first day of the revolution I was 
also not on twitter, since it was blogged anyway. I just joined twitter when the internet came, just 
because I need to know where my friends were.
I: You think its like that for many people?
R: Yes, it became so popular after the revolution because really for a time it was the source for 
information and on the spot updates not even the most credible channels that we have these updates 
about what happens on the streets.
I: Are there any credible channels on national television?
R: The ON TV is the only credible shows, I don’t watch anything else.. They are channeling all the 
time, its Mubarak, so it pro-Mubarak, its revolution, so they are pro-revolution, its SCAF so they 
are pro-SCAF…now somebody else are making a good point…
I: What about newspapers?
R: Shorouk, tahrir, masr al youm…those are the kind of newspaper that are credible, and you have a 
lot interesting articles by people that you don’t necessarily agree with but that you respect.
I: do you have friends that are pro-SCAF?
R: Yes sure, but not so many.
I: Are people involved in the campaign usually well educated or do you see many different social 
backgrounds?
R: You mean the one who watch or the the activists?
I: Both…
R: receivers not necessarily because it is in very rural areas that are very poor, I wouldn’t say that 
the ones working with it..I wouldn’t say that they are well educated or from a certain class, but they 
have knowledge and they know how to receive things.
Interview with Sara in Cairo, April 25, 2012
S = Sara
I = Interviewer
I: So we just told you about the project, what it's about. So we want to focus in the receivers of the 
campaign and then we chose Kazeboon as one example of a campaign we can ask people about. 
Last time you told us a lot about the campaign, so maybe we will ask you a bit about the same.
S: I will try to remember the same answer I had.
I: but first maybe you can tell about your background, age education, and how your activism in 
this...
S: my name is Sara, I'm 26 and I study political science at Cairo University. And I did my master 
also in political science in Lebanon. I work on women rights and this is my main area of interest, 
and I join several activities on the side. I join Tahrir monologues which is story telling under the 
revolution, and a group called Baheya el Misr which is a pressure group on women's issues, who is 
campaigning (...) and the Noon Neswa which is graffiti for women's issues. These are the main 
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three initiatives that I am working with, so that's mainly my background.
I: what is your experience with activism related to Kazeboon?
S: I don't know how to label Kazeboon in terms of activism. Kazeboon is mainly like an open 
source for information. I would consider myself as engaged in most of the events that happened 
since last year, since 2011. And we have seen the army violations ourself, we have seen friends 
tortured and beaten and harassed and detained. I believed in Samira Ibrahim's case before it went to 
court and before it became a public case. We saw tanks humiliating people all the time. So I 
wouldn't consider myself technically a receiver, because at some point I was involved in the action 
itself. But at some point to need a backup story, you need people to believe in what you are telling 
them, it's not just a personal imagination, it's not only a testimony, and Kazeboon is helping us do 
that. Kazeboon is a compilation of all the violations, protests, sit ins, marches that took place, 
mainly related to th army post Mubarak's era, ever since the military council became the ones in 
charge. And the media, the state media is usually using that trade line of “the army protected the 
revolution, we cannot attack the army”. Either by conviction of by obligation, and we had little 
channels of reaching out to people. Either by private channels which is usually under so many 
rumors and people will tell you “how do you know that for sure? They are doing this because of 
that candidate, they are doing this because it's their interest”. Only Maspero which is the state 
owned TV is the one that people trust out of habit, out of culture. And Kazeboon is flip cameras of 
million of protesters who are there and who are in the action themselves who film what's happening 
and put it online. There is no one's ownership, it doesn't belong to a group, it doesn't belong to a 
specific interest. It only exists because it tells part of the story that's not told. It tells what we know 
as a generation, as a group of the generation versus what everyone else says is not true, and we try 
to project that. When I know about a Kazeboon show I tell friends and people that I know do not 
know these stories: “go watch it”. It's not like you're going to a theatre and you're doing to pay a 
ticket and you have to stay there – no you just pass by them. If you fell it's worth it, go ahead see it, 
and if you don't think it's worth it move on. And that is the beauty of it, it doesn't... it comes to you, 
it doesn't ask you to come to it. To watch the videos of Kazeboon I never checked the calender and 
said “oh I want to go see Kazeboon at this place now, I usually find it in my way. When I'm in a 
march they would say: “after two hours we will project Kazeboon on that screen or on that square”. 
And that's the beauty and creativity and... that's the brilliance of Kazeboon. No one can ever say 
“this group of people have been founded by that organization to do that”. There is no one behind it 
that you know. Even if you know them they are not alone, there a millions who give them the 
material and who give them the photos and... it's not centralized.
I: so there's not like a group of editing people or?...
S: There are groups of editing people, but they just add it and those who take the videos are 
members.
I: and they don't write their name or they just?...
S: Yeah, and another important factor of Kazeboon is because of it's decentralization across Egypt it 
became popular. Usually the revolutionary ideas are centered in Cairo and Alexandria, especially in 
downtown Cairo as you know and as you see. Kazeboon managed to be everywhere, because it's 
online and it's free, you just download, get your laptop, get your projector, even get a peace of white 
cloth and put it on a building and tell people on twitter, on Facebook, even the word of mouth: 
“come watch the videos that day”. And in just few month you had Kazeboon screened in upper 
Egypt, in smaller villages, in governorates, in Europe and the US. Egyptians all over the world 
found finally the chance to feel that they are doing something. I have friends who live in Europe, 
Egyptians, who tell me: “how can we help, what can we do?”.
Usually you tell them “tell people about this event, tell people about this violation, tell people about 
what’s happening here”. And it’s hard for them to just draft something and send it somewhere, and 
it’s a hard process. So Kazeboon all they have to do is just do and download it and say... even 
universities and go to universities and say: “guys, we want to show you something”. And it tells the 
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truth, and that’s why I feel it’s beautiful. It’s ours, it’s everyone’s.
I: how did you first know about Kazeboon?    
S: How did I know first about Kazeboon... I saw the sticker, the graffiti first of the army cap, the 
word “Kaf”, the letter “Kaf” and the hat on top of it, and I was very curious “what is that?”, and I 
saw it several times, the graffiti and the sticker across downtown. And then the word itself made 
sense for me. It's simple, it doesn't accuse anyone, it's “they are liars” and we know who's “they” 
because of the hat.
I: it's interesting, because everybody else has told us it was from Facebook or Twitter they heard 
about it, this is the first time someone saw it offline.
S: yeah I saw it on a graffiti, and a small graffiti. It wasn't a big stencil, I was walking in downtown 
I don't remember where... and I was really, because I am working with different groups that use art 
to reach out to people I am attracted by whatever and see on walls and in the streets. So I saw the 
“Kaf” for Kazeboon and I was like, “who are these people, what is that, is that a new campaign, 
someone link me in”. And then people told me there is a Kazeboon group. I thought it's an initiative 
maybe that's trying to tell part of the story, have like sessions, do something. But then I saw one of 
the videos, but then we were in a march, and of course because you are in a march you know what 
you are defending for and standing for and what to ask for. People around you are either aggressive 
or are indifferent, they treat you like you're like alien. They look at us and like “why are you young 
people marching, what do you want?”, and you have to stop and tell them you want “1,2,3,4...” or 
show them a banner or give them a flier, it depends on what it's about. And that was the first time 
they said, I saw on Twitter a million times; Kazeboon be in an hour, Kazeboon, Kazeboon, 
Kazeboon... And I thought, finally I'll see these people. And all of the sudden you have a big screen, 
and it starts telling stories on the violations and what happened, and because we know it, it's not a 
surprise. 
But the best part is the reactions of the people who are just passing by and they would stop and look 
and sometimes cry, sometimes call others and tell them “you have to come now” or they would like 
leave or feel “who's doing that, what's that about”. It's the reactions of people. But Kazeboon is, of 
course it's not an easy situation. So many times they were fewer groups who went to the streets and 
they were beaten by the Mubarak son's groups. They were chased by the army, they were often put 
in so much trouble just because they are telling the truth.
I: But have you been active in the campaign, the Kazeboon?
S: Personally I haven't taken any videos, I'm more interested in taking pictures, but they don't use 
pictures much. So I'm a different... I wish I could help them, I always tell myself that I have to go 
with my flip camera and take the videos and send them to Kazeboon. But it's hard to walk with 
both, either you're taking pictures and protesting and holding the flyers and holding the flag or 
you're giving the flip camera. I promise though I'll have my flip camera once.
I: It's nice with pictures too.
S: it's nice with pictures, but they don't actually need pictures. And I usually ask my friends if it's a 
big event or it's a small one, and I feel that my presence will be more important in the smaller 
events. Mainly for support, if there's 10 people they would be better off as 30 or as 40, 50 people. 
That would make then stronger and if they're attacked by someone they would be able to resist a bit. 
And I check their calender as much as I can and I tell people that I know about... especially when 
it's out of Cairo I tell them, because I travel a lot in upper Egypt for work. I go and tell them “have 
you watched the Kazeboon?” and I try to be very anonymous and tell them “have you heard what 
they...” and they say “yes of course we know about it and we see it a lot”. So that's one of the good 
aspects about it, you never... each one has a small role and eventually it makes the bigger picture 
better, I'm not going to do anything on my own for Kazeboon, but if everyone is covering an event 
or a march or any kind of event and sends this files over, that contributes for them to have many 
material of hundreds of stuff happening across Egypt.
I: but when you say you send a video, where do you send the video to?
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S: there is Mosireen. Mosireen is, I don't know what's the title, it's an independent channel. What 
they do is the same concept as Kazeboon, they are a source of media information, and they have so 
many material and documentaries and testimonies of victims, of injured people, of martyrs, 
families, of everyone that you could... of worker's strikes, of women marches, of student marches, 
everything and it's a library. And you can easily go there and ask them for files and material if you 
need them for a video that you're making, for research that you're doing, for... they are very nice 
people.
I: because we know that they are making screenings on Tuesdays, but we only thought it was like, 
you know it was a Lebanese movie yesterday...
S: they do movies, a lot of documentaries, but they have material, they have tons of material from 
everywhere.
I: so Kazeboon gets the material from Mosireen?
S: some of it of course, but Kazeboon is mainly focused on the army violations.
I: but they have all?...
S: they cover everything.
I: but you can send a video directly to?...
S: I know Mosireen, I know some of the activists, first time to use that word, who are in Mosireen. 
So I tell them for example “I was in the women march on that day on that event, I have the video”, 
and they will tell me “oh great, give it on a CD or let's share it”.
I: okay.
S: but I'm sure people can upload it online, I never used the online uploader technique, but I'm sure 
it's...
I: I was wondering how it worked, like technically how it worked, just wondering how it worked.
S: which one, Kazeboon?
I: how people, where do they send their videos to?
S: the circles of activists and revolutionaries it is big, but it's not that big. Once you're involved you 
know who is working on the martyrs files, who is working on the injured's families, who is working 
on women's rights, who is working on army violations and legal cases or army, what do you call 
them, the military trials. It's a big circle or mini small circles and usually you have a friend of a 
friend somewhere doing something, it's not for people who are inside the loop to figure out how to 
contribute or where to put the material. If one idea comes from one person, in one day it's 
circulated. I don't know how though, if you ask me I don't know how. It's a big network online and 
offline. The places we go to as hangouts, the friends, the events, the worries, even the weddings, 
everything are the same people.
I: so most of the people who send videos are a part of this?
S: most of them I'm sure, I'm not in Kazeboon's editing team or technical team, but I'm sure people 
usually also who are in more isolated... like students for example. Most of the people who are 
activists are in the 30's, mid 20's. We have students now who are on strike, who are on protests all 
the time and they are younger. So it doesn't make sense sometimes to just post the videos that the 
outsiders are taking of the protests, a lot of times they ask them “give us your material if you took 
videos on your phone”. If you have updates tell us, you always need people from the action itself to 
give you the feedback or to give you the insights. It doesn't make sense a lot sometimes just keep 
saying “I'll take my own videos and I'll upload them”.
I: so maybe we've already touched a bit upon it, but which elements do you think have played or 
contributed to success of Kazeboon?
S: the ownership. No one will ever come and claim “this is my idea and I'm the superstar behind 
Kazeboon and I'm the face of revolution”. And people would say “oh we don't like him, oh we like 
him, oh she's wearing her bikini, oh my god, look at him who he's married to...”. This will never 
happen because it's not a person's idea, it's for everyone, it's popular, and it's the people's media, it's 
not imposed by any interest. It's part of the truth that's not exposed and it's harsh and it's brutal for 
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our father's generation who always saw the army as this independent strong institution protecting by 
the borders. My father for example was special forces in the army and he went to 1973 war. And 
after Mubarak stepped down when the army... sorry after the police on the 28th of January when 
they blacked, disappeared out of thin air and the army vehicles started coming on the streets I'm like 
“yay we're safe” and he's like “oh you imbecile”. He's like “what are you happy about?”, I'm like 
“wow the army is here, they'll save us”, “you're so stupid and naive”. He was kind of skeptical, I 
didn't know why. But even with a person who was skeptical, when I share with him some of 
Kazeboon's material he was shocked. I saw Maspero events, I saw army tanks running over people, 
running over a lot of people who were alive, not even dead bodies. I know friends who saw soldiers 
throwing bodies in the Nile, I didn't see that. I trust my friends more than I trust any statement. And 
when people, you tell then that, the first thing that they would do out of denial is tell you “that's not 
true”, even if they never loved the army or believed in the military force. They would deny it 
because it's easier to live with the fact that there's some kind of back bone institution that will 
protect you. But then when you show them the video of an army vehicle running over a family or 
people who are marching peacefully, that's reality even if you don't want to admit it you saw it and 
you have to live with it. And I understand it's very harsh, because gradually we had the chance to 
see the truth, we saw how the regime was corrupt, we saw how the police is corrupt, we see that the 
army is no different, the army is also part of the regime. We see how everyone who is politician is 
corrupt. So for us it's not like a chock “oh life is sad and it's ugly”. We know that revolution is a... 
we understand that revolution is a huge concept to deal with, it's not just hoppeling one person and 
imagining that life would be happily ever after, it's a huge process that maybe even we won't see it 
ourselves, maybe our children, question-mark, will see it. So it's hard for our hard for our current 
generations who only saw the war and who are just observers mainly to see all this ugly truth in 
front of them. Even if young people who are like us who didn't take part of Tahrir. They were just 
watching the news from TV, and for them to be told “okay there is no one protecting you, protect 
yourself. And you fight for your own rights, and there is no one who is going to give them on a 
silver plate”. It's a big like slap in the face, it's a big change.
I: in all this, how do you use social media? I know you use Twitter, you mentioned that, but can you 
say a little bit more...
S: how do I use social media, okay; first of all, first I was very excited about the idea of social 
media as a tool of expression that doesn't really ask you for any identification or procedures. You 
just post what you see and share what you want and I like, last year I believed that “this is it”. If I 
don't follow Facebook and Twitter, not even only mostly Twitter, I was very concerned on 
Facebook. If you don't follow them... no you shouldn't believe anyone else. Gradually I started 
realizing that it's a bubble. People who are on Twitter and Facebook believe that what ever they are 
discussing is what the world is discussing.
I: it's representing...
S: it's everything, and if anyone who doesn't exist in that bubble doesn't exist outside of it. And if 
people don't and... for example we might discuss an article in the newspapers, on Twitter, and you 
think that if you go outside and talk to people and they don't, “how come you don't know it, oh my 
god you're so ignorant”. Which doesn't make sense, you are the ignorant because you basically put 
yourself on your phone or on your computer and “this is life” - this is virtual life which is in Egypt 
not that big. People use Facebook for tests and “who are married, Brad Pitt or Tom Cruise” kind of 
activities. It's not for intellectual purposes.
And that kind of came at a later stage, I realized that at some point. And for me now I can say that 
social media is a tool of bringing my online activities to the offline world and vice versa. I work on 
women issues for example as a job and also as a personal interest. And I meet women and they tell 
me their problems and they tell me really scary statements, for example “my husband beats me 
because he loves me” kind of statements. And I post that online, so I would like “guys, this is what 
people think”. This is their, it's not my opinion, like I would post “I just met a women in this village 
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and she was telling me lalalalala...”. And the other way around, if I know... my parents always tell 
me “what does your blue website say?”, which is Twitter. Because they don't understand how we 
have all these updated information all the time. If there's a fire in Tanta, I know about it 15 minutes 
because a tweet in Tanta tells “oh there is a fire” and he takes a picture. If there's a protest 
somewhere in few minutes you would know about it, I don't need written newspapers anymore, 
honestly. It has been a long time since I read a newspaper out of info, I just read them for articles to 
see what's happening, but I don't read them because “oh let's see what happened”. I never, it has 
been a long time since I've done that, and it's scary sometimes to realize that. Like I feel weird for 
people who just wait for the news every morning to read the updates. “Really that's really old, oh 
my god you're still discussing that” (laughing). We've moved ahead long time ago, and I even tell 
my parents, they would tell me “oh my god have you read what this parliamentarian...”, it's like “oh 
yes” (laughing). It's different worlds, it's tricky if you get stuck in one of them. It's tricky if someone 
feels “I have 30.000 followers, everyone knows me”. It's even ridiculous when people come and 
greet you and you tell them “sorry what's your name, you don't know me”. “No!”.
And it's also important that we as users of these social media channels, to take what we know from 
there and put it to the offline world. If you see a statement or an event or some kind of... anything 
that you witness, take it off and put it somewhere where it's on the ground. Like tell someone, go 
check it out, write about it if you have access to...
I: do you think Kazeboon has succeeded in connected these two worlds?
S: Definitely, it's not an online work. It's taking what we know online, all these videos, all this 
material online to actual screenings in the streets. It's not even in theaters or in schools or anywhere, 
it's in the street on a peace of cloth. So we as a generation we use all these techniques and 
technology, we take the material and put it offline, and that's a brilliant idea. (...) I'm really proud 
also that so many people are trying to imitate it, even if they would be still called the imitating 
Kazeboon, it's okay. For example in Behaya we are doing compilations of videos on women and the 
revolution, women who are injured or women who are martyrs. It's taken... we were impressed by 
the idea of Kazeboon. All these material online, lets bring them together and have a video and we 
project it everywhere. And I think it's okay even if you would be called you're imitating us, it's 
okay. It's for a good cause!
I: yeah, if it works, if it's a good way.
S: yeah, I don't mind, exactly.
I: have you ever felt that you like made an effect on someone through social media, like changing 
their opinion or effecting them in some way?
S: Uhm, made an effect... Well basically I would consider myself... I'd rather use the term chocking 
someone, not effecting them, because especially again when it comes to women's rights in Egypt 
the reality is really sad and chocking. People would say “oh raising awareness, education...”, but 
still when you go to someone's house and she tells you a horrible story and a horrible detail, it 
cannot stop at me, it cannot stop and the report, I have to spread it out and social media is the best 
tool. I would definitely go to Twitter and try to write it up, and take it off my chest and put it out 
there. And I'm sure, if there is one reason why I know that people think I'm a women rights 
advocate or feminist it's because I prefer to tell the ugly truth. I think it's as a responsibility and as a 
job I need to tell the truth, I cannot just saying achievements and “we have trained 50 women on 
lalalalala...” it doesn't make sense. I would, even if I would go to such events I would say “and one 
women was the worst part of the day, did that”. And that definitely influences, I don't know maybe 
it helps someone challenge what they know. I write on my harassment on a daily basis. As egyptian 
women working on the streets we are harassed 24/7, and I think it's important to write down exactly 
what I have been told, what exactly the comments are with the brutality. I cannot say he told me bad 
words, I would type down these bad word in Arabic to chock whoever tells me “you are 
exaggerating” or “it cannot be that bad”. So that for me either would help someone, think that's not 
her fault, it's happening to her and maybe she should be brave enough and tell. And it might also 
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change a guy's perspective who thinks “it cannot be that bad”. So that's how I think of social media, 
that's how I think of influence.
I: and did your use of social media change after the revolution?
S: before the revolution basically Facebook for me was sharing articles and reading articles. You 
cannot just go online and search in 200 magazines and newspapers, I would just check “ah this 
person shared this it might be interesting”. On anything, on environment, on photos, on everything. 
Apart from also connecting with people and friend and lalala. But for me it was only about like a 
big newspaper. After the revolution it's quite interesting for me, Facebook is different than Twitter 
for me. On twitter it's one group of people, you feel like it's a big chatroom, everyone is talking on 
the same topic all the time, and it changes like that. You would find people talking about an article, 
all of a sudden about a protest, all of the sudden about a graffiti (...) on someones statement in the 
parliament. Back and forth all the time, and if you disconnect for one day you loose track, it's 
exhausting. So this is a small world of, lets say a big meeting of activists. While Facebook users I 
would say somehow they are the observers, they just share from Twitter, they just post the videos. 
And of course you have people who are in both worlds. But mainly when I post an article that I 
know of and I think it's normal and common from Twitter people say “oh my god it really 
happened, oh my god are you sure?”. I'm like “yep, yes I'm sure”. So I don't know how, I don't 
know why. Maybe Twitter is more faster and more user-friendly if you are on the go, you don't have 
time to just type and link and share and post and password and nanana. So I try also to mix what I 
know from Twitter and what I see and what kind of discussions we have as a smaller group and post 
them on Facebook and it's insane what the comparative reactions would be. Here you have all the 
support for every revolutionary action you have, you have freedom for this person, we support that 
person and then you have here “questions-marks, questions-marks”.
I: In Facebook?   
S: On Facebook, “how do you know that? Who told you this? This might be true”
I: So you think Twitter more like, on the...
S: yes its, I don't know what it's called, Twitter is more revolutionary I can say than Facebook. 
Facebook is still, since it's also owned by someone, I cannot even forget that, it's someone's 
personal property, it's someone's personal website. If he decides so shut down something, who can 
stop him. So eventually Facebook is still all about social activities, more or less, on a very large 
scale in Egypt, it's not that political. It's political of course because of what's happening, it's political 
because you see people having profile pictures of a candidate, sharing his videos, others making fun 
of them, photo here, link there. But Twitter since it's mainly about really small focused statements it 
doesn't give you room to do whatever you want, you ahve to really make a use of the space you 
have.
I: It's nice, so I have some last questions about Kazeboon. Why do you think the campaign is 
credible, because?...
S: Because it's videos and it's not someone talking, it's not something written, it's something 
witnessed, someone saw action, saw a statement, saw a chant. If I can tell you there were thousands 
of people who were there, you might not believe me, but if you see a street full of packed of people 
walking what will influence, that will be a statement on its own. So the question was why do?...
I: yeah why do you think it's credible?
S: It's credible because it's independent from anyone and anything, there is no motive for a specific 
person or a group behind it. And it's credible because it's (...) videos, pictures and videos are the 
most important tools of convincing someone, like the girl in the blue bra – no one had to speak, just 
had to show them the pictures.
I: but there had been many videos manipulated, so how do you know it's not something?...
S: they can manipulate it as much as they want but still it doesn't deny that she was stripped and he 
was standing.
I: for example when you see a video how do you know if it's manipulated or not, how do you know 
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when to trust it or?...
S: I haven't found across videos that I would think were manipulated, very few. Like if I see a video 
of someone talking for example, yes of course it might be manipulated, they might have cut the 
sentence, changed some kind of something on his speech, but if it's a video of an action I don't think 
it can be manipulated easily, you cannot just erase something and put something. Like before in 
January and February last year all those videos of the policemen shooting at people, why did people 
believe them? They could have said it's not true, why? When we saw this young man jumping on a 
police vehicle and taking off the water canons we believed it. I wasn't there, I know that most of 
people were in there as much as now, everyone believed it. I think it's the idea of denial or not, 
when everything happened with the police people believed everything. When they saw the police 
killing people everyone knew that the police were the bad guys, everyone knew that these people 
were not there because the are payed, because they were asking for their rights and because they are 
asking for freedom. Not because it's easy to deny it it's subconsciously relieving. People would say 
“but we are not sure who these young people are, ahh we're not sure what's their motive. Maybe the 
army did it not on purpose”. It's the same, why is it easier just to deny it? I don't get it really.
I: Do you know it the focus of the campaign has changed since the beginning when it started?
S: the focus in terms of?
I: is it still military violation or is it everything, liars in Egypt?
S: it has been a while since I saw it, but the last time I saw it, it was still on military violations. But 
they are growing, they didn't stop at Maspero, they didn't stop at what you see as a soldier versus a 
citizen. It's kind of incorporating what we know because they are the ones on charge, like Port Said, 
you didn't see a soldier inside the stadium, but still we know who is behind it. And when it's 
incorporated in the Kazeboon videos it's to tell people “it's all the same; Maspero, Muhammed 
Mahmoud, Port Said, and we know, who knows what else will happen”. It's not because you see the 
soldier then it's him, and if you don't see him it's not him, it makes you think out of the box, out of 
the picture and question what you take for granted. And I think also it's a tool, it's a very smart way 
of Kazeboon to approach it.
I: earlier you were talking about this bubble of people, do you think Kazeboon has succeeded of 
reaching out of this bubble?
S: it's way out of this bubble, it's not about I'm a tweet or check out what I did yesterday, it's a very 
simple idea of Twitter account, if you mention it, if you have organized a Kazeboon screening 
mention it and they will put you in the calender, it would stop at this. It's not for popularity contest, 
it's not for online users, it's mainly to make you join the offline world as well.
I: but you think it has reached people who not... who don't agree already in the cause?
S. yes yes yes, it reaches. It's in really smart places (...) metro stations, in front of universities, in 
front of state TV building, it was screened on TV on Maspero itself. That was, I was there, and I 
was blown away by the moment. We were screening the truth in their building!
I: how was people reacting?
S: chocked!
I: also were people yelling “this is not true” or?...
S: they cannot yell until they, it's... the reaction comes later, but during the screening, because the 
are seeing a whole... Maspero for example wasn't screened on any TV even until this very moment. 
No state TV ever mentioned Maspero as if it doesn't exist, as if all these people who were injured 
and dead never existed. Till this very moment it's only said, “the Maspero, the Maspero”... They 
never mentioned Maspero and on the other hand you make them see the vehicles and it's hard, and 
it's definitely hard, some feel very guilty. I have a friend, when he saw it by pure coincidence, I 
didn't even ask him to go there, he went me or without anyone of us. He wasn't really against the 
revolution, but he didn't believe, he believed it was over when Mubarak stepped down. And he saw 
the Kazeboon and he called me, he was crying, and he was like “I feel useless, I honestly cannot 
believe I was home or at the gym while you and girls were in the streets asking for my rights and 
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my freedom, I feel ashamed”. And I was stunned and I didn't know what to say, I never blamed him, 
because at some point you don't just stop your actions at blaming, you just move ahead with what 
you want to do and that's it. But he kept apologizing for so long and he felt incredibly bad, and I had 
to make him feel okay. “It's not your fault really, please stop crying it's weird” (laughing). It's the 
influence of videos is huge.
I: interesting, so I don't have any more...
S: sure?
Interview with Mohammed in Cairo, April 20, 2012
M = Mohammed
I = Interviewer
I: So you know about the Kazeboon? What is your experience with the Kazeboon?
M: My experience is from when Kazeboon was just a street campaign and when there were only 
these screenings. I organized one event and attended a couple, and when this momentum grew 
bigger Kazeboon has expanded and become more like an umbrella that would have this goal of 
bringing down the military rule and they would work on exposing the military in any way possible. 
There is a new project that we are working on called AskarMap, an interactive map, a google map 
where you can pin the locations of the military. The aim of the project is to show the people how 
deep the military rule is. It is not just the SCAF, but there is a military general in every company so 
the goal is to show how extensive this military rule is. (…..more info about this campaign 2.57). 
This is another project I have been working with and through this I know Kazeboon.
I: You say you were a part of organizing an event, what does it mean? What did you do?
M: The thing is…Kazeboon is a very decentralized thing, so its not like they have to tell you that 
you have to organize and event and they help you, there was the material the video material which 
is available on YouTube and they also print a DVD that you can go a pick up whenever you want. 
SO you have a DVD and a checklist of things you need; A screen, a projector, speakers bla bla, then 
you create a Facebook event and you send it to the organizers and they put it in the calendar. There 
is a Kazeboon calendar. So the thing is we are working on a campaign about handling over the 
power to the parliament and there was this debate in the revolutionary council whether we should 
have early presidential elections or we should just hand over power to the parliament in the 
transitionary period. So there was this debate, and there was a Twitter-nadwa. Which is basically 
taking the discussion we were having on Twitter to the streets where people can sit and have a 
proper panel discussion or something. We wanted to create a debate about this issue. We went to the 
Goethe institute in Down Town and we said we would take space in this time and that day and it 
was fine….but then they got a phonecall because the event-description that we had was very anti-
military. So they got a phonecall from the authorities saying that this event is not happening and 
they called us up and said sorry we can not host you. So I called up Alaa Abd al Fettah who is also 
an activist and one of my friends, and I said this is the case, this is what happened so the event is 
off. He said no its not off..we will make it on the street. We will find a place to do it, and then we 
will do a Kazeboon screening as well and then also a demonstration. So they had one thing which 
they did not like, and we gave them three that they don't like, and we will do it without them on the 
streets - so let them try and stop us. This was the day before l-nadwa, so the next day we go, and we 
call this guy on a street in Down Town, he has this print shop on the second floor, so he has to like 
drop is powercodes from the window and I go to Muagtam which is like two hours drive and we go 
to get a projector and we go get a screen from Noad and we go get carpets from I don't know who 
and we block like most of the street and we have this event on the streets. We had the nadwa, we 
had the Kazeboon screening and we had the demonstration. So this is what organizing a Kazeboon 
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screening is. You get the materials and you gather people and you do the show on the street and 
people will stop by and watch the military violations and how the military have been running 
people over and the girl that gor undressed in the street and so on. So people will see reality for 
themselves with audio and video.
I: So do you think the people stop and watch, even though they see what the videos are showing and 
that they don't agree with the reality portrayed?
M: In many occasions, many people will come and try to ruin the screening, they will come and 
fight with the people and try to ruin the projector and the screen and so on. There have been many 
fights during Kazeboon events because the people that think that the military would never do that 
and that the military is the last pillar of I don't know what and they protect us and they are last 
shield before chaos these people try to ruin Kazeboon events. But in our event nothing happened 
and everything was fine. But other people will pass by and they will actually get shocked by what 
they see; Oh I did not know that they did that! The power of a video is much stronger than what you 
hear or what you read in a newspaper. If you see it life on a screen it is much more credible. Of 
course the state propaganda has created this idea that with photoshop you can create photos and you 
can manipulate a video to make it show that the military is running people over, ehhh so some 
people would still be stuck in denial saying that this is not happening, this is fabricated and not true. 
But many people will actually believe that this is what happened.
I: So has there been debates following the screenings?
M: Of course. When there is a preset idea about coming and ruining the event, there is no talk. They 
come and they fight. But sometimes it creates a discussion, oh this is not allowed bla bla bla.  Oh 
and there was this Kazeboon event in Heliopolis that I went to. I heard there was a protest, and that 
they would stop in a certain square and do a Kazeboon show. So I went there, and people from the 
area came down and they started to discuss, okay this is not allowed, like you should not be here, 
we don't want another Tahrir square in this area bla bla bla and the military would never do that. So 
they started this debate, and in end they said: Okay you leave or we start beating the shit out of you 
- and we left. I mean, most of us are against fights where its the people against the people, we have 
no problem fighting with the police, but with the people its different. So I will believe that most of 
the people are like in the neutral area, they can be persuaded this way or that way, but there are 
people, f.ex people in the revolutionary camp, who would believe whatever we say about the 
military in terms of violations because they know that they would do that without a problem and 
there are people who are extreme on the other side who would never believe no matter they see it. If 
they see a military personnel beating the shit out of me, they will ask what I have done before they 
ask if he should do that to me or not. So some people can not be persuaded. But I think the majority 
is in the middle.
I: So you knew about the Kazeboon how?
M: I am more or less of an activist so I am part of the activist community and with things like 
Kazeboon I am often a part of the initial discussion and planning. SO I have known it through 
friends who have been working on it and I have seen how to enter it. So through personal 
connections.
I: How do you use social media?
M: Me personally? Mostly I have been using social media for fun honestly, but then the revolution 
came….
I: Social media meaning what exactly?
M: Twitter, Facebook and YouTube…and blogging a bit. Before the revolution I not politically 
concerned but I was not politically active. And when the revolution came, I was in Germany I was 
not in Egypt unfortunately, this was the first time I started using social media as a publishing tool 
and like as a news platform. Because during the black out in Egypt, it was only us the Egyptians 
abroad that has access to the internet and access to people in Egypt as well. SO the landlines were 
working, and there were rumors about the security, that burglars were breaking into houses and that 
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thugs were running around in the streets. People were extremely worried. And people in the West 
who were interested in following what was happening in Egypt had no idea of what was happening. 
and even some channels later, there cameras were broken and they were kicked out of Tahrir square 
and there was this news blackout, media blackout, communication blackout. SO we started creating 
this network of Egyptians abroad who would get news from Egypt and we published the news. SO 
f.ex. everyday I had a contact in the UK and I had a contact in Austria and a contact in Spain and 
they had their friends and everyday we would charge out Skype credits and call land lines of friends 
in different districts in Cairo and get like a security evaluation on how things were. So we would 
publish a list everyday; so like, Mohandeseen is save, Maadi gunshots, I don't know what - for 
people to keep up with what is happening and feel safe about their loved ones in Egypt. And the 
same for news regarding the protests and so on. So this was the first time I used social media in that 
sense. And then when I came back, I started using it in the way that people would call citizen 
journalism; I would go to protests and tweet what I see and what is happening and so on. ANd 
since, you know media is not very…hmm….its biased you know, especially state-media and even 
independent media, its not even independent, its private media, but thats it,
I: So independent like Masr al Youm or what are you referring to?
M: No, I don't believe there is anything called independent media in Egypt, there is only private 
media. The closest thing to independent media that we have is probably ONTV. So the only way 
you what is going on, is by seeing the things for your self or getting it from a source who are on the 
ground and tweeting life. So thats what I have been doing, like I would go to a protest and then 
tweet what is happening. The conflict and fights with the police and then I tweet what is happening. 
The police is doing this they are doing that so people can get more or less like the actual picture of 
what is happening. So thats one thing, another thing is that you use it, is to try to spread initiatives 
and mobilize people and so on. As a tool to mobilize people its been failing again and again and 
again and again, because you get to a certain point where you gather a thousand people, and a 
number of thousand is not so strong anymore. and suddenly you don't need to convince anyone with 
anything, anyone on Twitter f. ex is on your side. When it was the referendum f.ex. we would try to 
preach, vote no to the referendum and so on. But if you go on Facebook or Twitter you will think 
that you get like a 90% NO vote, but the reality was completely different. And we started realizing 
that OK, maybe social media is more of a bubble and its not the perfect platform for preaching or 
for mobilizing people. But its very good for initiatives and we have realized so much money for 
initiatives on Twitter. Like…we need this much money for printing these flyers - who can help? or 
we need this much medicine for the field hospital KFC Tahrir. We need this and this and this and 
few minutes after you will have it. So when its about mobilizing people to help and to get things, its 
perfect and its really fast. But when it comes to mobilizing people to like….lets go 200.000 people 
to the ministry of defense it doesn't work.
I: So is this how Kazeboon is different, bringing the videos from social media on the streets for 
people to see?
M: Yeah, thats the thing. The campaign actually reaches out to the people who are not on social 
media and this was the actual idea of Kazeboon. So people on Twitter and Facebook they have seen 
everything, but people in the streets they haven't. So we take the videos to them instead of having 
them going on YouTube to see the videos.
I: Okay…so when you see and update on Twitter or Facebook, how do you decide for yourself what 
to believe and what not to believe?
M: Well there are certain people throughout the last couple of years that I have began to trust and I 
know that they are credible people, so whatever comes from them I know they have verified the 
sources and I know they are credible sources that I take  as a credible source, but when it comes 
from somebody I don't know I use first logic, like if it is a video I look it through - has it been cut 
many times? Does it look fabricated or not? And I have a technical background so I ca somehow 
judge. And sometimes you just cross references. The beauty of social media is, is that you have ten 
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different cameras and ten different angles, so what you see from one ankle is not the same as what 
you see from another. SO you cross these sources, and you can form a picture of what really 
happens and judge for yourself if its true or not. So one is going through trusted sources, second is 
cross references.
I: What makes your trusted sources trustworthy?
M: hmm…I think experience. I have followed them the last couple of years, and what they tweet 
have turned out to be true. this was before having a personal connection. And then the frontline 
comrades, those are the people that you trust with your life and you can not trust them with 
anything else. You are out in these situations together where you are fighting back to back with the 
police and so on. You begin trust, you have been in this situation together, and I know that anything 
that you will say is ok. So being in this and that together will form this trust relationship that we 
have.
I: Have you ever watched or read something and believed in it, and then found out that it wasn't true 
and that you judged it wrongly?
M: Hmm let me think….no…the incidents that I remember now are not necessarily things that I 
believed which turned out not to be true later on, but there are few things that happened that we cant 
really explain and they came from trusted people and until now we have no idea what happened and 
they refuse to speak. So there is this guy who works in No To Military Trials He is a guy that I 
really trust and he has been with us in every fight and is one of the frontline comrades. One day we 
hear that there was a fight in Tahrir square with I think….thugs or something, and we get a Tweet 
from a guy we trust. A friend of ours that he got kidnapped. And he got kidnapped for a few hours 
and then he was released. SO what happened who kidnapped you? And he refused to speak. How 
do yo know that you got kidnapped, he doesn't want to speak. So what really happened? No one 
knows. This happened a few times, that two or three people got kidnapped and nobody knows what 
happened. What did they ask you? What happened when they kidnapped you? Like…you have been 
gone for 12 hours - what happened? And they would not talk. And this is something i find hard to 
understand, things like that are weird. And because of that people on Twitter will think that we got 
arrested or kidnapped so they can get popular or they can get more followers. I refuse to believe 
that. Perhaps some sick people do that, but when it comes to certain people they are not that stupid 
or that silly. Its weirs I mean…I cannot understand it till now.
I: Something you have talked about before….but how did your use of social media change after the 
revolution?
M: Before I would tweet a news form an article, but now it is news from the ground. And there was 
a certain point where Twitter was used for preaching, or for like spreading certain ideologies or 
something. F.ex. I remember in March..I mean during the revolution, Twitter was considered the 
revolutionary community - the revolution on Twitter. And then in March when the military had 
cracked down on the sit-in in Tahrir. And so many people were arrested we were like okay..the 
military is officially not with us anymore. This is the moment when we realized, the military is the 
enemy. And when we say that on Facebook and on the street and even on twitter back then people 
were divided so you would get attacked on Twitter for criticizing the military. Even big activists, 
like … el nagmeh, she is a journalist. I remember she was so against attacking the military, that on 
the 8 of april there was a protest in Tahrir square and military officers joined the protest and before 
the protest, she was like - if you say down with the military down with SCAF I will call the military 
and report you. And she did call the military and report it, she reported everyone in the square 
chanting against the military. A month later she was with us, like completely. So thats the thing - 
even at that time the activists were divided whether the military was the enemy or not and back then 
it was useful that we had this discussion and we talk and try to convince the people. Few months 
later everyone everyone were chanting down with SCAF. So at the moment now it is not used this 
way.
I: Is it the obvious examples of violence like Maspero that have made this change?
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M: yes, when people started seeing more violations they started to realize ok - they are not as good 
as we thought.
I: Have you seen many videos manipulating the truth and how did you react on this?
M: there was one video that the SCAF has made themselves on the official YouTube channel. That 
was after the cabinet events in november and about the buildings that got burned and so on. They 
published this video of guy putting a flame inside the building and trying to burn it down. But it 
was taken from a certain angle and just a few moments and then it was cut in many places - ya3ni a 
typical state propaganda video, but people bought it in a way. But I was there, many people were 
there - and they were throwing molotow cocktails at us from the building! If someone would have 
burned it, they would have burned it!
And then there was this incident, I have seen it many times, and I don't believe we were burning 
things down. There was a guy inside throwing molotow cocktails at us and stone and they had 
pistols and so on. So we also started throwing molotow cocktails inside and something caught fire 
and it started burning so people were like stop stop stop, so we stopped, and then understood what 
was happening. And our guys, the protesters went inside and out off the fire and then they got out 
and started throwing again . They just do it to stop them from killing us, but once the building was 
burning down they would stop it and go inside and put it off. So I have seen it on so many occasions 
that they would actually risk their own lives to protect buildings and so on. The way the video was 
produced and cut it was horrible, but the way we can counteract something like this is with a 
campaign like Kazeboon and like what Mosireen do. The Mosireen prepare all the materials for 
Kazeboon, the video material. So they will take the footage, and they will publish the raw photos, or 
like the actual photos so that people can see that the molotows are going from up to down and not 
the other way around. So Mosireen would counteract the state propaganda, and this is the only way 
you can counteract a video with a video, a picture with a picture, and article with an article – 
documentation.
I: just a practical question, you said they are making DVDs and you can go pick them up. Who are 
making these DVDs and where do you pick them up?
M: Mosireen, and you can pick them up from the office in Down Town.
I: So everybody can upload a video on the Kazeboon
YouTube channel?
M: I am not sure…because this is a movie with an intro and music and everything, so it is an actual 
production. And they have different versions, they have a long version and a short version and a 
version in mobile quality version, so you can get the official Kazeboon movie.
I: Do you have example on a situation where you changed somebody's opinion about the SCAF?
M: Through Social Media?
I: Yes, and with Kazeboon.
M: I don't know…you know its not like a switch, its more like a process. So unless its somebody 
that you live with, that you see everyday and you see how the thoughts are developing its not 
something that you see, like oh I convinced this guy…But f. ex once I was sitting in a café with a 
friend of a friend who was anti-revolution, and he was like: Hey we should calm down and the 
SCAF are good people and so on and by the end of the conversation he was like okay maybe early 
presidential elections would be a good idea
I: Do you have any close friends that you completely disagree with?
M: No…these people I am no longer friends with. Because what is happening now in the revolution 
and especially the violations of the military and so on, I believe it is no longer a political stand it’s a 
stand of humanity. There is no way I would understand a (fight-watcher?) or killing people.
I: Unless you can then change their minds…?
M: Yeah….actually a friend of our changed his mind…during the 18 days of the revolution we had 
this really big fight on Facebook. We were offending each other and cursing each other and our 
friendship was broken. Then a couple of days later he answered me on Facebook, and said sorry I 
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was wrong and I don’t know what  And then after the 18 days, and after the… he is Christian, and 
he feared the islamists more than anything, and it is understandable yaani…he was more or or less 
pro-SCAF and he would rather have military dictatorship than islamists getting to power and he 
would not agree with bringing down the military rule. A few months later,  with the violations of the 
military he would go down with us to Mohammed Mahmoud to throw rocks at the military. So it 
was really nice to see him going from having these horrible arguments to actually stand side by side 
and throw rocks, spraying vinegar in our faces and getting hit by teargas and rubber bullets
I: Do you know what made him change his mind?
M: the violations. I think it was Maspero, especially for Christians Maspero was the moment. With 
Maspero they realized, okay mashe we are facing not only military dictatorship but a racist regime 
as well. They were willing to crush people over with tanks so Maspero was the moment when the 
copts wet on the revolution side.
I: Were you a part of that?
M: No I was not there, I went a later on after the massacre and it was horrible devastating.
Mohammed's friends Maandi joins the last part of the interview.
Maandi: And they already established. One was in Germany when all the lines were cut and we 
couldn’t really communicate through mobiles, there is no mobile network working. You find one 
person that you follow all the time and you establish this…you know…I trust this person. I think 
Mohammed, in my network, was probably the one you trust with news – so you know, this place is 
safe, here is a problem happening and so on.  And this is how you get together. So when this person 
comes back you just like – its not like I  am flattering the guy or anything. I know a lot of friends 
who changed their minds because of those people who were actually willing to help that much nd 
do something positive about it. 
I: Did you ever trust someone and follow, and then found out he was wrong and unfollowed?
Maandi: No, I don’t know…I am very skeptical by nature. So I check everything I hear, I find 
different sources. I don’t think I have any incidents of following people and then found out that they 
were ….. But some things you know for a fact not to follow. Like the muslim brotherhood f. ex, you 
know from history that they are manipulating
I: Do you ever follow somebody that you disagree with?
M: No…I cant be bothered honestly. The other side is ugly, its not a difference in opinion, I would 
follow an islamist is saying, but I cant  listen to people against the revolution justifying torture and 
killing – its too much for me to handle.
Maandi: While you are in a cap you can argue, you can always argue with cap drivers and  people 
you are stuck with not by choice, and I always believe that no matter how strong people seems to 
feel about their opinions, you can always try to convince them. It gets very tiring very exhausting, 
But  I have had some incidents…I have been taking caps for around two months now…and there 
are always people you can talk to.. A lot of Egyptian people, they just follow what they see on the 
news which is most of time wrong, but you give them proofs that this it not the case, that this is 
what actually happening….
M: there is something you might find interesting about the Kazeboon and the entire street 
movement and the use of social media,  using social media and so on. There are things that the 
government cannot understand. One is how fast things are happening with social media  so how fast 
everything goes and two how decentralized the movement is, they have no understanding what so 
ever how things can be decentralized. They have been used to power structures like pyramid 
structure and orders. They do not understand that the revolution is a decentralized peoples 
movement. I remember once SCAF were sitting with Baradei after the Mohammed Mahmoud 
incidents, and they explicitly told him to tell his people in the square to leave, and he said I cant I 
have no power over them! They have no leader they do what ever they want. And on 25 of January 
the protest… they were facing the police and so on …and they moved really really fast and the 
police could not keep up with them. They said f.ex we will meet in Mohammed Mahmoud a two a 
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clock, and a two and one minute they were gone. So people would come for the protest and then 
look on Twitter to see where they were, and people like me who were abroad could constantly 
follow on Twitter where the protests were going and we would send them messages, oh you have to 
go this place you have to go that place. We were collecting people together and the police were not 
as fast, people gathered in the Tahrir because of this, because the police was not as fast as sms, 
twitter and Facebook.
And again with Kazeboon, they couldn’t do anything about it except some people trying to attack 
the screenings, but because it as moving so fast and so decentralized that they had nothing . How do 
I stop a decentralized movement? I don’t know? How to stop 14 events from happening 
spontaneous at the same time? You cant…. And this is the beauty of it this is why things like this 
work, and this is the lesson, with every initiative we make we try to do it as decentralized as 
possible to make it work. Cause if it has a center you can attack the center. This is the beauty if a 
campaign like Kazeboon.
I: I have a feeling from driving n taxis with friends discussing all these things, that there is an open 
mind and a willingness to change opinions among the people….how do you see it?
Maandi: But who do these people represent from the population? How many are willing to change? 
I mean…a lot of people  are not really well educated and they only have access to state media, 
which is not really enough. So…I don’t know..I n cairo in this area there would be a lot of the 
people that you are talking about, but in the rest of Egypt I don’t think social media has any effect…
So its kind of a ..a bubble.
M: Its not that it is a social media bubble, the general problem is whether it is a social media bubble 
or an activist bubble…the activists understand the role, they believe that they could in a way 
mobilize the masses, and this is not what they should do. What they should it is one: Keep being on 
the oppositions side at all times, no matter who the government is you are always on the opposition 
side being a pain in the ass for the government and the regime, and two: You keep creating these 
initiatives, like Kazeboon f.ex, you keep creating them and sometimes you go for a protest and you 
fin a 100.000 people with you and sometimes you are only ten and go get beaten up and arrested. So 
its almost like a stunt, you keep checking whether this stunt works or not and one day people will 
actually mobilize and they do, and when the street movement actually picks up different roles are 
automatically created and they have to be filled. People who have to talk to the media, people who 
know how to very quickly get tents, get food and so on. And its always the activist that have 
experience who will fit in these roles. And this is what people get disappointed over sometimes, 
they think their role is much bigger than it actually is. This i not your role, and its impossible 
anyway to create what you are fighting for, if you think a small community on twitter can create 
another revolution – this is not gonna happen! And its not your job, just keep creating these small 
initiatives where people actually move see where you can fit in the game.
I: Thank you so much
M: I hope I was helpful….
Interview with Amjad in Cairo, April 20, 2012
A = Amjad
I = Interviewer
I: You can really find,  like one video showing something and then very different ideas of what is 
actually going on, if it is manipulated or if it is no
A: absolutely, absolutely
I: so that is what we are trying to write something about
A: fair enough, cool
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I: Mashi
I: and tell us when you need to go
A: alright
I: and we will not use your name, not because you do not want to, but we are not using any of the 
names
A: shoot
I: so, Kazeboon, what is your experience with, how do you know Kazeboon?
A: I have attended a few of their.. not demonstrations in the sense of riding or like doing whatever 
in the middle of the streets, actually demonstrations where they had big screens and projectors and 
they showed as lot of videos and they cross-referenced a lot of the statements from before from the 
SCAF you know the Supreme Council Armed forces and some of their later statements, some of 
what they said they will do and some of what they actually did. And it was all very well 
documented I personally believe that it had a lot of impact on the people that watch it, some people 
that were very anti revolution and pro-SCAF pro the old regime and when they saw this, wow, we 
never thought it was like that.
I: so this, so actually to the screenings people show up, they know what the messages in the video 
is, but the do not agree in it, but they show up any ways
A: sometimes, a lot of people showed up because their friend were going, a lot of people showed up 
because they did not even know about the event. They (Kazeboon) chose very very highly 
condensed neighborhoods that have a lot of people and then I mean as a human race in general we 
are very curious people and as Egyptians in particular we are extreme curious, so you will be sitting 
in your living room at some point and then all of sudden you will look outside from your balcony 
and you are like ten thousands of people who are watching something on a screen, you are getting 
involved at one way or the another, and you are going to check out what is happening and you will 
realize wow, I did not know this, these guys are really evil so again they played on the curiosity, 
they played on a lot of social medias in matter a fact and it is spiral? Because the first one was a 
really really big success, and it actually received a lot of media coverage, and then the next one was 
even bigger and the following bigger and so on and forth
I: and where was that screening that you went to?
A: I went to the one in masaken Sheraton? They had one over there and I went to the one in Nasr 
city, they are the two I have been involved with
I: okay, so, and you, sorry maybe you said that, but you got to know about all this like through 
Facebook, or...
A: Twitter
I: through Twitter
A: yeah, through Twitter
I: because you know the people involved or because this
A: no because of some my friends that learned about it, and they posted stuff about it so I found out 
about it, that is a thing with social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter, you do not actually 
need to know the person that is doing something you just have to know one person who is involved 
and it is just like a cluster it spirals as spider web and that is how you figure out most of the stuff, 
because you can not be in touch with everybody, and you can not be on top of every source of 
information, but you can be on top of one or two persons in each domain and they feed you with all 
the news that you need to know
I: yeah, so the way you use social media, you use Facebook and twitter mostly or how
A: yeah , yeah, I mean a lot of, it really depends on where you are in the world, some countries have 
a tendency to be more twitter based, some countries have a tendency to be more Facebook based, 
personally I like twitter more, but a lot of Egyptians like Facebook more so you have to be involved 
with both so you can actually get the information you need.
I: and the way you use it now is that different from the way you used it like before 25th of January, 
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like the revolution?
A: absolutely, absolutely
I: did you use it back then?
A: yeah, I did, before the revolution Facebook were one of those things or twitter were one of those 
things  like you log on five minutes every three or four days and like check, Oh my friend sneezed 
five minutes ago, yeah! Or my other friend like you know, they are debating whether they should 
break up with their girlfriend or stay with their girlfriend. It was just like an escape for like five or 
ten minutes every three or four days and that were pretty much that. Right now you log on 
Facebook or twitter for like five times an hour, because things are moving so fast, there are a bunch 
of information circulating constantly and a lot of opinions of pretty credible as well non-credible 
sources being circulated about each particular topic, so it is become your source of information, 
especially with the fact, bear in mind, that the amount of people that actually trust government 
sources in terms of TV or media, like mainstream news is very little, I do not trust any single word 
that any government affiliated news agency produces whether written news like in a newspaper or 
radio based or TV. They have been lying for the last 30-40 years they have flat out lied on their 
faces? 06.32? throughout the revolution and they continued to do that as well and now
I: but then when you see something on Facebook or Twitter how do you know that it is not actually 
created by somebody from the government who figured that out, that people do not believe that, so 
now we are going to put it on Facebook and people believe it. How do you choose what is credible 
and what is not?
A: again, it really  depends on who is posting it, I mean whether through twitter or Facebook there 
is always to each post or to each status update or to each whatever, there is always the person that 
uploaded this, and you get to choose based on that and you get to make your assumption if this is 
credible or not based on that. The people I follow on twitter, the people I check the references of or 
those posts of on Facebook are people that are.. again I can not be one hundred per cent certain but 
they are people that are credible whether they are political activist, bloggers, writhers, TV 
presenters, media affiliated people, whatever, they are people that I trust and I have seen 
consistency in their work, I have seen credibility to what they say, I have seen their statements for 
the last, about year and a half now and it is constantly the same so, they are more trustworthy 
people, and I  feel a lot more comfortable trusting them than anybody else, but then again, you 
sometimes.. even they make mistakes and I make mistakes. Everybody makes mistakes and 
sometimes somebody posts something and you believe it and then two days later you realize that it 
was complete false, so it does happen, but if you choose the people you follow as sources properly 
you should not have that problem too often
I: yeah, so that is how you select your sources?
A: precise, I mean, whenever someone posts anything, and this is why some sources are more 
reliable than others, personally I never posts anything unless it is my opinion then I do not have to 
validate it, I just want to say my opinion. Like for example if I write a status update something like, 
“I hate SCAF” that you do not really need to substance it that with a whole bunch of evidence . but 
whenever I posts something about something that happened, or an interview or whatever, you 
always site the link of the article or the video or the youtube broadcast or whatever. You always site 
the reference from where you got this information from and if constantly your references are in 
order then you should not have any problems
I: sure. But you have experienced... Do you have like a concrete example of  if you watched a video 
for example or something and then you have later find out that it was manipulate, so a source that 
you thought were credible but  it was..
A: actually yeah, that just happened yesterday
I: really
A: like yesterday. There was a very interested video on Youtube, where the title of the video says, I 
can not really remember the name of the person, but the title of the video says, that xxx person 
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campaign manager for presidential candidate Hazem abu salahs gets kicked out from a TV-Show. 
So you watched it and this guy is a ridiculous excuse of a human being I mean he is doing things 
and saying things that no mammal should be allowed to say, so I repost that one. Then one of my 
friends, and this is a good thing about having a lot of friends that you like you know are credible 
people and are on top of things they get to jump in save you and covers your butt. To seconds after I 
posted it, one of my friends got in touch and like, that guy are like a Hazem Salam Abu Ismail fan 
and he is a lawyer and he was involved with the campaign as a participant but he is definitely not 
the man in charge. And I was like, fair enough, and I immediately removed the post, reposted it 
again like, this is a fan, not the campaign manager. Sometimes it happens.
I: that is the beauty of the network.
A: yeah, yeah.
I: great. Just to go one step back to the Kazeboon thing. The screenings that you went to. Based on 
the videos, did they create debate or
A: yes absolutely. The thing is with Kazeboon, as well as other initiatives they do  create a lot of 
debate once they are actually on the ground. You got initiatives like Masrena, initiatives like 
Kazeboon and a lot of initiatives, when launched they presented a new perspective and they are 
very very well prepared. For example one of the things that like you know, used the revolution like 
a spring board and spiraled into like a local maybe not international but a local epic stardom was a 
man called Bassem Yousef. He started a small youtube show in his bedroom somewhere, he 
produced 7 episodes, but they were so well prepared and he did his homework very very well, 
everything he talked about were backed up with a lot of sources and references and everything and 
he did this comedy show of ten minute per episode, that spiraled into instant viral on the internet 
and right nor he has the most successful TV show and he is labelled the John Stuart of the middle 
east. Similarly, his videos now that are still being produced on Youtube as well on the TV, they are 
spiraling a whole lot of debate, whenever people are watching it they are like, oh I did not know this 
and yes this is how it was and blab la bla and it spirals a lot of debate between people similarly with 
Kazeboon because and again with Kazeboon maybe more so because they are not in it for the fun or 
for the comedy, they are just in it to demonstrate one key point: the SCAF are liars.
I: yeah
A: That is it. They lied here what they said, here is what they did, here is their statement from 
before and here is their statement from now, so when it is that well prepared when it is all 
documented when it is all provided with video, you know videos are a lot more difficult to 
manipulate than articles, they prepared it very very well and a lot of people started debating because 
of it, a lot of the people that were pro revolution in their arguments with people that were anti 
revolution now had a lot more ammunition, now had a lot more arguments to present. A lot of the 
people that were anti revolution did not know all this stuff and then when we were faced with it 
they realized, wauw we were misguided so of course it is going to start a lot of debate
I: yeah, and is it still as relevant as it was before, I mean is it going strong. It seems like it had its 
high time
A: yeah it peeked I think because at the time as Kazeboon was Launched the country were truly 
split as a matter a fact there were more people that were pro SCAF and thinking that SCAF were 
good descent human beings that were saviors of Egypt and then there were people that believed 
they were liars, but now with the last six to eight month having gone by more and more people are 
realizing whether through Kazeboon or other initiatives or just trough the reality of things that the 
SCAF are as a matter of fact lying bastards, so at the end of the day now there are not so much a 
need to present that SCAF are liars, because pretty much everyone knows it by now, I am not saying 
that everybody believes that, but now the majority believes that as opposed to the minority.
I: yeah…
I: you said this about choosing sources and you said it was your friends and they are credible, is 
there specific ones that you always follow
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A: oh yeah absolutely, particular writers, particular bloggers, TV presenters and media affiliated 
people, one of my favorites is Bilal Fadl he is a writer, Alaa al aswaany, sometimes Ibrahim Issa 
although I don’t really like his opinions but these are credible sources,( laughing ) so they are 
particular people like parliament members like Omar hamzawy, motaz ebn al Fattah,  or not 
necessary parliament members but these people are very very credible sources, they have stuck to 
their word, for example doctor Baradei, former presidential candidate he is now constructing a new 
party. Those are sources I follow on a daily bases, and I see what they are talking about and what 
they are doing, initiatives like Masrina and like Kazeboon, like mahaliyaat all of these are very very 
powerful initiatives and movements, 6 of april movement for example, like you know grassroots 
movements and initiatives that are very very credible and you know what you are getting from them 
to a very very high percentage probably very credible and true, so yeah of course there are 
particular people that I follow on a daily bases
I: it is so amazing to sometimes read about how the reality can be or how one certain event can be 
like portrait in so many ways or mostly like, you know in so different ways, like the whole history 
with the girl with the bra in Tahrir in December, and the whole discussing about if it was 
manipulated or
A: December or January, yeah
I: mmm, it is just something we have been talking a lot about, it seems that there is so many 
different perceptions of what is the reality right in Egypt now
A: of course. Because you have to understand that you are talking about social media, which is an 
incredible powerful tool, like quite the most powerful tool right now, however in a country like 
Egypt were you got 85 million people living, according to different estimates the amount of internet 
users from those 85 million people is anywhere between 7 to 10%, from the 7-10% that are using 
the internet, less than half are using Facebook and twitter. So we are talking about a pool of 4 
million people in the span of 85, we are talking about less than 5% of the population are Facebook, 
twitter or social media users. So you will find, and unfortunately and this is very very true, you will 
find that there are within the realm of social media are enclosed in their own bubble, and they are 
having their own argument online but there is a complete world out there that constitutes the bigger 
majority if Egypt, that have no access to these things and not interested in these things and they are 
getting there news from completely different sources that are incredibly manipulated, so..
I: and somehow it seems like these people in this bubble tends to  like forget that they are in this 
bubble, I think one of the things about Kazeboon is that they actually go to the streets and reach out 
to the people that are not in this bubble
A: absolutely, absolutely.  I mean I love it when I see people o Facebook running these question 
polls of whether, like who are you going to vote for for the presidential elections or who are you 
going to vote for for the parliamentarian elections, do you think the SCAF are liars or not? The 
results are so not even close to representing what the Egyptian people, is like I mean it is a 
completely tampered and very very biased voting poll  you cant really crate a credible poll based on 
what people say on twitter or Facebook because at the end of the day, these are like 5% of  a general 
majority of 85 million that thinks very very different thought and that have very different opinions. 
While it is a great source of getting you information and news especially when you need to have it 
very very quickly, you no longer have the time to sit in front of the TV skimming  through 30 
different news stations  for four hours to get tree or four pieces of news. Om Twitter or Facebook 
you skim trough your timeline and there is all the news that you can possibly want so it is a great 
source for that but most certainly not a source, maybe in other country yes, but in Egypt it is 
definitely not one of those sources that you can rely on to represent the Egyptian opinion or 
direction the thought of the Egyptian people. So a good place for news but not a good place to 
represent Egypt through.
I: this is an interesting point. Great. Thanks…..
A:  what was the first thing the government killed? It was not the TV or the Radio, it was the 
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internet, because they realized that people were organizing through tweets and it was not done 
before, it was freaking new to the world, how you can use such an open and public platform and 
create different hashtags, and different groups and pages that connect people and you can actually 
start moving people around like on a chest board through Facebook. Movements were moved 
around and strategies were build, people where having quick discussions and came up with 
decisions and actually implemented them on the ground through tweet. People were organizing 
resources and everything were happening on the internet.
I: that is amazing.
A: and at some point when people stopped tweeting you started, oh shit, they were arrested, they 
got killed or they were shot
I: and people like started asking about each other on twitter and who saw him, and call my friend. 
Really amazing
A: Any rumors will go viral on social media, but again if you have trusted people that you follow, 
and you always check with them, like whenever I see a rumor I go like wait a second, so I go check 
with them, if they did not post anything then it is probably false, if they did post something then I 
will stick with it. 
Interview with Yusef in Cairo, April 17, 2012 
Y = Yusef
I = Interviewer
Y: so the whole conversation i just about Kazeboon now?
I: yeah and you of course, your activism and...
Y: okay I'm not an activist.
I: your use of social media, we're interested in young Egyptians use and and then we use the 
Kazeboon campaign as an example or a way to examine...
Y: well there a more stuff like... the revolution has started with a group - an event created by the 
group “we are all Khaled Said”
I: there are so many groups...
Y: yeah but its the most effective one, because it's the most famous because it's based on the case of 
Khaled Said, I hope you do know about the case and how it goes.
I: yeah.
Y: So it was a big shock for most of our generation because it’s simply the idea of “now they can 
come and kill you” (...) and what made it more challenging is that the ministry of interior was 
defending the two police officers (...) They said that Khaled Said was smoking hash and when they 
came he swallowed the package and it got stuck in the throat.
I: yeah they made a lot of stories about it, really interesting. And the interesting about it is how 
some people actually believe these stories, of course a lot of people did not believe it, but this is 
also interesting: how do people believe this and why do people not believe it and?...
Y: I can way the the general point here is that we have two medias: the official media and the 
alternative media - so the whole case is about the struggle between the two medias and the effect in 
the people. During the whole time the effect of the official media was clear on the people because 
there wasn't an alternative media, because at that time that was not internet, Facebook or any other 
source of information, so the sources were based in television and new papers. And till the end of 
the 20th century the state was controlling this stuff, so they got the information they want you to 
get. Toy cannot find the truth.
I: and what do you the alternative media as Facebook and Twitter, what do you think they did 
different and what was good when they came?
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Y: (laughing) they come with a change now.
I: did you start using social media more after the revolution or?
Y: no before that.
I: before that. But I mean did it increase or did you use it at the same level before?
Y: after the revolution it really increased - especially now you got - even in this media a kind of 
struggle, because now the regime has understood the danger of social media and how it really 
effects on the people. especially the young who have Facebook accounts and stuff like that, so they 
managed to create counter groups.
I: but there was a lot of groups before the revolution as 6th of April and all these groups, but under 
the revolution and after there was a lot more...
Ahmad enters the room and we present ourselves and speak informally in English and Arabic. 
Yusef explains him about our project in Arabic and Ahmad tells about Kazeboon in Arabic.
Y: I will get back to what I was talking about before he came - I was speaking about the official 
media and the alternative media through the social network and the internet and the independent 
newspapers like Egyptian today, Al Misr Al Youm... so the idea as we said that there was this 
control from the regime on the media, and then when the alternative media have appeared it 
expands as an idea of another source to get the information. Especially when the people started to 
figure out that there is a big difference between what the regime is saying, it's representing Egypt as 
a paradise and that the person is “a source of wisdom in our life” and bla bla bla shit you know 
that...
I: then they saw another story?
Y: yeah, what you really believe in is a big problem, so you start to figure out that there is a big 
space between that and that. So we need something to express what we are really feeling. So thats 
why people started supporting the alternative media and stuff. So is started with these independent 
newspapers at that time and the opposition newspapers and later with the expand of the internet and 
sites like Facebook and YouTube, it became not just a way to know the news, but also to express 
your opinions and to share opinions with other people.
I: it does two ways.
Y: And to find people who share the same interests and the same hopes on a different Egypt. So it 
became affective, at the 6th of april it was also started by a girl - she published the idea of “lets have 
a general strike on this day and that will be against the regime”. So at that time many people got 
influenced if this and the involvement in that and it was effective at that time. (...) also of what the 
regime had worked on through the official media there are representing like the people who are not 
going to work they wouldn't do general strike, the citizens have refused the cause for this media and 
stuff from Mubarak and stuff like that. And of course they were using the police against any 
manifestations happening that day. But of course it expands more after that, so we got the 6th of 
april and Baraday, you heard about Baraday. So the idea of coming here and announcing that he’s 
looking for to be a candidate in the presidential elections.
So these what a big fight between how the official media represented Baraday and how the 
alternative media presented him. There was a struggle between the two parts and how it influenced 
the people. So in general at time I was hearing people that were supporting Baraday as the idea of 
“we need someone else, we don’t want Mubarak anymore”. At that time it was planned to 
appointing his son as president. so the idea os “we don’t want Mubarak and his son, we need a good 
alternative, Baraday. So some people though of him as a good alternative, that he could be a 
president”. And some people think we want someone, but not Mubarak. Other people said Baraday 
was in an atomic agency and that he spent most of his time outside Egypt and doesn't know about 
us. That was what the official media was representing - as him having a bad influence on egyptians 
(...). They try to represent him in official media on the idea of that he’s married a jewish of christian 
guy - there were rumors at that time that his wife is not egyptian and not wearing the hijab. And 
Baraday is in CIA and trying to ruin the country and make Egypt like Iraq.
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I: so all these rumors...
Y: it's not even rumors, the official media were representing that through all the papers and all the 
channels. That was incredible because some people get influenced by that, even my sister is 
believing that Baraday is american and supporting the american agenda. He’s not really like - he 
was facing Mubarak and that was the way Mubarak tried to fight Baraday because he cannot do that 
politically, he use a durty way and until now he still succeed because of course Baraday he had his 
role and his part in the revolution, but still... the people are still having the influence of all that the 
media has represented, and it will take time to overcome that.
I: in this process how did you use the social media in all this, like during the revolution?
Y: concerning Baraday or concerning the revolution?
I: more later in the revolution.
Ahmad starts speaking in Arabic, Yusef tells about him being a member of “We are all Khaled 
Said” and about the campaign, that the role is this group was to represent the alternative story, but it 
is difficult to hear because Ahmad is speaking in Arabic in the same time.
We decide that we continue the conversation at two different tables in order to hear both Ahmad and 
Yusef.
Y: the whole conversation I was doing about the official and alternative media, it’s not just about 
that time before the revolution, because it goes on after the revolution, and even during the 
revolution itself. So as a group “We are all Khaled Said” was an alternative media for all the lies 
that the official media is representing with this case, so Kazeboon worked on the same idea, but it 
includes what the military was doing.
I: not only the regime, but the SCAF?
Y: yeah because the official media are representing like that the soldiers are defending themselves. 
They don’t start to shoot, and like when they do that they only use sticks or teargas that's it. They 
don't use cartouch with rubber bullets (...)
I: I saw the poster with a soldier standing with a baby, it really like, when you see it like...
Y: there's a message too. And they are accounting all, the case is not only representing that. They 
are also trying to represent what the protesters are doing that it’s like against the army, not against 
the SCAF. The army is the only thing left in Egypt as the police has collapsed from what happened 
in the revolution. So if you brake the army you brake the country. So when you represent it that way 
to start making the people afraid of the idea of not even speaking about the army, but to speak about 
the revolution. (...) so there is still more people more involved in that. So the good thing about the 
Kazeboon is like to get out from the internet to be in the streets in communication with people, that 
was a good thing for me.
I: for people who don’t have internet access?
Y: exactly. Even the campaign itself it’s trying to work and be in places where no really... in the 
rural zones especially.
I: yeah because it's still a minority in the country that has even internet.
Y: Yeah. So for me I knew about the Kazeboon from the Facebook page “Kazeboon”, and of course 
in this Facebook page you know about the news of the shows they are doing and asking the people 
to join because they are counting to have a huge amount that doesn't force anyone to to beat... try to 
beat them by force, they need a kind of protection, so some shows didn't work well because when 
they started doing the shows some people started to yell and to throw rocks and stuff like that, so it 
didn't work well, and some worked well.
So for me I live in Mohandeseen, so there was a... my friends who are more active and really 
political activists they started to talk with me about the idea to do Kazeboon shows in 
Mohandeseen. Mohandeseen is supposed to be a rich zone (...), but the people there are middle class 
and they are still neutral. They are not supporting the revolution and they are not supporting the 
SCAF.
I: they are not active in any?...
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Y: yeah, they are more concerned of “I have my work and I have my family and I have my home”, 
so stay away from all that and it’s okay. So the idea of presenting the show for them is really...
I: make them have an opinion?
Y: yeah, it wasn't easy really. At the first time we managed to do that... now any activity after the 
revolution is just an event on Facebook, so everybody knows about that. So we got something 
special in Hohandeseen, because we got the revolution side, for me and my friends and all the 
activists, and we also got the regime supporters and Mubarak supporters.
I: okay so you got like both... were you audience at this screening or were you part of arranging the 
screening?
Y: well I was part of arranging the screening.
I: and then in the audience there was both pro SCAF and against?
Y: in showing the screening no. It’s about the preparation, because when we do the event the regime 
supporters get news about that, and Mubarak supporters. So they do have a place to ruin that. So the 
first time we managed to plan that we planned that in their square, it’s Mustafa Mahmoud square in 
Mohandeseen, a famous one, so thats were the first gathering of Mubarak supporters were, the first 
time they got here - so it’s like you are in their room.
I: and you come there and show?
Y: so we were planning for making a gathering of all the activists in this square an then start to 
make a march around Mohandeseen and settle the screen and the projector and start the show after 
the demonstration.
I: okay after the demonstration or?
Y: after the demonstration, but the problem was that when we started the gathering Mubarak 
supporters knew about that so they started to make problems with us. They started to throw rocks to 
us, so it started to be dangerous. At that time in the gathering there were more girls than boys, so we 
started to get afraid about the girls, like “Hey let’s start to move in the march and stay away from 
them”. And then we didn't manage to make the show because of the idea of getting afraid of like 
they can attack us where the show is going to be, so let’s just have the march today and we plan 
another time for that (the screening).
So it didn't work the first time, but the second time we had more precautions because during the 
revolution and with the police withdrawal there was the idea of public committees. These public 
committees like, people are living in some place and they manage to know each other and to 
organize defense and the supplies for the place at the time during the 18 days of revolution. As there 
is no police everybody were afraid from the attacks, so there was a public committee in 
Homandeseen, a public committee in Maadi, and so a public committee in most of Cairo and the 
places where there was curfew and army at that time there was a public committee to help the 
security of the place because there’s no police, so nowhere to count on catching (...) so how can we 
defend ourself against a thief or someone trying to kill someone.
I: yeah.
Y: and it worked... I think it worked much better than the police.
I: nice, that's good...
Y: So the good thing about that like... of course most of the public meetings were just... it’s like by 
accident. Because of what happens the people go down on the street and organize themselves, but 
some other committees started to be more like... to be more active after that. It’s not just about 
security, it’s about the (...) to get supplies and... so we got Mohandeseen and we got Zamalek and 
then close to Zamalek there’s Meetoba’a, you know Kit Kat square?...
I: no we came two weeks ago, so I only know a little bit.
Y: so it’s close to Zamalek and on the other side there’s Meetoba’a, so we managed to be in contact 
with the public committee there, like “we need you to secure, we’re going to have Kazeboon show, 
and we’re going to do it in Sphinx square and we need to secure it from any attacks where the were 
having the knives and stuff like that (...) So we tried to make it more planning like... we managed to 
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secure the place even before the show starts. We will announce that the show is at 7, but we will 
start to be there like 6.30 trying to secure and to figure out if there’s Mubarak supporters or not.
I: so actually you try to do the screenings more for... not for Mubarak supporter, more for people 
that don’t have an opinion or that are pro?
Y: yeah
I: okay. Because I was interested in maybe it was also the purpose to change the opinion of those 
who are pro the regime... but it’s more difficult...
Y: we are hoping that but just to show them, when you just show them that they start to figure out 
okay....
I: they start thinking about it?
Y: Yeah, “the army are doing that really?” thats not what the media is saying, so when they started 
to think of, okay it’s real, the army is doing that with that... so we were counting on that and it 
worked some way. Especially at the time... Kazeboon its like... it’s more started in the clashes of... 
in the clashes of December 2011, at that time. And that was before the big demonstrations we 
planned to have on the 25th of January. Not the first, but the second one.
I: yeah the second 25th, the year day...
Y: yeah, and at that time the official media were representing the conspiracy of burning Egypt and 
you know... attacking the banks and stuff.
I: aah really okay...
Y: so Kazeboon should work with the idea of, no we are not planning to attack or we are not 
planning to burn, it’s going to be just demonstrations. But they are against SCAF, and SCAF are 
afraid from us. So they managed to do all they can do for that.
I: yeah they try to make like, people don’t believe in like...
Y: yeah and I can see Kazeboon’s really effect goes on with a huge amount of people who shared 
in... who participate in this demonstrations. So it was a big success for Kazeboon.
I: because it’s spreading information to people who maybe wouldn't themselves try to get the 
information?
Y: Yeah.
I: Okay. Did you have experience with like, talking to people about the campaign or something and 
making somebody change their mind or having another opinion or did you ever experience that?
Y: No, I was just working on the idea of planning. Planning and securing at that time, especially at 
that time of Sphinx square and dealing with the the public committee... and what time it was just my 
role to be standing to be standing on the bridge watching if someone’s coming.
I: you had a different role?
Y: yeah, so I wasn’t with a people trying to get their opinions. 
I: okay. But do you think the campaign changed the opinion of many people?
Y: Yeah. I’m sure about that. And even the stuff... the show you can find it on the internet. And of 
course some people started to go to Tahrir square to figure out what’s going on.
I: because they saw videos and then...
Y: it’s like, you get more against the SCAF, more protesters and injuries, so the families of the 
injured people started to be involves more. It’s started to expand.
I: but do you think the social media plays a role in this process? Like of getting people on the streets 
and... how do you think it’s playing a role or do you think it’s an effective...
Y: for social media?
I: yeah in all this process and people coming to the screenings and going on the streets, do you think 
the social media play like a role in this process and people start using it more?
Y: Yeah. it’s having a big part in that, it’s not having a 100 per cent part. If I can make a percentage 
I can say it’s like, it’s really effective like 60 per cent which is a huge percentage. Thats a big effect.
I: its really amazing...
Y: of course people like there are more ways to communicate with people there is like for example 
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like this Friday there’s going to be this million march or this million gathering in Tahrir square on 
the 20th of April.
I: yeah I heard about it...
Y: so of course the social media and social network is having it’s part on publicity for that and also 
the... all the political movements like 6th of April or like... the Muslim Brotherhood of whatever is 
like, they have the papers, like statements of papers...
I: flyers?
Y: yeah, speaking to the people about that there is this million march, it’s also some of the effective 
things they are working on. 
I: so I’m also wondering... for example when you get information about the 20th of april of stuff 
like that, how do you select the sources you use, like the ones you trust... how do you select them 
and how do you know which like, you know?
Y: it depends, for me as Yusef because I’m involved in the revolution, well I’m not an activist, but 
like I’m involved in that since the days of “We are all Khaled Said”, so it’s like “We are all Khaled 
Said” is one of the important episodes for me and also during the revolution there are many pages 
related to many political groups, so like... I’m counting to be a fan of these pages, so when they 
share something I got it...
I: so you always get the news?
Y: Yeah.
I: it’s just because there’s so many different... like how do you chose you trust this or or?...
Y: well it came by time, and at the same time I started now to be more... I’ve started to be thinking 
more neutral, or I hope I can do that... so it’s not just be a fan of the pages which are supporting the 
revolution, but I try to be also a fan of the pages who are against the revolution, so I can also 
understand their point of view. Or how can they discuss the same case by their point of view. 
I: yeah, okay that’s interesting.
Y: for example the case, Khadije was speaking about video of the girl with the blue bra, so I gather 
videos which are showing what happened and I got the videos from the regime supporters and how 
they were (...) they try to be focusing on some things like the idea of when they started to take her 
clothes of...
I: yeah I’ve seen it...
Y: a soldier was trying to cover the girl, so like they focus on that, and there was that soldier who 
beat the girl he didn't wear military shoes, he was wearing a sport shoe or something. So they make 
a remark on it like, how that could be? A soldier in the army wearing sport shoes?
I: so they say he’s not a soldier?
Y: yeah. They start to say it’s fake.
I: so you always try to see like both interpretations to get your idea of what’s true?
Y: I’m trying to show it to me friends like, okay look how they think about that, our point of view 
about that, so we can have our way to defend that.
I: yeah, you know their arguments, okay. Do you have any friends or do you know people who have 
like totally different view on for example?...
Y: yeah (laughing) my family.
I: so how...
Y: well my family is like, they are following the official media. 
I: okay yeah.
Y: Well even the official media have started to make some tricks, like there was of course the 
official television by satellite they got some channels like some old channels during the regime, like 
they are criticizing the government, but they are actually with the regime.
I: aah really? so they like pretend that they are...
Y: exactly.
I: or like against or critical but then?...
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Y: exactly.
I: but then it’s impossible to know like what to believe?
Y: yeah. But that was a kind of channel. There was also another channel, it started to be more like 
criticizing news. For me I do trust a channel is OnTV, because like they try to be more like 
representing what’s really happening. And they are supporters of the revolution, so okay...
I: so do you trust them because they support the revolution or because of the way they... like how do 
you know? Because maybe they support the revolution but maybe they still show things that are not 
true. How do you know how to trust this channel for example?
Y: well, it came by experience because of the coverage of all the acts.
I: you know what to look for?
Y: yeah, well it comes by time, it’s like... it came by time and to figure out the coverage of these 
acts, like for example: for these days of the clashes of December 2011 with the acts of the girl.. 
especially the acts of the girl we see how a channel like OnTV is representing that, I’m talking 
about that. How another channel which is, like a recent channel it’s called CBC started be more 
influencing the people, because it’s like they are not saying they are with the regime, but they have 
this game of sending messages through small things. 
I: Okay, so you compare the two different like, ways of showing or interpreting?
Y: so the trust here comes from the long time I have saw this and saw this and how they have 
covered the news. The funny thing about CBC it’s like, they were showing some news before it 
happened!
I: wow...
Y: That was extremely...
I: They can look into the future? (laughing)
Y: like during the clashes of December 2011 it was (...) the prime ministry’s office a place is like... 
they gather samples of all books, so they set it on fire. Nobody knows where they come from, they 
set fire on it. So the CBC have announced that the place is on fire one hour before it happened!
I: so maybe they were...
Y: yeah, so that’s “okay I wonder now how you know about that?”
I: how do you know this, yeah okay.
Y: but of course when they set fire on it, all of course the CBC is like receiving from everybody like 
“Egypt is burning, on no Egypt stop that”. You now this... all people get afraid from that. So for me 
as I’m in the street and I am involved in the clashes and I saw it happen, so you can imagine... I 
came from that and I have to face my family’s idea of “your burning Egypt, you’re ruining the army 
and stop that and like”.
I: and you can’t believe how they have a totally different?
Y: Yeah, I’m making discussion but it’s not easy to do that with them, because that’s their source of 
information. 
I: of course they trust this...
Y: yeah. 
(I speaks Danish with Khadije about the time remaining)
I: I was thinking of one more thing... it’s about this videos, you’ve seen many videos that were 
manipulated or that was manipulating the truth?
Y: yeah.
I: okay but how do you react when you see this? I know you’ve talked a little bit about it, but what 
do you do and... maybe it’s a silly question.
Y: you’re speaking about manipulation it which side, like with the revolution side or with?...
I: that could be both, like...
Y: it’s because you start to figure out the game of revolution it was just Mubarak and anti-Mubarak, 
so that was more simple than now. Now it becomes... under the name of revolution there are many 
political movements that are manipulating the people that are supporting them, because you are 
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supporting the revolution.
I: it’s not one?...
Y: yeah, and there is many points of view. There is the islamists' points of view, there is the liberals 
point of view and there is the socials point of view, and each point of view is different. Especially at 
that time, in this last months there was many kinds of manipulation. It was manipulation of the 
muslim brotherhood, the idea of idea of dealing with the SCAF to be sharing with them the 
authority or control of the country by being members of the government. They are saying that 
enfavors the revolution, meanwhile socials and liberals they don’t have... they are manipulating the 
people in the idea of what the islamists are doing, they are traitors for the revolution, because they 
are dealing with the SCAF, so no support neither to SCAF, neither to islamists. You support us, 
because you support the revolution. So you start...
I: there’s so many... that’s why it’s so interesting like, how do you (...) come around with all this 
different information and know what to believe and what not to believe, you know, it must be 
really...
Y: well I’m doing a kind of manipulation too, but in favor of compromise between all the political 
powers, because that’s what I believe mean now.
I: You think it’s better to stay together and compromise?
Y: Yeah. Well but at the same time to face the facts, like there are people who do have their interests 
like SCAF or the men of Mubarak’s regime who are still not in prison or businesssmen and stuff 
like that. So all these people they have their interests and they try to do manipulation in the idea of 
“help the country and we need stability, we don’t need anymore change in the revolution”.That’s 
affecting the tourism and it’s affecting the country, so undercover of that they hide the idea of we 
are keeping their interests. We harm it if the revolution really starts to be effective in making laws, 
getting the rights to poor people. So we going to have this kind of struggle, it’s many instruments, 
so the social media here is one of the instruments.
I: is it to change people’s opinion or?
Y: yeah.
I: it’s interesting. It’s still like “the revolution is going on”. 
Y: yeah, well all the possibilities exist now. There’s possibilities of clashes and possibilities of 
compromise, but it’s the big issue really. We are talking now that many people planning on clashes 
and many people planning on compromise and people in the middle.
I: and now there will be the elections...
Y: yeah.
I: okay, I don’t have any more questions, but it was really interesting to hear.
Interview with Ahmad in Cairo, April 17, 2012
A = Ahmad
I = Interviewer
While interviewing Yusef, his friend Ahmad who was also sitting at the coffee shop joined us.
This interview was carried out in Arabic, since the informant could not speak properly English. 
A: “First time I heard about Kazeeboon. Walked at “dal3et harb stree” and saw a lot of people and a 
big screen. This was the first time I was introduced to Kazeboon. Then I walked up to some of the 
guys standing next to the projector and offered my help if they needed someone to help with the 
movies. And then they called me. I first criticized them a lot. Since they were only showing the 
movies in upper middle class areas, and a lot in the AUC. These people are already against the 
SCAF, we need to get out to people without access to social media. So this were only in the 
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beginning. Now they reach a lot of villages, and that is what I really liked about Kazeboon.
Examples: 
The case about who Maspero where the SCAF violated a lot of people. The media did not show the 
true story, and rumors were carried on, about the activist as the bad ones. But I saw it with my own 
eyes, so I posted a lot of tweets about it, and told people that I was there personally.
Another example was when the (NDP) building? were burned. They (news, SCAF) said that the 
activist were behind it. But everyone knew that it was not. Because if it were us, then the building 
would not have been burn from the top? Right? So they did a lot of these stories under the 
uprisings/rev.
“Girl with the blue bra”- the reason why people believed in the rumors about this story were 
because of the mentality of these people. That a girl should not demonstrate. So Again that depends 
on the social class.
Example: 
Maspero 7 people.  “Sometimes you need to check the sources or the story. Once there was a tweet 
about a big demonstration at Maspero, and I of course went there, but there were only 7 people.”
A: “I used Twitter before the revolution, but of course it increased under the revolution, I especially 
used it when there were big demonstrations and everything were blocked, and people did not know 
how to get away. Then we tweeted about emergency exits.
Cyberspace/virtual world Vs. Real activism on the street: “too much talking, not so much is 
practiced any more. People are having their revolution on Facebook and not on the streets anymore. 
Something that came so fast as the groups on social medias disappears as fast as they came. “if you 
see something happening you should go to the streets instead of being alive on cyberspace”.
A:“The revolution did not succeed because of social media, it were there the last couple of years, 
for example with 6. April but Facebook and twitter was the medium.
Source/credibility – Tweeter: 
Followers. Credibility in number. Not a specific person. But the ones who have a lot of followers 
and that are known for having credibility by being active.  He check up on the story or news, by 
looking at others tweeter, and calling friends.
V-for-Vandetta! – he compares the revolution with the movie.
A: “We made the revolution possible, not the west… Please write it down, this is important”. 
Interview with Wael in Cairo, April 24, 2012
W = Wael
I = Interviewer
I: When did you hear about the Kazeboon campaign?
W: I am a member of an organization called youth for justice and freedom and after the incident 
with the girl they undressed (with the bra) we had a meeting talking about how the mainstream 
media portrait the incident and how they totally manipulated the story, so instead of talking about 
how big this incident was they talked about what she was wearing. And I saw the picture of the girl 
in a newspaper and a headline saying “Kazeboon” (liers) and then we suggested creating a 
campaign called ‘Kazeboon’ and I actually came up with the idea of the cap as the logo
I: oh so you were actually there from the beginning?
W: yeah, we were sort of some of the founders
I: and when was this?
W: this was when the (ahdas magles al wezara went on) precisely the day after the incident with the 
girl, I don’t really remember the date but it was at that time
I: Kazeboon were also active on social media, how were you active? Did you also participate on 
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social media platforms?
W: We used social media as a tool to reach out to certain people precisely the youth, but we did not 
only wanted to reveal the lies of SCAF on the Internet but also on the streets.
I: yes I heard that you reach to a lot of areas in all over Egypt?
W: not every place, but I was for example coordinator for south Cairo in the beginning it was like a 
movement but with the reaction of people, it then was open for all, this is not campaign or 
movement of anybody, no one owns it. If anyone wants to arrange a screening they can, our only 
aim was to show that the SCAF and the media are liars. We entered a lot of areas and also areas 
were we usually not go to, or would dare to go to, like some villages, but when we entered and had 
a screening people were really touched, but of course SCAF did not make this easy for us, they 
fought us in many ways, by beating us, or not letting us in in some areas.
I: is there any screenings right now?
W: no right now there is not so much going on, especially not on the street but Kazeboon are still 
active on social media
I: Can you tell us how the campaign went on and how the screenings were done?
W: yes, the great about it is that it is so simple,  you only need a projector and the video and a place 
at the street. The thing we do is that we show SCAF saying that they didn’t fire anything, and then 
we show a video where they are shooting, or the media telling a lie, and then showing exactly how 
they are lying by showing something that does not fit with what they are saying.
W: we showed pictures of people they are calling baltagheya (criminals), people who are surely not 
for example a big mufti from Azhar or an ordinary boy from Ein shams university, but they called 
them that because they are against the system.
I: how did people react to the screenings? did anyone change their minds after participating in a 
screening?
W: Yes surely. I think that the Kazeboon campaign is the most succeeded campaign I have ever seen 
or heard about. When I was to the first meeting about Kazeboon, I never thought it would reach this 
far. But people were really affected by seeing the violence from SCAF, it touched them and people 
got to see with their own eyes who were the Balthagheen and what is the truth and what it a lie. So 
people were very affected in many ways,. This campaign was really affective from October to 
January, where hundred of thousands of people marched all of cairo yelling “yaskod, yaskod hokm 
al 3askar”, I never imagine that this would happen, but this is because of Kazeboon and their focus 
on the military.  So for example when we had a screening in Helwan, where I come from, which is a 
dead city, especially when it come to politics, people got so affected that we ended up having a 
march with about 3000 people. This campaign really succeeded in reaching a lot of different people 
and with the information that we intended to spread. There were of course people who did not 
believe us, and who fought us in many ways and cursed us, but I will say that 70% of the people 
were positive.
I: you talked earlier about social media, and how it was used as a tool in the campaign
W: as some of the tools. Or actually the most important tool. Facebook and twitter where there 
before the revolution and we also used it before to get people to be more political active in different 
organizations, but of course even more when the uprisings came, especially to mobilize people in 
the age 18-30.
I: how was your personal use of social media before and after the rev?
W: I was actually very political active before the revolution as well, so it did not change so much 
for me. I would say it was more a social platform were I stayed in contact with friends, and today it 
is more a political forum or a place to mobilize people and my use increased after the rev because 
before there were not so many political active Egyptians on Facebook and Twitter and today there 
are millions… if America would have known what Facebook would be used for, it would have 
killed the one who made it, haha (laughing)
I: did you ever experience that a video or some news was manipulated or a lie? Some rumors?
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W: yes..of course, any place in the world you will find rumors. For example there were rumors 
about a big demonstration at the ministry of defense and it turned out to be nothing. Sometimes we 
do not know where the information comes from, it can be the military.
I: the military?
W: yes, or sometimes just someone trying to spread news very quickly without being very sure, so it 
sometimes ends up being not true.
I: in your opinion, how big are Kazeboon in the minds of people and how far has it reached?
W: the campaign almost reached out every city and every capital of a mohafaza, so for example in 
Cairo, all cities of cairo and for example Tantaa because it is a city in south, and in Alexandria, all 
cities of Alexandria. And we were planning to do a week only for villages.
I: ah, and did you manage?
W: no unfortunately, because there were so much going on and then Port said happened, so we did 
not have the chance unfortunately. And then we planned to do other Kazeboon screenings, for 
example about the economic situation in the country, where they blamed it on the revolutionaries 
and we then wanted to show that, no this has nothing to do with the revolution but with the system, 
so Kazeboon developed to not only being about the military but also other things about the 
revolution and the system that were a lie.
I: you talked about rumors, how do you select your sources? And what is true and not on social 
media?
W: when people are writing something on Facebook and Twitter I either know them or know 
someone who knows them, or I trust them.  So if it is something that comes from some of these I 
trust the information. And if it is someone that I do not know, then I check with other people or 
check if there are a lot that are sharing the same information. But most of what I read is true, of 
course not all of them, but I follow people I trust. And then there is information you just cannot 
trust, as “Mubarak died” these kind of information are 90% always false.
I: Have you changed anyone’s view on SCAF through Kazeboon?
W: I did not have so much contact with people directly. I was mostly in charge of the events and 
talking about the videos. Sometimes I discussed with people that came to see the videos. They 
agreed that the SCAF were liars but they kept stating that if we totally remove the military there 
will be chaos in the country and therefore they did not think that we should be against SCAF, but 
they still agreed with us on that the SCAF are just at new Mubarak if not worse, so yes I talked a lot 
to people and maybe affected their views.
I: is there any screenings in the near future and what is Kazeboon doing now?
W: there is a lot of screenings right now but not a Kazeboon screening. Right now the focus is on 
the elections.
I: what do you think is the reason why Kazeboon had so much success?
W: firstly it was because we reached a lot of different cities and areas that was not that involved. I 
don’t know if I am a bit too romantic, but people were really affected by the incident with the girl 
(with the blue bra), in Egypt we say that the carrot broke (bæret flød over) people had enough and 
this incident were really the last thing they could take. People were thinking, how could the army of 
our country, every small boys dream do this to our people, to our girls.  This and the fact that we 
went to so many different places and that we stood together and did were not afraid of anything, all 
this are reasons for the success of Kazeboon. Another really important thing is that the campaign 
did not have a leader and that it was owned by everyone and for everyone. The fact that it did not 
have a leader that they could break, so therefore they could never break the campaign. These are the 
most important things I think and of course that the things we showed were very credible. And of 
course people were tired of always hearing about that it was not the SCAF but a third part
I: third part as who?
W: The US and Israel in cooperation with some from the country. People were tired of hearing such 
rumors. They are not stupid to always believe that.
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I: you talked about that Kazeboon came out after the incident with the girl, but was it now there 
before that? After the Maspero incidents?
W: Kazeboon focused on a lot of things and on Maspero but the idea started from after the situation 
with the girl.
Interview with Mariam in Alexandria, April 29, 2012
M = Mariam
I = Interviewer
I: How many are involved in Kazeboon in Alex?
M: No number, it's so spontaneous. People download the material from the YouTube channel of 
Mosireen and make screenings in different venues.
The first screening was after the Blue Bra girl in Cairo in front of the Northern military Zone. The 
movement in Alex is of course not as organized as in Cairo, but it is well known.
The Kazeboon is the only way to access the mainstream media. The only tool is the street. The 
movement is based very much on interpersonal relations, as a start Rasha Assab ( an initiator of the 
campaign) distributed the material to her friends and further the material was distributed at the 
screenings.
There have been several screenings in different venues, and Mariam knows that outside Cairo there 
have been screenings in the Delta and in Mansoura but apart from that she doesn’t know.
There is a new initiative called Manshuba focusing on economic and social issues also using the 
strength of the video – people believe their own eyes much more than they believe something they 
read.
There have been many incidents of clashes at the screenings. Sometimes fights and debates other 
times screens have been smashed.  Several times Mariam has experienced that people have changed 
their ideas about the military and the activists after attending a screening and having a conversation. 
According to Mariam this not only happens as a consequence of watching the documentations of 
violence, but also just from getting faces on the activists. There is a pertinent idea of the activists 
being crazy young people not respecting laws and just making Egypt suffer, but at the screenings 
the audience can see that the activists are not thugs but ordinary young people and not only 100% 
activists, but also just people who supports the campaign by organizing one screening – and 
someone who were before against the idea of Kazeboon have agreed on joining the next protests.
Kazeboon is strong because it is showing videos in full length, in the mainstream television they are 
always cut.
Now the focus is moving away from military violence. It is difficult to argument to hard against the 
SCAF while no violations are actually carried out…and any argument about a lack of development 
would be easy to counter by saying that the military is busy preparing elections. The focus is thus 
moved to election, and campaigns against the Muslim Brotherhood and the parliament. This 
contains visual documentation of looting, stealing and it’s a visualization of their ideas.
Credibility: 
Most of the time the active Kazebooners in Alex have the video produced by Mosireen to use for 
the screenings. And if not, they download material from YouTube. Either from the YouTube 
channel of Mosireen, well known activists apart from that  it is not too difficult to evaluate which 
videos are true and which not. In Mariam's case she is often present herself at the important events, 
and can therefore see for herself in the videos are true, and secondly, its pretty easy to guess from 
the cutting and the angels.
Untrue information on Facebook: Just the other day there was a footage from events supposedly 
taking place in front of the Saudi embassy, but it  showed out to be in Mohammed Mahmoud – 
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somebody wanted to create a non-existing story…This is undermining the whole revolution and it is 
a problem! It is being and have been in many occasions used against them that false information has 
been posted to run a story…to create a bad image of the activists.
Use of social media:
In 2008 the 6. of April movement started to mobilize people and this was one of the first examples 
of Facebook being used as a platform for that. Now the use of Twitter has increased, and this is now 
the mostly used tool to mobilize people. The number of users of both FB and Twitter has increased 
within the last year, citizen journalism is playing an ever more important role and e.g. in the 
organization where Mariam works, Sandara, they have citizen journalism workshops. Eg. the went 
to Abu Kir (semi-outskirt area in Alex) and produced and screened videos about social and 
economic issues in this area to make people aware of this. This project has created a kind of internal 
media, and the some of the people attending the screenings have created local independent 
initiatives about the issues. The next phase is to make workshops in how to write about these things. 
There is a great interest and curiosity in general in the community about a project like this.
Twitter: 
Mariam is writing political statements on Twitter and her opinion about the situation in Egypt. 
Recently, maybe a month and a half ago, Twitter launched an Arabic version, so that it is now 
possible to Tweet and create hashtags in Arabic – this has opened new opportunities of outreach. 
Mariam knows several friends whose mothers have created a Twitter account. They are not so 
active, but use it as media to follow what is going on., and for them the Arabic version of Twitter 
has made a big difference. A year ago you would hardly meet an Egyptian young person having a 
Twitter account who don’t know English, but since the number of users has increased there are 
definitely users who know Facebook and Twitter but not English.
JUST remember: Social Media is no way replacing street activism. This is the most essential ever 
ever. People were mobilized b these media, but from then on they were out there risking their lives!
Interview with Kamilah in Cairo, April 24, 2012
K = Kamilah
I = Interviewer
The interview was done both in English and Arabic as the informant Kamilah didn't speak English 
that well. The writing in italic is the translation of the Arabic.
I: You have been a part of the Kazeboon campaign?
K didn't understand the question
I: You have been active in Kazeboon?
K: not usually, not always. But I know, I know how they work. I know their work and I know 
persons in the movement who are very active.
I: have you doing anything active in the campaign, have you posted a video or worked in the 
campaign? Have you done anything in the campaign?
(She misunderstood the question)
K: we get information through the TV and the President and the people in charge don't say true 
information to the people. We say the truth. We collect in the group information true and say to the 
people this is true in our country, and the government don't say that we say that to people and we try 
to….we use photo and we do show and we connect with people, we show this photo and video for 
them.
I: and you were also active in the movement?
K: yes
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I: How?
K: In my place I call people and tell them to come and see this photo and video.
I: And you also put up the screen and stuff like that?
K: No I'm just talking with people
I: and spread the word?
K: yes, and explain the idea for them. I sit with any people and talking for this idea and I tell them 
to see this. Because they sometimes don't watch this and they think we are liars. I talk with them to 
explain that we are not liars. The Liars are the government not us. And with time they believe us 
and help us in our idea, this idea is now in every place in this country and everyone believe us and 
ask me and anyone in this movement about any information.
I: when you call people, you call other people in Kazeboon?
K: Yes
I: okay, and you contact your friends?...
K: Yes
I: …and tell them to come?
K: yes
I: how long have you done this?
K: 6 months
I: do they have screenings now?
K: what?
I: do they have shows now?
K: now no no. We do this in the last…we have been doing a lot…now we don't do anything, but 
maybe soon we will.
I: maybe with the election?
K: maybe yes
I: so there are no shows now?
…she turns around and asks her friends Hossam who's being interviewed by Khadije and I at the 
table behind us.
K: not now but soon maybe there will be.
I: how did you know about Kazeboon?
K: from my friend on Facebook
I: okay, he send you something?
K: yes, and they have a page on Facebook and there are many people in this page who watch the 
videos and photos, At the page you can see the videos and the photos.
I: why did you become active?
K: what?
I: why were you active?
K: because I want my country to be better and I want to see everything be beautiful in this country 
and they lie to and don't tell us the truth. We try to contact people and tell them that there's 
something they don't know about this..because in this country people (…) and believe anything you 
tell him, the government not true. We try to send true information to the people to choose anything 
in this country after they know we know the truth. When they know the truth about the country they 
choose the right thing.
I: and the movement play an important role?
K: not this movement alone. There are many movements in this country. They try to connect with 
people and explain to them what is…we try to give them knowledge about our country, we want  
them to know the truth, so they can choose right.
I: have used social media a lot in this campaign?
K: what?
I: have you used social media in the work of Kazeboon?
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…she misunderstands
K: no, we use the Tahrir Square, and Facebook. Because most of the media is owned by the 
government not us (…) we show what's in the street and the people (…)
I: okay you used Facebook, Twitter and YouTube?
K: yes
I: did you ever film anything with a camera and put it…gave it to Kazeboon?
K: this videos is in Facebook, everything we show is in this page (…)
I: so you also filmed?
K: no, everyone…we don't film only the…but we no
I: who record the videos?
K: sometimes we, sometimes we see this video in the place, in different places and we get this video 
and show it in another page, and sometimes some people send us videos and photo. Sometimes we 
are present in the events so we film with our mobiles. But not everything, we don't film everything.
I: is there anyone who cuts the videos and put them on the internet?
K: the admins of the page
I: there's an admin?
K: yes
I: is it one person or is it…
K: noon, I think there's many because if someone is not, there's someone else there.
I: and all of them are volunteers?
K: yes, they are all volunteers
I: so you think that everything that Kazeboon put's on the internet is true?
K: yes. Okay, I want to say something. The movement there's many persons organizing this thing 
and explaining the idea, and this idea is present in all places in all municipalities, different persons 
who are not part of the movement, they use the idea and make videos. Can you understand?
I: yeah, so there are people not part of…can you maybe try and explain it again?
K: we explain this idea to people. Sometimes some people love this idea and they do like us, and 
show photos and videos in their town.
I: when you go to the internet and you want to find a true story…
K: again?
I: when you use the internet, how do you choose which story is true? or which is not?
K: people they send videos and photo and the information we get from…we ask sometimes for 
some information and sometimes…document, we show this document in these photos and 
sometimes the photos and videos show the truth. We don't say, we show, show the videos and the 
photos and people decide if this is true or not.
I: so it's up to you to see if it's true or not
K: yes
I: do you think the Kazeboon has..the way they include all people, everybody can join Kazeboon.
K: everybody what?
I: it's possible for everyone to…(tries to say 'join' in Arabic)….to join.
K: aah, join! yes, I think they know some information they don't know this information before we 
show this information.
I: do you think the Kazeboon has reached a lot of people?
K: yes
I: how…do you it's important that they also have done shows?
K: what, again?
I: do you think, it's important that they have also done shows?
K: yes, we will done this in the future and we will say the truth…we will always create the shows 
until…we get, we make this country better and beautiful, we will do this.
I: do you how big Kazeboon is? do you know how many people who have seen videos? do you 
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have an idea?
K: in the page 100.000 in the page on Facebook. But in the street you can't know because…
I: but do you know how many cities who made the shows?
K: every city in this country
I: really?
K: yes
I: and do you know if people who go to the shows in the streets…do you know how they react to 
the show?
K: react? reaction?
I: yes, reaction
K: sometimes they believe us but sometimes some people don't believe us. But most people believe 
us, and they say we are good people.
I: has the focus of the Kazeboon campaign changed? (tries to explain the question in Arabic) In the 
beginning the most important thing in Kazeboon was to show what the military did…
K: I can't understand, can you explain in English?
I: They wanted to show the truth…
K: who?
I: Kazeboon. They wanted to show the truth about the military, what they did?
K: what is the meaning of 'military'?
I: military. The truth about the actions of the military.
K: we show about the military, and about the government and police men and everything liars in 
this country. Not just the military, anyone who doesn't say the truth, we try to show the truth to 
people.
I: and now, do you show videos about the politicians in the government? what do Kazeboon talk 
about now?
K: in this moment we don't make things, but if anything…
I: I've seen at Facebook that everyday…
K: yes, any person send to us anything and he want to show this and we believe it's true we show 
these videos and photos, but not something…it's not something we have to do.
I: do you use Twitter?
K: Facebook
I: when you. Do you have people on Facebook where you trust them more than other people?
K: okay, again?
I: do you have friends on Facebook…if they put something on Facebook you know it's true?
K: yes, sometimes
I: but do you have special sources you go to if you want to look for information?
K: the page We are All Khaled Saeed, many pages, many pages on Facebook say the truth, not just 
the Kazeboon, many pages.
I: you have specific places you look?
K: yes, We are All Khaled Said, (…) anything about the revolution.
I: can you maybe tell me what you do, what's your job?
K: I'm studying, I make master in politics. Political Psychology.
I: do you have a job?
K: yes, I do but now I don't work. I have exams. But after this I'll work.
I: and can I ask you how old you are?
K: yes, 25.
I: Have you met people trough Kazeboon? do you have friends that…
K: yes, many people and many friends.
I: do you have friends that don't believe what Kazeboon is saying?
K: yes
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I: have you tried to change…?
K: yes, but they..sometimes their farther and mother work in the military, but they are my friends 
what can I do?!
I: But have you talked to them about this and discussed it?
K: yes
I: and what do they say about Kazeboon?
K: they don't believe because they think that the military says the truth, because some families work 
with them (the military).
I: but do you think that the Kazeboon has changed the idea of some people?
K: yes, yes
I: okay, so it is possible
K: and we will try more
I: so it is possible
K:yes
I: thats good. What about your parents? do they believe in the military or you?
K: me
I: but have they changed? in the beginning did they believe in…
K: my uncle doesn't believe me but my father and my mother believe me.
I: from the beginning?
K: no, in the beginning they said, why are the military liars? 'no they tell us the truth' but I explain 
and explain and I show them photos and videos. Sometimes they believe me and sometimes they 
don't.
I: but do you think that…there's a lot of people putting videos on Facebook, do they all tell the 
truth?
I: no, sometimes we see something that's not true and we don't show it. We show what we believe is 
the truth. Photos and videos that show this.
I: how do you know if something is true or not?
K: videos and photos. We know if this is the truth or not, if it has been photoshopped. We know. We 
look at the videos and the information and ask many people and we talk with our friends. If we 
know yes this is true we show it and if it's not true we don't show it.
I: and you…do you tell your friends to send videos to their friends?
K: yes
I: so they spread the videos to a lot of people?
K: yes and we make these videos and these photos in our page and many people take these videos 
and photos and they show them to people. Sometimes we don't know takes them but we are very 
happy to see our idea in the street.
I: do you if the idea is outside Egypt as well?
K: what?
I: do you know if the idea…are the videos shown in other Arabic countries?
K: no, in our country Egypt. We don't know if this idea is in other Arabic countries. But we know 
this idea in our country and many municipalities many people show this idea.
I: how big is the group of admins? do you know? is it 20 or 50 or is it more?
K: in the page on Facebook?
I: no the admins, the people who cut the videos?
K: maybe, but some change, because the idea…anyone believe this idea and want to work in this 
idea 'you're welcome'. We are not just some persons, anyone who believe us and wants to work with 
us are welcome.
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Interview with Marwa in Cairo, April 21, 2012
M = Marwa
I = Interviewer
Marwa is boycotting the election, will not vote. Believes that SCAF will not allow anyone who's 
against them to take the presidency. The candidate that she prefers is not going to win anyway.
She rarely use Twitter now because she doesn't like the wipe their anymore. Before people were 
fighting for the same case – putting down the regime – but now they are fighting each other because 
of the coming president election. Several of her friends have depressions now because of the current 
situation, where everybody fight each other instead of standing together. The unity feeling is gone.
Credibility:
She gives the example of the girl with blue bra. First people saw the picture and many said it was 
photo-shopped but they changed their mind when the video came out – then they could believe that 
it was true. There had been accusations of photo-shopping because the military-guy who was 
stepping on her stomach was not wearing the right military boots.
Yes, rumors spread on Twitter ! she did not believe it until her trusted sources had posted it - 
trusted friends (Gigi Ibrahim, 3rabawy, Zenobia or newspapers: Al-Suruq).
When they have huge number of followers on Twitter they must be trustworthy why else would 
people follow them.
Some Tweeps only show up when big events happen, to criticize the activists and then disappear 
again. The name of their twitter accounts will be send around with a warning that these are not 
trustworthy.
The ones she trust the most are those she met or knows offline. Some Tweeps she followed as they 
tweeted from the square and later met them by coincidence.
Kazeboon is not active now, but before they did a good job.
She believed everything she saw from Kazeboon. The videos had been shared so many times so it 
must be true.
Egypt is not Twitter, and that's why Kazeboon was so good because it came to the people without 
internet.
Her family is pro-SCAF and she has not been able to convince them otherwise: her mom will not 
realize what SCAF has done, and she is in the 'denial state'. Fx with the incident with 'the girl with 
blue bra' her mom was asking why she even went to the square. Her dad admit that SCAF is doing 
these things but he believes it's the best solution for the country.
Many from Nasr City are 'fuluul': pro-SCAF and the old regime.
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Annex 2. Interview guide
! Introduction questions about background: age, education, experience with activism
! How did you first know about Kazeboon?
! Have you been active in the campaign?
! Online or at screenings?
! What role did you have?
! We heard that there’s a group editing the videos and information from Kazeboon, do 
you know who they are and how they work?
! Which elements do you think have given the campaign success?
! How do you think it affects the campaign that there are no leaders?
! How do you use social media?
! Did you start using social media differently after the revolution?
! Have you ever felt a direct effect on someone through your use of social media?
! Why do you think Kazeboon is a credible campaign?
! How much do you think the campaign reaches and affects people who don’t agree 
with the message?
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